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Abstract
The crisis in Burundi began when President Pierre Nkurunziza declared that he would
pursue a third term despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s Constitution. Opposition
parties along, with some members of President Nkurunziza’s own National Council for
Defence of Democracy, Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), argued that
President Nkurunziza’s decision to extend his rule beyond the maximum two-terms was
in direct violation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement, also referred to as
the Arusha agreement, signed in 2000. This action triggered opposition parties and civil
society groups to organize peaceful protests to challenge President Nkurunziza’s third
term bid. In response, government forces and Imbonerakure youth militia coordinated a
campaign of repression and intimidation. The country of Burundi is characterized by
political violence, targeted assassinations, and accusations of torture and rape by both
government forces and armed opposition groups. The purpose of this study was to
examine how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the
perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Understanding this
phenomenon is extremely important because the recent hike in violence among
Burundians has negatively affected the peace and stability of the nation. Through a
mixed-method case study approach, the study’s main findings indicate the significant
fracturing of citizen perceptions of peace and stability along identity lines, significant
fear and insecurity among Burundians about the current crisis, as well as the continuing
impact of the long-standing violence in the country’s past. Keywords: presidential term
limits, conflict resolution, political violence, term limit manipulation, qualitative case
study, and quantitative survey.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Problem Statement
Leadership change through presidential term limitations have generated unrest
and violence across the African continent. It has been argued that two-term limits foster
checks and balances and promote political stability by enabling a change of guards and
serving as a deterrent to presidential abuse of power (Kiwuwa, 2013). Many African
leaders, however, have bypassed or opposed term limit mandates in their respective
constitutions to stay in power. When this phenomenon became a problem in many
African countries, the consequence of term limit manipulations sparked a wave of
protests, violence, unrest, and uncertainty, as seen in Burundi.
The Burundian crisis began on April 25, 2015 as a result of President Pierre
Nkurunziza’s desire to pursue a third term despite the maximum two-term limitation in
Burundi’s Constitution. President Nkurunziza came to power in 2005, when he was
chosen by Parliament to serve as president after the end of the twelve-year ethnic civil
war (1993-2005), which claimed an estimated 300,000 lives. President Nkurunziza and
his supporters, including members of the Imbonerakure youth militia, trained and armed
by the governing National Council for Defence of Democracy, Forces for the Defense of
Democracy (CNDD-FDD), maintain that he was elected by Parliament in 2005 as part of
the Arusha agreement and not by direct universal suffrage. Hence, they argue,
Nkurunziza’s third term should count as a second term (Armed Conflict Location &
Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2014; Siegle, 2015;
Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vandeginste, 2015).

2
Along with some members of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s own CNDD-FDD,
the opposition––National Council for the Restoration of Arusha agreement and Rule of
Law (CNARED)––argued that President Nkurunziza’s decision to extend his rule past the
maximum allowable two terms was in direct violation of Article 96 of Burundi’s
Constitution and out of compliance with the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement,
also known as the Arusha agreement. The Arusha agreement was created in 2000 after
prolonged dialogues that were spearheaded by former Tanzanian Presidents Julius
Nyerere and South African Nelson Mandela. Opponents of President Nkurunziza further
contended that the Arusha agreement should trump Burundi’s Constitution or that the
Constitution should clarify the Arusha agreement (Ahluwalia, 2016; Nantulya, 2015).
The Arusha agreement is a framework that ended the civil war and a series of
violent conflicts. Its purpose was to usher in a power-sharing government, to provide
checks on presidential power, and to promote political stability. Secondly, the Arusha
agreement was implemented to ensure that no specific ethnic group could comprise more
than 50% of military and security services. Both the Arusha agreement and the
Constitution also prevented any ethnic group from occupying more than 60%
representation in cabinet positions and in diplomatic and consular assignments. Thirdly,
the Arusha agreement was a coalition building and a conflict resolution mechanism.
Lastly, the Arusha agreement integrated former combatants into new, cohesive, and
representative security forces. That is, the new national defense force would include 60%
officers from the former government army and 40% who were former combatants
(Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Daley, 2006;
Hatungimana et al., 2007; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015; Siegle, 2015; Thomas-
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Greenfield, 2015; Vandeginste, 2015).
While the conflict in Burundi centers around term limit manipulation, issues of
identity seems to be dominant. Given Burundi’s history of conflict, Burundians are
concerned that the conflict could reignite the already fragile ethnic division between
Hutus and Tutsis—the country’s two major ethnic groups. Additionally, acts of violence
such as sexual harassment, rape, and torture are common in the current conflict. Human
Rights Watch (2017a) and Amnesty International (2017a) have reported violence directed
against women by government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed
opposition groups increased since the conflict began in April, 2015. The report further
noted that some security forces and Imbonerakure youth militia raped women in front of
their families while arresting a male family member. Much of the violence appeared to
have been directed at family members of alleged government opponents. The report
concluded that sexual violence seemed to be used as a means to claim power over
individuals linked to opposition parties or groups. In such instances, violence against
women is used to send a message to perceived opponents (Human Rights Watch; 2017a;
Amnesty International, 2017a).
President Nkurunziza’s decision to manipulate the Constitution, violating the
Arusha agreement, triggered unprecedented demonstrations by opposition parties and
civil society groups to challenge his third term bid. In response, government forces and
the feared CNDD-FDD Imbonerakure youth militia coordinated a campaign of repression
and intimidation against opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid. The group
was accused of political violence that targeted opposition members and members of civil
society groups. The name Imbonerakure, which means those who see far, originated from
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the native Kirundi dialect, and the group emerged from the same disbanded militia as the
ruling party (Nindorera, 2012; UN News Centre, 2015).
The former United Nations (UN) Human Rights Chief, Zeid Raad al-Hussein,
claimed that his office began “receiving consistent testimonies indicating that
Imbonerakure members operate under instructions from the ruling party and with the
support of the national police and intelligence services, which provide them with
weapons, vehicles and sometimes uniforms” (UN News Centre, 2015, p.1). The
repression and intimidation spiraled into violence following a failed military coup d'état
in May, 2015. After the failed coup, the crisis escalated, with security forces and armed
opposition perpetrating more violence. Despite pleas from regional organizations and the
international community to postpone the July, 2015 election until the crisis was mediated
and peace and stability returned, President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party held an
election. The election was boycotted by opposition parties, the UN, the African Union
(AU), the European Union (EU), and the United States, all of whom rejected the election
results due to their lack of credibility. This crisis led to the deaths of an estimated 1,155
people between April 26th, 2015 and April 25th, 2016 and to the displacement of over
300,000 refugees fleeing abduction, violence, and torture (Armed conflict Location &
Event Dataset, 2016; Ahluwalia, 2016; Siegle, 2015; UNHCR, 2016: Vircoulon, 2015).
In addition to circumventing Burundi’s Constitution and the Arusha agreement,
opposition parties and civil society groups feared that President Nkurunziza was
preparing to eliminate constitutional presidential term limits completely, allowing him to
contest a fourth term in 2020. For instance, the National Commission of the InterBurundian Dialogue (CNDI), tasked with finding solutions to the deep political crisis,
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revealed that a majority of the Burundians consulted “support the suppression of the
presidential term limits and stand for the amendment of the constitution” (Uwimana,
2017, P. 1), and President Nkurunziza suggested that the “will of the people is above the
judiciary” (Fraser, 2017, p. 2). The majority of CNDD-FDD hardliners welcomed this
report, as most of them supported eliminating presidential term limits. In juxtaposition,
Jérèmie Ngendakumana, spokesman for CNARED, contended that “Burundians are not
calm and not ready for the amendment. They are gripped by fear following the murders
observed on a daily basis, kidnapping cases, forced disappearances, [and] arbitrary
arrests” (Uwimana, 2017, p. 2).
In recent developments, President Pierre Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD party
loyalists sought constitutional amendments that would allow Nkurunziza to rule Burundi
until 2034. The May 2018 referendum, it was feared, could trigger further deadly
violence (Kaneza, 2018). Recommended amendments in the referendum included a
change of the current constitutional limitation on presidential terms to two durations of
seven years each, a change that would allow President Nkurunziza to stay in power for
two additional seven-year terms (Johnson, 2017). Any attempt by President Nkurunziza
to eliminate presidential term limits could create another intractable conflict,
destabilizing the Greater Lakes Region.
ACLED (2016) stated that the conflict in Burundi claimed about 1,155 people
between April 26, 2015 and April 25, 2016. Of this number, at least 690 of the reported
dead (roughly 60%) were civilians. Furthermore, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that the number of refugees fleeing abductions, violence,
and torture in Burundi exceeded 300,000. Over 180,000 Burundian refugees crossed into
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Tanzania, over 81,000 into Rwanda, over 42,000 into Uganda, over 18,000 into the DRC,
and over 1,700 into Zambia (UNHCR, 2016).

Figure 1. Burundian refugee exodus. Note. Thousands of Burundians who have fled to
Tanzanian territory on Lake Tanganyika, using an old ferry that can carry a maximum of
600 people. © UNHCR/T.W. Monboe.
A 2016 Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) report suggested
that many civilians who opposed President Nkurunziza’s government or the ruling
CNDD-FDD who were looking for a better life throughout the Great Lakes Region
became victims of the crisis. Similarly, Siegle (2015) implied that the exodus of refugees
to neighboring countries occurred due to fears of mass violence and the threat of a return
to civil war. As Burundi finds a solution to the current conflict, the upcoming May 2018
referendum to amend the country’s Constitution could jeopardize the East African
Community (EAC) inter-Burundi dialogue and exacerbate violence further. Many
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observers are also worried that the proposed changes to the Constitution could prolong
the longstanding ethnic tension between Hutus and Tutsis.
An initial review of the literature indicated that a lack of checks and balances,
weak government institutions, electoral malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of
punishment were key motivating factors for some African leaders to extend their grip on
power. From this conceptualization, the main purpose of the study emerged: to
understand how conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected
perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Understanding this
phenomenon is extremely important because the recent rise in violence among
Burundians negatively affects the economic conditions, as well as the peace and stability,
of the nation. The other purpose of this study was to use conflict resolution approaches
and analytical theories to expand research into and knowledge of circumstances of
political violence in Africa, particularly in Burundi. The proposition that guided this
study was that the impact of presidential term limits manipulations on peace and security
in Burundi would differ along ethnic lines but not differ significantly along gender lines.
The goal was to provide findings that would add new theoretical standards and provide
recommendations for assessing future conflicts associated with presidential term limit
manipulation.
Historical Overview of Burundi
A key feature of the political structure of Burundi is the more than four decades of
on-and-off intractable conflict over control of power, resources, wealth, and economic
opportunity, as well as a history of inequitable policies between the Tutsi minority and
the Hutu majority. Burundi’s population constitutes three main ethnic groups: Hutu
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(85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%). Historically, Tutsi ethnic groups have held power,
dominated the security forces, and controlled the education sector. The Twa people were
viewed as second-class citizens and had little role in the political and economic system.
For the majority Hutus, these marginalizations affected every aspect of society, causing
them to develop resentment toward the Tutsi minority. It is important to note that
animosity between the Hutus and Tutsis in the region started during colonialism. The
divide and rule approach that the Belgians established for dealing with indigenous people
gave rise to the ethnic division between the Hutus and Tutsis, as it allowed Tutsis to gain
higher levels of education, enjoy more success, and seize and consolidate more powerful
positions than the Hutus (Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Uvin, 1999).
As far back as 1962, when the country attained independence from Belgium,
ethnic conflict has overshadowed most of Burundi’s history. Violent conflicts in 1965,
1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 claimed hundreds of thousands of Burundian’s lives (Daley,
2006; Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015; United Nations Security
Council, 2004). Burundi’s beleaguered past was a critical factor contributing to the
current crisis. In April and May of 1972, an uprising headed by Hutu military officers
against the Tutsi government of President Michel Michombero broke out in Burundi. In
response to the uprising, the Tutsi-led government, assisted by Tutsi youth militia known
as Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore, went on a systematic killing spree that led to
the deaths of an estimated 200,000 Hutus. A similar event occurred in the 1993 civil war,
when Tutsi-dominated armed forces assassinated Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye and
the Hutu majority responded with a killing spree against the Tutsi minority. The civil
war, which lasted from 1993-2005, claimed an estimated 300,000 lives, and an almost 1.2
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million Burundians fled the country. Some Hutus understood the massacre of the Tutsis
in 1993 as payback for the occurrences of 1972 (Daley, 2006; Ndikumana, 1998;
Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015).
In subsequent years, two rebel factions—the CNDD-FDD and the Party for the
Liberation of the Hutu People-National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL)––took up
arms against Burundi’s military. The main demands of the rebel groups included
returning to democratic majority rule, ending their marginalization and the nation’s
constant cycles of violence, and, most importantly, restructuring Tutsi-controlled armed
forces and security services. Moreover, in January, 1994, in the midst of the war, the
Hutu-dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party elected Cyprien
Ntayamira as president. In April, 1994, President Ntayamira’s plan was eliminated along
with Rwandan President Juvéna Habyaimana’s, a fellow Hutu. Both presidents were
killed, which sparked the Rwandan genocide and worsened Burundi’s civil war
(Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015). Throughout Burundi’s history,
politicians and civil society groups from both of the ethnic groups tried to preserve some
degree of ethnic equilibrium in government, but they failed to avert massacres of both
Hutus and Tutsis.
As CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu–FNL fought against Tutsi controlled armed
forces, the CNDD rapidly gained support among Hutus, and its members began to
perceive themselves as the country’s largest and most cohesive rebel group. Both rebel
groups had opposing views, tactics, strategies, and solutions to the civil war. After a
peace agreement to end the civil war was negotiated between rebel groups, political
parties, and combatants, several rebel groups were disarmed, disbanded, and integrated
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into the national army and government. The current president, Pierre Nkurunziza, was
active in the conflict, joining the CNDD-FDD and eventually becoming chairman of the
group after the CNDD-FDD separated into factions (Hatungimana, Theron, & Popic,
2007; Nantulya, 2015: Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012; Russell, 2015).
As these violent conflicts transpired, their consequences were particularly dire for
women. For example, after the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, women and girls were
affected disproportionately. Of the grave consequences of the conflicts in Burundi, gross
human rights violations––such as rape, torture, and other forms of sexual violence––
became very alarming, and they continued even after the cessation of the war. Yeboah
(2017) claimed that “violence was a part of the everyday lives of most women and girls
during the periods of series of conflicts the country experienced” (p. 83). The conflicts
reinforced pre-existing patterns of gendered violence and increased the marginalization of
women. Likewise, throughout and after the series of wars in Burundi, existing disparities
increased and social safety nets broke down, making women more vulnerable to genderbased violence and exploitation (Yeboah, 2017).
Although most of the violent conflicts in Burundi have deep roots in political and
ethnic tensions––which, to a large degree, are the consequences of political struggles––
the current crisis is more political than ethnic in nature. Nonetheless, many Burundians,
policymakers, and scholars fear that prolonged ethnic tension could deepen violence if
the political crisis is not resolved.
Violence by Ruling Party Youth and Security Forces
Opposition leaders, opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid, civil
society groups, journalists, civilians, and members of President Nkurunziza’s own
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CNDD-FDD party who opposed him were harassed, arrested, unlawfully detained, and
even assassinated. So far, the crisis has been characterized by a daily retaliatory form of
violence among government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, armed factions of
several opposition groups, or individuals perceived to be rivals of President Nkurunziza
and CNDD-FDD (Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vircoulon, 2015). In December, 2015,
armed gunmen targeted four military installations throughout Bujumbura; the following
day, people found dozens of dead bodies dispersed in the streets. Many accused
Burundi’s security forces of summarily executing opposition members in neighborhoods
and arresting hundreds more (Armed conflict Location & Event Dataset, 2016; Human
Rights Watch, 2017a).
Human Rights Watch’s (2017a) country summary for Burundi indicates that
intelligence services, along with security forces, regularly partnered with Imbonerakure
youth militia to conduct abductions, disappearances, torture, rape, and killings. Another
Human Rights Watch (2017b) report added, “Members of the Imbonerakure have been
involved in scores of human rights violations in Burundi since at least 2009” (p. 3). The
report adds “Between December 30, 2014 and January 3, 2015, Imbonerakure members,
Burundian soldiers, and police officers committed at least 47 extrajudicial executions”
(Human Rights Watch, 2017b). For example, a spokesperson for the Union for Peace and
Development-Zigamibanga (UPD) opposition party, Patrice Gahungu, and UPD
president, Zedi Feruzi, were killed in May, 2015 (Armed conflict Location & Event
Dataset, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016b).
On August 3, 2015, an unidentified gunman on a motorcycle attempted to
assassinate the leader of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and
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Detained Persons (APRODH), Pierre Claver Mbonimpa; Mbonimpa survived with severe
injuries, however. Mbonimpa’s son-in-law, Pascal Nshimirimana, was killed near his
home in Bujumbura in October, 2015, and his son, Welly Nzitonda, was killed on
November 6, 2015 after security services stopped him (Human Rights Watch, 2016a).
Security forces and Imbonerakure sometimes raped women whose male family members
were believed to be opponents of the government, such as the National Liberation Forces
(FNL). In some instances, “Imbonerakure and police raped women who attempted to
cross into Tanzania, apparently to deter them from leaving Burundi” (Human Rights
Watch, 2017b, p. 3).

Figure 2. Protester and police interactions. Note. In the Ngagara district of Bujumbura
(AP), demonstrators trying to march to the town centre flee as police disperse them with
tear gas.
Human Rights Watch (2017) and ACLED (2016) also reported that the numbers
of disappearances and clandestine kidnappings increased from late 2015 to 2016. In
December, 2015, for instance, several plainclothes men believed to be part of intelligence
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services abducted Marie-Claudette Kwizera, of the human rights group Ligue Iteka, and
her whereabouts remain unknown. Similarly, Jean Bigirimana, a reporter with the
independent newspaper Iwacu, disappeared in July, 2016 after leaving his residence in
Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura, for Bugarama, in Muramvya province.
It is apparent that the crisis in Burundi has progressed down a dangerous yet
familiar path, and little change has occurred to halt the violence. The continued human
rights violations have also led to an influx of refugees seeking safety in neighboring
countries. The crisis has had a continuing effect on the population, including inculcating
a persistent fear of attacks and a return to civil war (Thomas-Greenfield, 2015).
Violence by Armed Opposition Groups
Although originally nonviolent, some anti third-term bid protesters eventually
resorted to violence. According to reports by ACLED (2016) and Human Rights Watch
(2016a), various armed opposition groups systematically used violence against security
forces, civilians, and government officials. Throwing grenades at police patrols and
police stations and attacking military bases around Bujumbura, government opponents in
certain Bujumbura neighborhoods increased this violence (ACLED, 2016). ACLED
(2016) and Human Rights Watch (2017b) reported, in April, 2016, that unknown gunmen
in Bujumbura used rockets to assassinate Brigadier General Athanase Kararuza, an army
advisor to the office of the vice president. Unidentified also gunmen killed numerous
high-profile government officials in Bujumbura, including Jean Bikomagu, former army
chief of staff, and Adolphe Nshimirimana, the former head of intelligence services.
In Bururi province, unknown armed men killed numerous CNDD-FDD party
supporters in April and May of 2016, including Jean Claude Bikorimana. Three
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government supporters were among four individuals killed at a bar on April, 2016; an
additional assault on the same day assassinated CNDD-FDD a party supporter, Japhet
Karibwami, at his residence (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). In November, 2016,
unidentified gunmen assaulted and severely injured Willy Nyamitwe, President
Nkurunziza’s communications aide, close to his residence in Bujumbura. The
assassination of Environmental Minister Emmanuel Niyonkuru on January 1, 2017, and
various other acts of violence and terror indicate that Burundi remains deeply troubled
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2017a).
It is clear that violence orchestrated by government forces, Imbonerakure youth
militia, and armed opposition groups has been systematic and shows no sign of ending.
These violent events, and many others, have further undermined the peace and stability of
Burundi and the Great Lakes Region generally. Leaders around the region, as well as
international organizations, are concerned about mass violence, the risk of renewal of
civil war, an influx of refugees, and extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, incendiary
rhetoric from both the ruling party and opposition leaders has exacerbated the division
between Hutus and Tutsis.
Role of the International Community
From the outset of the crisis in April, 2015, the AU, EU, and UN spearheaded
numerous intervention frameworks to bring about peace and stability, but these efforts to
prevent government forces and armed opposition groups from committing violence have
been unsuccessful. As Ahluwalia (2016) argued, “the world is deeply conscious of the
propensity of ethnic violence in this region to descend into genocide” (p. 1). One could
argue that Burundi’s current crisis, in which both government and armed opposition
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groups targeted civilians, could escalate into civil war, creating serious consequences that
would ripple across the region.
In August, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed on a
resolution to deploy 228 police officers to Burundi to aid UN human rights observers, but
President Nkurunziza and his government rejected the deployment (ACLED, 2016;
Ahluwalia, 2016: Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Similarly, in December, 2015, the AU
authorized the use of 5,000 peacekeepers, called the African Prevention and Protection
Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), but the government of Burundi declined the proposal.
The Burundian government withdrew its membership from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) after the court initiated an inquiry into the Burundi crisis (Human Rights
Watch, 2017a).
In his United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Thierry
Vircoulon, the Central Africa Project Director for International Crisis Group (2015),
proffered the following warning:
The present patterns of violence are a reminder of what happened before the civil
war broke out in 1993. For the Burundians, the story is repeating itself. The déjà
vu feelings and the memories of the civil war are the reasons why so many of
them have left their country. (p. 3)
Although the institutional restructuring among high-ranking government and senior
military officials was based on ethnic lines (Siegle, 2015), thus far, however, mass ethnic
violence has not been common in the current crisis; however, the AU and UN fear that
prolonged ethnic tension could deepen existing violence in the future.
Moreover, the consequences of the crisis in Burundi entail economic, social,
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political, and security repercussions for the Greater Lakes Region. Arguably, further
crisis in Burundi might provoke an armed invasion from Rwanda, where resentments
from of the 1994 genocide still linger. Such an invasion could trigger military responses
from surrounding nations concerned about Rwanda’s influence in the Greater Lakes
Region (Siegle, 2015; Thomas-Greenfield, 2015). Earlier conflicts in the Great Lakes
Region were rooted in similar identity problems as well as in nationalism, structural
violence, power struggles, issues of governance, exploitation, and unequal access to
resources. These dynamics have been strong drivers of conflict in the Great Lakes
Region, but the AU, EU, UN, and other international organizations have framed a
conflict resolution roadmap for resolving the Burundi crisis.
Such a unique roadmap is needed because of Burundi’s particular circumstances.
Historically, Burundi spent over ten years recuperating from a violent civil war and trying
to reclaim greater social structure, but recent violence and oppression has brought
memories of the past to the surface, buoyed by an accelerating outflow of refugees and
increasingly desperate economic conditions. Burundi serves as a clear example in Africa
of how a president will take extreme measures and use extreme means to maintain power,
destabilizing a decade of peace, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction (Siegle, 2015;
Thomas-Greenfield, 2015; Vircoulon, 2015).
Term limit manipulations as a continental problem. Over the past few
decades, most African leaders were trapped in a complex web of term limit
manipulations. In the Great Lakes Region, the dilemma of term limit manipulations
raised many contentious and divisive sentiments within the region and elsewhere.
Leaders in both the Republic of the Congo and Rwanda endeavored to change
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constitutional limitations on presidential terms. In the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), President Joseph Kabila demonstrated his steadfast desire to retain power by
delaying the 2016 presidential election. It is important to note President Kabila is now in
the seventh year of a five-year term. The term limit manipulations phenomenon remains a
prevalent threat to peace and stability across the Great Lakes Region, but presidential
term limit circumvention has also increased across the continent and sparked unrest and
instability, often degenerating into violence and instability. This was the case in Burundi,
where unrest developed into a seemingly intractable crisis, with street conflicts between
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, armed opposition groups, security forces
conducting arrests of suspected protesters throughout the country, grenade attacks
targeting security forces, and violence against Internally Displaced People (IDPs)
attempting to flee (ACLED, 2016).
From a historical point of view, many African leaders saw the presidency as a
lifetime profession; Prempeh (2008) used the phrase “The Big Man” (p. 109); Kiwuwa
(2013) used “presidential careerism” (p. 262); and Akech (2011) used the term “imperial
presidency” (p. 98). These phrases describe African leaders who entrenched themselves
in power and systematically manipulated their constitutions. As Tangri and Mwenda
(2010) argued, “Politics in many African countries has been characterized by perpetual
incumbency in leadership. This was particularly the case in Africa’s early independence
decades when many presidents held power for indefinite periods” (p. 32). In the past,
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Toure of Guinea, Jean-Bédel Bokassa of Central
African Republic, Félix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’ Ivoire, Hastings Banda of Malawi,
and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya bestowed on themselves president-for-life status (Akech,
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2011; Baker, 2002; Bamfo, 2005; Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). This phenomenon
manifested throughout the continent. Cameroon’s Paul Biya, Uganda’s Yoweri
Museveni, Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir, Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo, Republic of the Congo’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Eritrea’s Isaias Afewerki,
Chad’s Idriss Deby, and Djibouti’s Ismail Omar Guelleh all used their powers to
undermine presidential term limitations in their individual countries. Most of these
leaders came to office with progressive ideas, but they soon became consumed with
greed, corruption, and using protective means to upholding their powers. They exploited
their countries’ weak institutions and used their positions to enrich themselves, their
families, and inner circles. (Table 1 shows Africa’s past and present long-serving leaders
who circumvented term limits to stay in power.) Accordingly, “Term limits or enforced
power alternation has come to symbolize not only an attack on the democratic freedom to
choose one’s leaders, but equally an unwelcome limitation and check on the power and
potential of the incumbency” (Kiwuwa, 2013, p. 265). It is clear that term limit
manipulations have contributed to the slowing down of good governance and
democratization and, oftentimes, has contributed to violence and unrest.

19
Table 1
Past and Present Long-Serving African Leaders
Country
Algeria
Angola
Cameroon
Chad
DRC
Djibouti
Eritrea
Equatorial Guinea
The Gambia
Uganda
Sudan
Republic of the Congo

President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Jose Eduardo dos Santos
Paul Biya
Idriss Deby
Joseph Kabila
Ismail Omar Guelleh
Isaias Afewerki
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
Yahya Jammeh
Yoweri Museveni
Omar Al-Bashir
Denis Sassou Nguesso

Rwanda
Zimbabwe

Paul Kagame
Robert Mugabe

Assumed Office
1999-present
1979-2017
1982-present
1990-present
2001-present
1999-present
1993-present
1979-present
1994-2017
1986-present
1989-present
1979-1992 &
1997-present
2000-present
1980-2017

In some instances, the presidency lasts until death. Baker (2002) agreed that some
African leaders “want to be recognized until death as father figures of the nation or as
those who brought democracy” (p. 287). For example, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo
died after 38 years as president. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya ruled his country for 42
years until he met his violent and ruthless death. Omar Bongo of Gabon died in office
after 41 years at the helm, and Guinea Bissau’s João Bernardo Vieira was assassinated
after a combined 31 years as prime minister and president. Rwanda’s Juvénal
Habyarimana was assassinated after 21 years in office. Guinea’s Lansana Conté died
after 24 years in office, while Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi ruled for 21 years before he died.
In some cases, the presidency is a family affair or business. For instance, after the death
of presidents Omar Bongo and Gnassingbé, both were succeeded by their sons.
Manipulating constitutions by amending term limits, for the most part, worked for
incumbents, but it has also created violence. President Obama noted this problem at the
AU summit in Addis Ababa in 2015, at which he argued, “When a leader tries to change
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the rules in the middle of the game just to stay in office, it risks instability and strife, as
we’ve seen in Burundi” (Baker, 2015, p. 4). A year later, UN Secretary General Ban KiMoon shared the same sentiment at the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU.
He warned that African leaders “should not use legal loopholes or undemocratic
constitutional changes to cling to power, and they should respect term limits” (Blair &
Maasho, 2016, p. 1). Third termers and the rise of president-for-life syndrome have
generated regional and international outcry.
Many African leaders have continued to use one of the most common tactics for
maintaining their grip on power: manipulating constitutions, imposing constraints on
political competition, using violence, and, sometimes, changing rules to extend their grip
on power in such a manner that their main opponents are excluded (Baker, 2002; Bamfo,
2005; Boadi, 2015; Widner, 2005). Some African leaders went as far as manipulating
official rules to stop their rivals. In 2007, presidential nominee Nigeria Olusegun
Obasanjo blocked his challenger, Vice-President Abubakar Atiku, from receiving the
ruling party’s nomination. Former Zambian President Chiluba barred Kenneth Kaunda,
from running in the 1996 presidential election by changing the Constitution to require
Zambian lineage for all presidential contestants (Akech, 2011). In some instances, in
places where intense multiparty elections were established, leaders conducted electoral
malpractice (Akech, 2011; Prempeh, 2008; Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). In Burundi, the
ruling party orchestrated election rigging, coercive methods, assassinations, violence
against opposition leaders and their supporters, and members of civil society groups
during and after election cycles (Human Rights Watch 2016a; Vandeginste, 2011, 2015;
Yarwood, 2016).
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In the last decade, some African heads of state stepped down after their terms
ended, paving the way for the peaceful transfer of power. Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria,
John Kufuor in Ghana, Mwai Kibaki in Kenya, Hifikepunye Pohamba in Namibia,
Jakaya Kikwete in Tanzania, Armando Guebuza in Mozambique, Thomas Boni Yayi in
Benin, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone all left
office as required by their respective constitutions. In Ghana’s 2016 presidential election,
Nana Akufo-Addo defeated incumbent president John Dramani Mahama after serving
only one term in office. Similarly, in Nigeria, for the first time, an incumbent lost a reelection bid and power transferred peacefully.
Efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to
restrict regional leaders from extending their terms in office beyond the two terms failed
because the “two terms in office has been dropped for the time being by heads of state in
May, 2015. Togo and The Gambia, both with presidents who have been in power for
more than two terms, opposed the idea” (Vines, 2015, p. 2). In the Gambia, the long-term
president lost his fifth term bid in the December 2016 presidential election, and power
transferred peacefully with the help of ECOWAS forces intervening to remove President
Jammeh. As in Nigeria, this was the first time in the Gambia’s history that a sitting
president lost a re-election bid. In Togo, President Faure Gnassingbe currently faces
nationwide demonstrations against his government as opposition parties and civil society
groups are seeking an end of five decades of a ruling dynasty from father to son, electoral
reform, and the reinstatement of presidential term limits, which the legislature amended
in 2002. The demonstration against Togo’s president has claimed seven lives to date, and
many more have been wounded (Akwei, 2017).
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Interestingly, some African leaders are defying the conventional wisdom of term
limit manipulations by shortening term limit mandates. In Senegal, President Macky Sall
pushed for a referendum to reduce the country’s presidential term limits from seven years
to five years. Similarly, in Benin, the legislature overruled President Patrice Talon’s bill
for a referendum to change the Constitution, including a provision to lower presidential
terms from the current two five-year terms, to one six-year term in office (British
Broadcasting Corporation, 2017b). In the Gambia, the new President, Adama Barrow,
vowed to push a two-term limit. These leaders’ efforts to lower term limits juxtaposed
with the actions of some other African leaders, including those who scrapped term limits
to stay in power. Indeed, momentum exists behind African leaders adhering to term limit
mandates, but, as Prempeh (2008) argued, “Africa’s current presidents may be termlimited but by all accounts, they have not yet been tamed” (p. 110). To illustrate this
point, 93-year-old Zimbabwean former President Robert Mugabe vowed for decades to
maintain power until he died (Dzirutwe, 2016). Mugabe finally surrendered to the
mounting pressure of a military overthrow and impeachment (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2017c). Former president Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia had the same
sentiment, desiring to rule the Gambia for “one billion years” (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2011, p. 1); yet, he too, was defeated and forced out of power. As Bamfo
(2005) argued, the aspiration to cling to power remains a fundamental problem for
current African leaders, just as it did for those in the not-too distant past. The Great Lakes
Region is a prime example of the phenomenon of term limit manipulations becoming a
regional security threat.
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Successful and Unsuccessful term limit manipulations. Constitutional
engineering, or constitutional coups, is nothing new in Africa. Since post-independence,
presidential term limit manipulations generated controversy all over the continent, and in
recent years, this trend seems to be on the rise in many African countries. Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda set the example for this trend. In 1986, shortly after assuming
power, President Museveni asserted that the “problem of Africa in general and Uganda in
particular is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power” (Tangri &
Mwenda, 2010, pp. 31-32). However, in 2005, Museveni successfully changed Uganda’s
Constitution, allowing him to pursue a third term in office. Ugandan parliament, on
September 12, 2017, unanimously approved a law to eliminate age limits from Uganda’s
Constitution, possibly permitting President Museveni to extend his rule. Currently,
Uganda’s Constitution bars anybody over 75 years old from running for president, which
prevents 73-year-old President Museveni from running in the presidential election
scheduled for 2021 (Biryabarema, 2017). In Cameroon, President Paul Biya successfully
eliminated a two-term limit in 2008. In 1999, former President Samuel Nujoma of
Namibia changed the country’s Constitution to let him pursue a third term in office.
President Nujoma argued that the constitutional restriction did not apply to him because
he was indirectly elected before serving his first term. President Pierre Nkurunziza of
Burundi resorted to the same argument as President Samuel Nujoma. After he failed to
reach a constitutional revision that would permit him to stand for a third term, President
Nkurunziza argued that the 2005 election did not count due to the fact that parliament had
elected him. The constitutional court agreed and ruled that President Nkurunziza was
qualified to run again (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016a).
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In neighboring Burundi, Paul Kagame of Rwanda also extended constitutional
limitations to preserve his grip on power. President Kagame spearheaded a referendum in
December, 2015 to eliminate two-term limits in Rwanda’s Constitution, which allowed
him to run for a third term in 2017 (Boadi, 2015). As Kiwuwa (2013) noted, these
concerted tactics by leaders to restrict their young democracies in the name of their
continuous service to the public troubles democratic transitions. Table 2 shows a detailed
list of successful and unsuccessful attempts to extend or remove presidential term limits
in Africa.
Table 2
Countries Where Extending Presidential Term Limit Mandates Were Proposed or
Removed
Country
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Republic of Congo
Djibouti
Gabon
Guinea
Malawi
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Rwanda
Zambia

Year Amendment Proposed
2008
2014
2018
2008
2004
2015
2010
2003
2001
2003
1999
2010
2006
2002
2002
2005
2015
2001

Result
Passed
Failed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Failed
Passed
Failed
Failed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Passed
Failed

President Denis Sassou N’Guesso of Republic of Congo (also known as CongoBrazzaville) endeavored to change the Constitution in April, 2015. A referendum was
held in October, 2015, in which term and age limits were removed. This permitted
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President Denis Sassou N’Guesso to prolong his tenure in office. These leaders joined a
growing list of past and present African presidents who pursued amending their
constitutions to maintain power. Some African leaders’ desires to manipulate
constitutions were met with civic resistance. Tangri and Mwenda (2010) argued, “in
Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the
strength of domestic and international pressures” (p. 31). Nigeria’s Senate dropped a
strategic constitutional amendment in 2006 that would have allowed President Olusegun
Obasanjo to seek a third term in office. Zambia’s Frederick Chiluba was prevented from
seeking a third term in 2001. In 2002, the aspirations of Malawi’s Bakili Muluzi to
change the Constitution, which would have allowed him a third term, were deserted in the
face of protests against him (Akech, 2011; Lynch & Crawford, 2011; Prempeh, 2008;
Tangri & Mwenda, 2010). Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Frederick Chiluba, and Bakili
Muluzi relinquished power because of domestic and international pressures that were
mounted against them.
In October, 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was overthrown in
a widespread uprising after trying to prolong his 27 years in office by removing the twoterm limits that had been inserted into the Constitution in 2000. A similar event occurred
in Senegal in 2012, where Former President Abdoulaye Wade argued that the provisions
of the Constitution he ushered in 2001 did not apply retroactively to his first term because
the mandate came into being after his first election. The constitutional council allowed
Wade to run for a third term, which incited thousands of citizens to take to the streets to
contest the move. Wade, however, was defeated and relinquished power (Carter, 2016;
Cornado, 2012; Yarwood, 2016).
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The styles and tactics of constitutional engineering used vary depending on
environment. In some instances, where the leader’s party controls parliament, the leaders
resort to these legislatures for constitutional alterations through a parliamentary vote. In
other cases, leaders refer to courts to seek interpretation of the Constitution, as in
Burundi’s case, or hold referenda, as in Rwanda’s case, to force constitutional alterations
in their favor.
Support for and against presidential term limits. Numerous positions have
been advanced in support of and against the implementation of presidential term limits in
Africa. Recent instances of term limit circumventions have led to significant unrest,
which demonstrated the difference between the interests of the political elite and the
people whom they claim to represent. Kenya’s opposition leader, Raila Odinga, has been
a vocal critic of presidential term limit circumvention in Africa. He “warned the continent
against encouraging sitting presidents to change their country’s constitutions to remove
term limits, saying that this could lead to political turmoil” (Leftie, 2015, P. 1). Former
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, echoing this view, argued, “Term limits may ensure
that a Presidency does not become a long-term place of impunity because of legal
immunities that may come with the office” (2016, p. 6). For instance, Dulani (2015), in a
study detailing the levels of public support for presidential term limits in Africa, stated,
“Results from 34 African countries show that there is strong support for presidential term
limits among citizens across almost all countries” (p. 2). Another vocal critic of
presidential term limit manipulations is Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese billionaire who, in 2007,
founded the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards $5 million in
initial compensation, and a $200,000 yearly payment for life, to any African leader who
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strengthens democracy, human rights, and the democratic transfer of power to their
successors after their term ends (Cowell, 2013; McBain, 2013). Hifikepunye Pohamba,
former Namibian president, won the award in 2014, and former Liberian President Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf won the prize in February, 2018, making her the fifth winner.
On the other hand, opponents of presidential term limits believe that term limits
are unconstitutional because they violate the rights of people to vote into office a leader
or president of their choosing for as long as they desire. Lebas (2016) argued that “term
limits are fairly weak as a tool for limiting executive power, and they do not address the
deeper sources of Africa’s democratic deficit” (p. 170). In response to President Obama’s
criticism of African leaders’ failure to respect presidential term limits, President Yoweri
Museveni vigorously stated, “For us in Uganda, we rejected this business of term limits.
If I am in power because I am voted by the people, then I am there by the will of the
people” (Vanguard, 2015, p. 2). Furthermore, former Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe alluded to the term limitation principle being unfairly applied between African
and western countries. He argued, “European leaders do not face the same term limits,
yet are considered full democracies” (Du Plessis, 2015).
Although many incumbents have contended that term limits are contrary to
African norms, this rationale disregards African-led initiatives and institutions that
demonstrate the opposite to be true. In other words, presidential term limit mandates are
measure to tackle the problem of long-serving presidents through establishing policies
against presidents for life and moving away from one-party authoritarian leaders.
Presidential term limitations as a concept of democracy. It is important to note
that presidential term limits are not a guarantee of democracy but are a core principle of
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good governance. Democracy entails strong institutions and leaders who are elected
freely and popularly by the will of the people through credible elections. Differing views
exist on whether presidential term limits should be a main principle of democracy in
Africa. Scholars such as Mann (1994) have succinctly argued that term limits weaken
democracy by putting an end to professional politicians. Maltz (2007), for example,
found that, aside from encouraging leadership rotation, presidential term limits, when
they are reinforced, can assist to uphold democracy by avoiding downward spirals into
oppression and autocracy. Hammerstad (2004) believed that, “A prudent look at the
continent’s post-colonial history should, thus, lead to the conclusion that term limits are
not just desirable, but necessary” (p. 96).
Furthermore, Hammerstad (2004) stressed that democracy “is not only understood
as majority rule and regular elections. It includes all the paraphernalia of democratic
governance: checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, political party pluralism,
minority protection, constitutional protection, [and] freedom of speech and association”
(p. 3). The African Union’s (AU’s) own definition of democracy, stated in the Lomé
Declaration of 2000, clearly recognized seven particular components of democracy: the
impartiality of democratic structures, impartial electoral commissions, comprehensive
voter registration systems, multi-party politics, a wide-ranging political system,
presidential term limits for heads of state, and the impartiality of the judiciary system
(Hammerstad, 2004). Arguably, the majority of Africans, as Dulani (2015) argued, are
increasingly demanding presidential term limits and democracies in Africa, even as a
growing number of African leaders are undermining term limitations using electoral
maneuvering and the increasing oppression and intimidation of opposing parties. Clearly,
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a development is re-emerging across Africa in which presidential term limits are
increasingly under attack.
Relevance of the Study
In recent years, many leaders in Africa have attempted to circumvent their
constitutions to stay in power beyond their tenures. This tactic is known as term limit
manipulation. In some cases, they do so by silencing political opponents through targeted
marginalization, and sometimes they employ violence. Due to employing these strategies,
violence and unrest were extensively experienced between political leaders, government
sanctioned militaries, civil society groups, and citizens in Burundi, DRC, Togo, and
more. Despite issues surrounding presidential term limit manipulation, very few
researchers have thoroughly studied this phenomenon.
Lack of research on how presidential term limits are manipulated or removed in
Africa limits the ability to grasp the phenomenon. In some instances in which efforts to
examine this phenomenon have occurred, the arguments were essentially outlined within
the framework of the comparative political science discipline. For instance, earlier
research by Van Ham and Lindberg (2015) examined the impact of electoral
manipulation means accessible to presidents, such as the use of violence and intimidation,
to prolong their grip on power. Lindberg and Clark (2008) studied military interventions
as a means of regime change and democratization. Bamfo (2005) and Maltz (2007)
mainly explored the merits of term limits, the devastating impact that long-term
leadership had on the improvement of political institutions, and the effects of
democratization. Goldsmith (2015) examined the impact of the lack of presidential term
limits on civil violence, insecurity, and conflict. Prempeh (2008) studied the balance
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between legislative and executive branches in instances where power was vested in the
executive.
While these scholars have provided key understandings of term limit
manipulations, they lack a conflict resolution framework, and their results have been
limited to the political science discipline. To improve the study of presidential term limits
in Africa, it is important to examine the conflict in Burundi through the prism of the field
of conflict resolution. The current knowledge and research requires expansion for a more
thorough grasp of the situation. Therefore, the researcher, for the present study,
implemented a logical framework that started with the root causes of term limit
manipulation with the hope that results of the study will be useful, in the field of conflict
resolution and peace studies, for addressing disputes and conflicts related to term limit
manipulation.
The aim of this study was not to make broad generalizations about presidential
term limit manipulations in Africa; instead, the emphasis was on Burundi, but insights
came from other African countries where term limit manipulations triggered violence,
unrest, and uncertainty. The researcher chose Burundi because it offered an important
example concerning peace building and conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa. This is
because the country has a protracted history of power struggles, violent ethnic conflicts,
and prolonged conflict resolution methods, and it is now resorting back to violence.
Definition of Terms
The following terminologies used in this dissertation are precisely described in
political context: checks and balances, constitutional engineering, corruption,
democratization, ethnic violence, good governance, political violence, presidential term
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limits, term limit manipulation, and big man syndrome.
Checks and balances: Ensures that the executive, judiciary, and legislative
branches of government check each other’s powers. Checks and balances stop any single
branch from abusing power.
Constitutional engineering: A process by which presidents or political leaders
embark on changing presidential term limits in constitutions to benefit themselves.
Oftentimes, they employ the legislature or the judiciary to change the Constitution. In
some instances, they hold referenda to force constitutional alterations. Constitutional
engineering is very similar to constitutional coups.
Corruption: The act of abuse of power by government officials to extract from
government revenue/resources, or the same from the private sector, for individual
enrichment, extending their grip on power.
Democratization: The process whereby more democratic systems of government
are introduced to give the population equal participation and whereby decisions occur
collectively. In essence, democratization means rule by the people.
Ethnic violence: Violence between two or more opposing ethnic groups, driven
by ethnic animosity.
Good governance: The effectiveness of institutions and decision-making
methods that allow states to conduct their affairs efficiently. Good governance has many
characteristics, such as respect for the rule of law, fairness and inclusivity, accountability,
and transparency.
Political violence: Violence against citizens that is politically motivated. Political
violence is perpetrated by individuals and governments to achieve political goals.
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Political violence includes civil wars, demonstrations, revolutions, riots, and
insurgencies.
Presidential term limits: Laws in national constitutions that limit the total
number of years/terms that a president can stay in office. In some countries, this means
that a leader can only serve two 4-year or two 5-year terms.
Term Limit manipulation: The act of changing a Constitution to allow a
president to extend his or her grip on power.
The Big Man syndrome: A term use to describe oppressive, authoritarian, and
corrupt leaders who rule their countries for a long time. In sum, power is bestowed on
one person—the president.
Research Questions
Since the focus of this dissertation was on exposing the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi, it was appropriate to formulate a
research question to help inquire into the root causes of violence. To understand this
phenomenon, it was appropriate to ask the following questions:
Qualitative Question
1. How has term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability
among people in Burundi?
Sub-Questions
1. Why did President Nkurunziza manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in
power?
2. How has term limit manipulation impacted Burundians?
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3. How can Burundians avoid more violence and create a pathway of peace and
stability?
Quantitative Questions
1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutus and Tutsis towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
Organization of the Study
The dissertation is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 examines the conflict
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. The chapter provided a historical
overview of conflict in Burundi, which set the foundation for this research. This chapter
also examined the overarching issue with presidential term limit manipulations in Africa
and argument for and against presidential term limits in Africa. Chapter 2 reviews the
literature and discusses the main concepts pertinent to the topic. The literature review is
divided into six sections. The first section covers lack of checks and balances, which
enable some African leaders to extend their tenures in office. Section two examines the
role of weak government institutions in democratic process. Section three analyzes
electoral malpractice, which leaders use to gain an edge over their opponents, and the role
that electoral malpractice plays in presidential longevity. Section four looks at greed and
corruption, which influences leaders who overstay their mandates. Section five analyzes
fear of punishment for corruption or human rights violations. Finally, section six looks at
the theoretical framework used to explain and explore conflict. Elite theory, intergroup
conflict theory, and structural violence theory can all shed light on the root causes of
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these conflicts.
Chapter 3 describes the methodological style used in this study. The chapter
examines the instruments used in the research––survey techniques, data collection
methods, data analysis methods, and validity and reliability checks––and the ethical
issues. Chapter 4 details the examination of the data and presents the research results. In
Chapter 5, a summary of findings is presented, followed by discussions, the conclusion of
the study, and recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter, the literature review, sets an important foundation for the present
study, as it links frameworks and ideas of presidential term limit manipulations,
democratization, and violence. The literature relevant to research into presidential term
limits in Africa and Burundi is diverse and describes complex dynamics. The focus of the
literature is on whether African leaders should respect term limits, democratic
institutions, democratization, and related issues.
After the end of the Cold War, the adoption of mandated presidential term limits
in Africa became a widespread movement across the continent, but many African leaders
resorted to changing their country’s constitutions to remove term limits provisions.
Akech (2011) asserted, “between 1960 and 1962 alone, thirteen newly sovereign African
states, beginning with Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, amended or replaced their
independence constitutions in favor of new ‘rules of the game’ that centralized public
power in a one-person presidency” (p. 98). In the last decade, this approach came under
increasing attack, with some leaders circumventing their constitutions to extend their
terms. As Bamfo (2005) argued, African leaders emulated the behavior of other
incumbents who pursued term extensions, whether their efforts were successful or not.
In this section, the researcher examines pertinent literature on presidential term
limitations, violence, and democracy in Africa, with emphasis placed on Burundi. The
researcher defines presidential term limits and how they differ from one African country
to another and outlines two opposing sides regarding presidential term limitations—
arguments for and against term limits. Next examined is whether presidential term limits
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are worth embracing as a basic component of democracy in Africa.
Finally, the focus of the literature review was on five reasons considered most
relevant to the research problem: first, a lack of checks and balances; second, weak
government institutions; third, electoral malpractice; fourth, greed and corruption; and,
fifth, fear of punishment. The results of this study add to the current scholarship base by
examining the impact of these five concepts in relation to term limit manipulation in
Burundi. The researcher applied elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural
violence theory to analyze the root causes of the crisis. These theories provided a filter
for explaining and understanding how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit
manipulation has affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi.
What are Presidential Term Limits?
Presidential term limits are a vital medium to “check presidential power, but they
concern the requirement to leave office after a number of terms” (Cranenburgh, 2011, p.
446). For instance, under Ghana’s, Egypt’s, and Nigeria’s constitutions, a president is
eligible to serve a maximum of two four-year terms in office. In Burundi, Sierra Leone,
Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Tanzania, an incumbent is allowed to serve a
maximum of two five-year terms, while in Liberia and Ethiopia, presidents are mandated
under their constitutions to serve a maximum two six-year terms. Presidential term limits
are a core element of democratic government and are essential to checking presidential
power (Bamfo 2005; Kiwuwa, 2013). According to Maltz (2007), “Presidential term
limits have become one of the defining features of democracy” (p. 129). Presidential term
limits, however, are not a guarantee of democracy, but a core principle of good
governance.
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The implementation of mandated presidential term limits was never completely
addressed in Africa until the 1990s. In the 1990s, a second wave of democracy ushered in
term limits to prevent one-party systems and to introduce multi-party elections across the
continent. Throughout Africa, the trend of mandated presidential term limits became
important following events in Burundi, Rwanda, and elsewhere, where leaders succeeded
in manipulating limitations when pursuing additional terms in office.
Presidential term limits benefit the cornerstone of democratic principles. On the
one hand, they encourage the transfer of power away from of incumbents, significantly
support policy and structural changes, and advance the chances of political-party changes
in the power structure of a country. On the other hand, a long term in office could lead to
a power buildup, and more arrogance, along with and the propensity to exploit it (Bamfo,
2005; Kiwuwa, 2013; Maltz, 2007; Prempeh, 2008). There are five reasons why African
leaders are able to cling to power (particularly, President Nkurunziza: (a), a lack of
checks and balances; (b) weak government institutions; (c) electoral malpractice; (d)
greed and corruption; and (e) fear of punishment.
Lack of Checks and Balances
In a democratic system, the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches work in
tandem, which means that they depend on each other for legitimacy. These three
branches are independent of each other and check each other’s potential abuses of power.
On paper, most African countries incorporate these features, but power rests with the
executive branch, making checks and balances problematic. Given the imposing strength
of the executive branch, most legislatures in Africa do not check its power (Cranenburgh,
2011; Keating, 2011; Lynch & Crawford, 2011, Prempeh, 2008; Rakner & De walle,
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2008; Tripp, 2004).
Despite the formation of multiparty politics across Africa, several scholars have
noted, there differences in the degree to which democratization drove the reinforcement
of formal institutions that check the executive branch. As Diamond (2008) explained,
Africa is ruled by longstanding repressive personal rulers and power is highly
concentrated in the hands of overpowering executives. Opalo (2012) stated, “In Africa as
elsewhere, one of the best sources of protection for hard-won democratic gains in a
country is the presence of an independent and resourceful legislature” (p. 85). Prempeh
(2008) alluded to the fact that that “Constitutional design has helped to ensure
presidential dominance over the legislature (p. 115). Bamfo (2005) echoed the same
view, arguing that “Africa’s new democracies are still characterized by centralization of
power around the presidency” (p. 347). Posner and Young (2007), providing an
optimistic view, argued, “Across sub-Saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are
coming to matter much more than they used to and have displaced violence as the
primary source of constraints on executive behavior” (p. 98).
Boadi (2015) provided an optimistic view on the separation of powers, arguing
that, “Parliaments have been flourishing, making at least some legislative oversight of the
executive increasingly common in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 102). Tripp (2004), however,
held a pessimistic view, stating, “Power is concentrated and personalized in the
executive, usually with a supportive military in the background in the context of civilian
rule” (p. 7). As Prempeh (2008) emphasized, “Most of Africa’s legislatures have suffered
substantial gaps in their institutional lives since independence. Those that do have a
record of continuous existence have operated largely under single-party regimes” (p.
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114). This pattern is familiar across the continent. Some African presidents unilaterally
pass laws without consulting with their legislatures.
In December, 2015, President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia declared the country
an Islamic State without consulting parliament (British Broadcasting Corporation,
2015a). In a similar vein, in 1996, President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia declared his
country an officially a Christian state without consulting his party, his cabinet, or the
national legislature (Prempeh, 2008). Kiwuwa (2013) and McMahon’s (2004) important
discussion focused on whether the shift of African countries towards democracy was
clear-cut and whether democratization in Africa failed to accomplish what were believed
to be the principles of democracy. On imperial presidents, Tripp (2004) contended,
Power in their dictatorships was virtually equated with the ruling strongmen, who
personally directed the administration and political institutions, arbitrarily passed
laws to suit their own purposes, banned independent political organizations,
maintained power through various forms of patronage, and used the military as a
personal army. They used the state to perpetrate violence against citizens
arbitrarily, with little regard for the law. (p. 4)
Increasingly, imperial presidents who controlled power over the other two
branches of government undermined the separation of powers specified in many African
constitutions. Given the power of the executive branch, the task of checking presidential
power was left to the judiciary branch. Judiciaries across Africa, however, experienced
the same problems that undermine legislative effectiveness (Prempeh, 2008). Burundi
experienced several clashes between the executive and the legislative branches as well as
disagreements between the executive and the judiciary. In 2015, Burundian President
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Pierre Nkurunziza turned to the courts after a failed constitutional revision to authorize
him to pursue a third term in office. Under pressure from the government, the
constitutional court granted Nkurunziza the ability to run for a third term (Ahluwalia,
2016; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2015b; Vandeginste, 2015). Ahluwalia (2016)
further noted that after Burundi’s constitutional court allowed President Nkurunziza to
stand for a third term, one of the court’s magistrates absconded the country on the basis
that he received several death threats. Since 2010, Burundi’s legislature passed laws
primarily targeting civil society groups and restraining democratic space. In June, 2013,
the government passed a law restricting freedom of the press and, six months later,
passed another law limiting public gatherings (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).
These proposals were intended to strengthen the executive branch while weakening the
legislature’s role in checking the president’s power. One could argue that if checks and
balances were effective and robust in Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza would be less
likely to manipulate the Constitution to extend his tenure past the maximum two terms.
Clearly, in Burundi, President Nkurunziza wields more power than do the nation’s other
political institutions and structures. The legislature and the judiciary protected the
interests of President Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD leadership rather than upholding
overall political institutions and structures.
The question that reverberated in this literature was whether or not the concept of
separation of powers was upheld in Africa and, particularly, in Burundi. Cranenburgh
(2011) and Vencovsky (2007) suggested that the institutional context, especially the
complete concentration of power in the executive branch, needed challenging to bolster
democratization. Cranenburgh (2011) added that another way to tackle “executive
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dominance is to limit presidential power, in the words of Prempeh, to tame African
‘imperial presidents’” (p. 446). It should be evident that an imbalance between a strong
executive branch and weak legislature and judiciary enabled President Nkurunziza to
manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in power. The failure to check the powers of
President Pierre Nkurunziza encompassed weak government institutions that allowed him
unrestricted powers. Cranenburgh (2011) offered a prescription for confronting
institutional apparatuses to check executive power, contending, “it is necessary to first
examine the ways in which executive power is constituted and executive-legislative
relations are structured in African countries in a section on the hybrid nature of these
regimes” (p. 446). Ndikumana (2005) recommended that for institutional effectiveness
and political stability to be sustained, there ought to be a “set of rules that not only reward
success but also allow efficient institutions to veto the inefficient ones. In the case of
Burundi, sheer force has prevailed as the only rule of the game in politics” (p. 22). These
prescriptions seemed plausible, but, historically, the culture of corruption and impunity in
Burundi was a main factor that impeded the effectiveness of the legislative and judicial
branches in upholding the principle of separation of powers.
Weak Government Institutions
The literature on weak government institutions in Africa, and particularly in
Burundi, focused on weak opposition parties and weak government institutions, while
presidential term limits did occur in stable democratic countries. In other words, the
components of effective political structures are only as robust as the institutions that
preserve them. As such, a lack of checks and balances strengthens weak government
institutions, which enables leaders to manipulate term limits. As Craig (2015), quoting
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Thierry Vircoulon, Central African project director for the International Crisis Group,
stated, “The lack of strong institutions is the reason why you have a strong man. So,
strong men are not going to build up strong institutions; strong men are going to build
weak institutions to remain in power” (p. 1). Africa suffers from an overpowering
executive. As Prempeh (2008) noted, “Africa found itself beset by the strange paradox of
strong presidents sitting atop weak state—states that routinely lacked the requisite
institutional capacities and resources to fulfill even their most basic foundations” (p.
111).
This was the case in Burundi, where President Nkurunziza and ruling elites
preyed on weak institutions to safeguard their powers and wealth and suppressed those
who threatened their power. Ndikumana (1998) underlined this point, describing how
“key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the education system are
controlled by ethnic and regional entities” so that “the population feels alienated and
disappointed by the inability of the state to protect its rights and advance its interests” (p.
30). For instance, after the controversial 2015 presidential election, President Nkurunziza
appointed his loyal supporters to every important institution of government to suppress
dissent.
Another noted motive for periodic third-term presidents was the absence of robust
political opposition in several African countries. Convincing evidence exists to suggest
that weak opposition to individual leaders often determines that a president can stand for
a third term. As Lebas (2016) noted, “Executives are able to act with impunity because
there is no strong, organized opposition to challenge entrenched incumbents and push
them toward a genuine political opening” (p. 171). Brown and Kaiser (2007) found that
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representative government and civil society groups, two important cornerstones in a
democracy, both tend to be ineffective in Africa as a whole. Rakner and De walle (2008)
noted, “A stable and numerically viable opposition is a key requisite for horizontal
accountability through legislative checks on executive power” (p. 109). McMahon (2004)
suggested, “Many political parties in Africa do not have a broad support base of
individual financial and volunteer contributions upon which to draw” (p. 302). Rakner
and De walle (2008) believed that “three main factors appear to weaken opposition
parties throughout the region: the advantages of incumbency that stem from executive
dominance; the opposition’s limited access to resources; and the low legitimacy of
opposition politics in the region” (p. 112). Burundi has weak government institutions;
some of them are so weak that they appear not to exist at all. If an opposing party is
strong and effective, the ruling government often suppresses it (Vandeginste, 2015).
Oftentimes, the executive branch has suppressed opposition parties, making it impossible
for them to function. Rakner and De walle (2008) agreed that “the strong presidency and
the authoritarian legacy of many African countries tend to weaken parties generally and
especially oppositions” (p.113). A 2015 Freedom House report outlining the suppression
of opposition parties in Burundi stated that the 2010 local elections were affected by
electoral wrongdoings, limitations on freedom of association for leaders of opposition
parties, a ban on all opposition party gatherings, and the arrest of more than a dozen
opposition activists. In 2014, President Nkurunziza’s regime constantly interrupted
opposition party events, barring meetings and protests and targeting opposition
supporters with harassment, arrests, violent attacks, and, in some cases, extrajudicial
killings (Freedom House, 2015).
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According to a Human Rights Watch (2014) report, “Most leading opposition
figures who had fled the country after boycotting the 2010 elections returned to Burundi,
encouraged by the government, in advance of the 2015 general elections. However,
opposition party members continued to face obstruction and harassment” (p. 1).
Opposition leader Zedi Feruzi, of Union for Peace and Democracy-Zigamibanga (UPD),
for instance, was gunned down, along with his security guard, by government forces in
May, 2015. Unidentified armed men assassinated Patrice Gahungu, spokesperson for
UPD, on September 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015). Vandeginste (2015) argued that
President Nkurunziza’s “CNDD-FDD’s dominant position allowed it to eliminate
parliamentary opposition and “to divide and rule over opposition parties, which it
systematically split into a ‘real’ and a government-friendly wing” (p. 625). These types of
violence and intimidation are common in Burundi to a point that they effectively stop
opposing candidates from involvement in election-related events and scare off their
supporters from voting for the opposition. Gaynor (2014) contended that these systems
are “at the core of Burundi’s problems. It is an institutionalized system of corruption,
social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack of accountability and
clientelism” (p. 205). This strategy, manifested in Burundi for decades, weakened
opposition parties and reduced the democratic space available to challenge the
government. Zakaria (1997) characterized the outcome of this kind of limitation on
political participation as “illiberal democracies” (p. 26). Similarly, Ottaway (2003) used
the term semiauthoritarian to describe these types of political setting.
The absence of strong government institutions, such as a strong legislature and
judiciary and an effective opposition party to effectively challenge an authoritarian
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leader, seems to be one factor that enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza to extend his
tenure past the maximum two terms. As Hausken and Ncube (2014) noted, a resilient
opposing party is one that is well structured and is not “easily silenced by the incumbent
regime. We suspect that another reason why most African presidents are re-elected
without contestation is that the opposition is silenced or is so disorganized that it cannot
conduct a large-scale contestation” (p. 612). The judiciary, legislature, and other
governmental institutions, which are supposed to check the abuse of power in the
executive branch, are all examples of weak opposition in Burundi.
Government institutions set up to check executive abuses of power have not
fulfilled their purpose in Burundi. As such, institutional weakness facilitates impunity
and enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza to manipulate the country’s political systems,
extending his tenure past the maximum two terms. Solid institutional reforms are needed
to bolster good governance and democratic principles.
Electoral Malpractice
Among the drivers of long incumbency is electoral malpractice. In most elections
in Africa, incumbent leaders have a vast advantage over their counterparts in accessing
state funds, which allows them the upper hand in elections (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013;
Zamfir, 2016). Furthermore, Gyimah-Boadi (2007) argued that the presidency enables
political leaders to “manipulate electoral institutions, electoral rules and procedures; to
siphon off state resources and deploy them into partisan use in elections; to commission
development projects; [and] to extort donations from private businesspeople and rentseekers” (p. 29). Similarly, Zamfir (2016) added, “globally, incumbent leaders and ruling
parties tend to win elections, but this appears more pronounced in Africa and can be
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explained by a multiplicity of factors” (p .3). Based on these assessments, the power of
incumbency severely affects the political process between opposing candidates and
political parties. Before delving into the literature on electoral malpractice in Africa and
Burundi in particular, it is important to define what the term means. Birch (2011) defined
electoral malpractices as the manipulation of electoral processes—such as the
manipulation of electoral systems, the manipulation of electorates, and the manipulation
of voting—to help one party or an opponent in an election. Birch (2011) further
explained that electoral malpractice goes by a number of terms: electoral corruption,
electoral malfeasance, electoral fraud, electoral misconduct, and electoral manipulation.
Electoral malpractice was characterized into three stages—pre-election stages, election
stages, and post-election stages (Birch, 2011; Olawole, Adewunmi, & Oluwale, 2013). In
all stages, incumbents use oppressive tactics to cling to power. As Bhasin and Gandhi,
(2013) stated, “To achieve their goals, authoritarian incumbents have an array of
strategies to choose from manipulation of electoral rules, media dominance, vote-buying,
and electoral fraud” (p. 621). This hinders democratization efforts and the likelihood of
free and fair elections. It also distorts the political playing field. For example, in Burundi,
the opposition that protested repeated police harassment and intimidation of its supporters
and members boycotted the 2015 presidential elections over fears that the political and
security atmosphere might not guarantee free and fair elections. This was also the case in
the 2010 presidential elections, when seventeen political parties decided to boycott the
election due to deteriorating political and security threats.
It is important to note that elections facilitate participation and political
competition, but, most importantly, they encourage the peaceful transfer of power.
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Nevertheless, many African leaders deem losing an election as losing access to state
resources, power, and patronage. To maintain their power, political elites take advantage
of weak government institutions, manipulating polls, intimidating opponents, and,
oftentimes, orchestrating violence against voters. Some cases of violent post-election
conflict include Gabon in 2016, Uganda in 2016, Burundi in 2015 and 2010, Côte
d’Ivoire in 2010, Kenya in 2007, and 2008 in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe’s case, after
President Robert Mugabe lost the elections, he managed to retain power by settling for a
power-sharing government with the opposition in 2008.
From this assessment, it is reasonable to argue free and fair elections are both key
sources of, and fundamental steps towards, effective democracy. The concept of a free
and fair election comprises freedom of assembly, speech, and movement, and freedom
from intimidation. A fair election consists of transparency and accountability in the
electoral process, impartial electoral regulations, equal opportunities for all political
parties, equal and unbiased access to the media, an independent and impartial election
management board or election commission, and flawed counts/vote-rigging (Birch, 2007;
Bratton, 2008; Mapuva, 2013; Van Ham & Lindberg, 2015). These issues were evident in
Burundi, where President Pierre Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party used their powers
and resources during pre-election phases, election phases, and post-election phases to
silence political rivals and their followers. For instance, after the election of 2010, toplevel CNDD-FDD officials, along with security services, harassed and interrogated
various reporters about their reporting and threatened them with lawsuits. The election,
marred by uncertainty, was characterized by assassinations, harassment, and the
intimidation of political opponents and their supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2014;
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Mapuva, 2013; Vandeginste 2011). President Pierre Nkurunziza deliberately used
violence, compelling opposing parties to boycott the presidential election, which
improved his chances of retaining power.
As an apparatus of democracy, elections are the foundation for selecting
representatives, allowing political parties to vie freely for votes; indeed, such competition
is one of the trademarks of democracy (Bratton, 2008). Many incumbents manipulate
electoral rules and processes by distorting the level playing field to preclude opposing
leaders from challenging elections, or sometimes by restricting certain segments of the
population from participation in the electoral process (Birch, 2011; Mapuva, 2013).
Incumbent presidents have an Election Management Board (EMB) or an
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) at their disposal. The essential reason
incumbent presidents win elections involves the institutional and administrative
independence of the election commission. In most African countries, the president
nominates members of electoral commissions who often control the process (Van Ham &
Lindberg, 2015). Figure 3 illustrates the various types of electoral manipulation in Africa
from 1986 to 2012.
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Figure 3. Types of manipulation in African elections (1986–2012). Note. EMB=
Electoral management Body. Source: V-Dem Dataset v3.
The impartiality of the electoral commission is crucial to a free and fair election.
For instance, in Burundi, seven National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI)
members were selected in advance by the President in meetings with other political party
leaders, and he then submitted nominees for ratification to both chambers of the
legislature for a final vote (Makulilo & Ntaganda, 2015). Several opposing parties
demanded the nomination of a new electoral commission to reflect the equal number of
members representing the ruling and opposing parties (Vandeginste, 2011). In the
presidential elections of both 2010 and 2015, the leading opposition parties refused to
take part in elections due to an overall atmosphere of voter intimidation, massive
violence, pre-stuffed ballot boxes coordinated by top-level CNDD-FDD party members,
lack of secrecy in the ballot booth, bribery, and lack of independence in electoral
management (Human Rights Watch, 2016a; Vandeginste, 2011, 2015). Furthermore,
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“opposition groups are also opposed to the current electoral commission because it isn’t
complete after two of its five members fled” (Nzohabona, 2015, p. 1). It is apparent that
when electoral management/commissions are weak or lack independence, all manner of
manipulations and irregularities persist. These interrupt and undermine political
participation.
The literature on electoral malpractice has acknowledged several elements
explaining the intricacies of elections in Burundi. The relationship between elections,
electoral violence, and democratization is multifaceted. As the cornerstones of
democracy, elections increasingly create passionate discussions across the continent. The
existing research on electoral malpractice in Africa, and Burundi in particular, has
revealed the enduring legacy of incumbent presidents, their unrestricted powers, and their
use of state resources, which weaken opposition parties and makes it difficult for them to
compete effectively. For elections to function as instruments of democracy, they must be
inclusive and free from misconduct. Hence, institutional safeguards are needed to
safeguard the integrity of elections. These include distributing the authority to manage
several electoral functions among various bodies and offering a counterbalance to the
electoral administration (Birch, 2007; Bratton, 2008). As much as electoral malpractice
allows leaders to stay in power, corruption and greed enable leaders to manipulate weak
political systems, allowing them to maintain power for extended periods.
Greed and Corruption
Scholarly attention to the ways in which greed and corruption have motivated
many leaders in Africa to cling to power has increased over the past decade. Due to a lack
of robust checks and balances and weak government institutions, an overbearing head of
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state and his associates can effortlessly misuse or seize state resources and exploit their
wealth to repress opposing parties and bolster their enormous power (Mosbacher, 2013).
Taking this perspective, Yeh (2011) and Rakner et al. (2007) agreed that many African
leaders see the presidency as an opportunity for amassing wealth and exploiting state
resources, which helps to feed their struggles for control of power. Collier (2000) added,
“Once a society becomes corrupt, there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt” (p.
197).
Anneke Van Woudenberg, deputy director of the Human Right Watch Africa
division argued the following:
Retiring as a head of state in Africa does not usually come with a lot of benefits.
Very few African countries—in fact almost none—have any kind of pension or
security scheme for former presidents or heads of state. So, out of power means
out of money. (Gaffey, 2015, p. 2)
In the same vein, Tangri and Mwenda, (2010) suggested,
Contributing to perpetual incumbency is the fact that executive power has brought
with it many opportunities for accumulating wealth in an African context of
scarcity and poverty and limited avenues of private accumulation. For example,
the riches and private fortunes derived from Angola’s oil and diamonds have
constituted a key motivation for President Jose´ Eduardo dos Santos and a narrow
band of regime insiders to hold on to power for an indefinite period. (pp. 32-33)
This trend is widespread in Africa, where many leaders have used their political
positions to embezzle resources, making themselves wealthy while leaving their citizens
in absolute poverty. As Ayittey (2005) implied, the presidency in Africa is a gateway to
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power and wealth accumulation, and presidents are prone to take any measure to preserve
their power and wealth. Gurr (1970) suggested that the likelihood political conflict
increases with perceptions of inequality and marginalization, while pervasive corruption
conceivably encourages citizens to resort to violence. While President Nkurunziza and
top-ranking CNDD-FDD elites enjoy an extravagant lifestyle, millions of Burundians
lack basic human needs, such as education, healthcare, housing, food, and access to clean
water and sanitation. In the case of Burundi, Vandeginste (2015) agreed that high-level
corruption is a major motive for discontent with President Nkurunziza and his CNDDFDD party, which is likely to prompt a new trend in political instability. In a similar
view, International Crisis Group (2012) detailed the growing corruption scandals
concerning high-level CNDD-FDD and state officials, which curtailed hope among
Burundians of a change in governance and fair access to resources. The deepening
corruption crisis discredited post-conflict reconstruction and drove political and social
anger.
Since, in Burundi, access to state power also means access to wealth, which
prolongs President Pierre Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party’s consolidation of
power, Siegle (2015) contended,
In addition to the natural desire of many leaders in positions of authority to extend
their time in power, Nkurunziza’s efforts to retain control of the presidency likely
stem from a Burundian political economy that rewards senior officials financially.
Access to political power in Burundi allows for considerable control over public
procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and
reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments. (p. 3)
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Furthermore, an International Crisis Group (2012) report claimed that President
Nkurunziza and his party officials are regularly involved in high-level government
corruption scandals, using kickbacks and bribes via a public bidding and private mining
and oil concessions permits. Siegle (2015) echoed the same view, arguing that
presidential power allows for control over the public sector, privatization dealings, land
and property sales, and import and exports. President Nkurunziza is able to do this by
stacking key government institutions with supporters, developing patronage systems in
which political loyalty is exchanged for resources.
Burundi’s anti-corruption officials have constantly faced intimidation from top
government officials. The International Crisis Group (2012) report added that the “heads
of these anti-corruption institutions are also often subjected to strong pressure, adding to
them the direct supervision of the executive: "They lack independence because some of
their staff are activists or hold political office in the presidential party” (p. 11). Arguably,
corruption is a manifestation of institutional ineptness or bad governance, and the
political leadership in Burundi has depended mostly on misappropriation of the country’s
resources to maintain a political elite.
Much of literature reviewed in this section shows that President Nkurunziza and
CNDD-FDD party elites undermined both the legislature and the judiciary, which are
tasked with holding the executive accountable for corruption. It is clear that institutions
set up to monitor greed and corruption in Burundi are ineffective and weak. Yeh (2011)
clarified this notion by claiming,
Corruption is not only caused by a lack of checks and balances but also serves to
prevent the emergence of the institutional reforms necessary to create checks and
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balances. In the majority of African countries, corruption pervades the institutions
that normally provide such checks and balances: the police, the judiciary and the
legal system. (p. 632)
The core problem is a lack of effective government institutions to fight elite
corruption. As a result, top-level corruption in Burundi creates an indispensable means of
strengthening the present government in power. Experiences in Burundi indicate that toplevel CNDD-FDD leaders are extremely powerful, allowing for the creation of effective,
impartial anti-corruption commissions. With no efficient limitations on government
conduct, corruption became widespread, which enabled President Pierre Nkurunziza and
his CNDD-FDD ruling elites to turn state-owned institutions into mechanisms for selfenrichment. This created marginalization as well as grievances and discontent against
President Nkurunziza and the ruling elites. One can conclude that access to political
power is a major driver of corruption in Burundi. Ruling elites or governing elites use
government resources to enrich themselves; more destructively, they use corruption to
support client-patronage connections to heighten their political dominance and safeguard
their inner circles.
Fear of Punishment
Many scholars underscored fear of punishment as another reason that autocratic
leaders retain power. Scholars such as Carter (2016), Tangri and Mwenda (2010), Igwe
(2008), and Baker (2002) have suggested that the reason African leaders stay too long in
power is because of fear of punishment for their human rights violations and corruption.
For example, Baker (2002) argued, the unwillingness of leaders to “leave office may be
that presidents fear a rush of lawsuits or even criminal and human rights prosecutions.
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Chiluba, for instance, was said to fear such an eventuality in Zambia and for good reason,
as current events demonstrate” (p. 287). According to Tangri and Mwenda (2010), a
motive for clinging to power is that leaders fear being prosecuted for their various
misdeeds. There are presidents with dismal human rights records, and those who
have been especially venal and rapacious while in office have perpetuated their
political incumbency to prevent new leaders uncovering their abuses and
prosecuting them for their corruption and personal enrichment. (p. 33)
This was the case in Gambia when President Yahya Jammeh agreed to step down
after losing the December 2016 presidential election. A week later, he reversed his
position, denouncing Thad election results after some opposition party members
suggested prosecuting him for crimes against humanity and corruption (Reid, 2016). The
Gambian case, and many other cases across Africa, highlighted how fear of punishment
has encouraged some African leaders to cling to power.
Recently, the ICC charged several former African presidents with crimes against
humanity. In June, 2016, Jean-Pierre Bemba, former vice president of the DRC, received
an eighteen-year prison sentence for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Simons,
2016). In May, 2012, former Liberian warlord and President Charles Taylor received a
fifty-year prison sentence for his part in the decade-long Sierra Leonean civil war
(Simons & Goodman, 2012). Former President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast was sent
to The Hague to face charges of post-election violence in 2011 (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2016b). In the case of Burundi, the ICC prosecutor’s office examined
several reports describing acts of rape, other methods of sexual violence, torture, killing,
false imprisonment, and enforced disappearances (ICC, 2016). Similarly, in April, 2017,

56
the prosecutor of the ICC stated that they were beginning an investigation into the crisis
in Burundi (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Siegle (2015, December 9) noted that the ICC
Prosecutor’s office warned, “any invocation to ethnic violence would be used as evidence
in a future ICC investigation, have led to the tempering of such inflammatory remarks.
Nonetheless, the intimidation and targeted killings continue” (p. 2). In addition, UN
investigators reported,
Crimes were committed by Burundian state agents or individuals under their
control. It said this included high-level officials of the National Intelligence
Service, which reports directly to the president, the national police force, military
and Imbonerakure, the ruling party's youth league. (British Broadcasting
Corporation, 2017c, p. 2)
The report urged the ICC to act because human rights violations are crimes
against humanity.
In recent years, many African leaders have ramped up their political powers to
defy the impartiality of the ICC in order to make sure that incumbent leaders were
shielded from prosecution, even when charged with crimes against humanity and other
offenses under international law (Jalloh, 2009; Roth, 2014; Ssenyonjo, 2013; Sserunjogi,
2016). At the forefront of this effort is President Museveni of Uganda who, at the April,
2013 inauguration ceremony of Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta, accused the court of
being “biased against African leaders.” To his own fifth term inauguration in May, 2016,
President Museveni invited Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the ICC for
crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. During his speech, President Museveni
urged African leaders to “Forget about this ICC useless thing. Earlier, we thought the
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ICC was useful, but to us, now African leaders, we see it is useless. It’s a bunch of
useless people” (Duggan, Ntale, & Swails, 2016; Roth, 2014).
Most African leaders argued that western leaders themselves commit war crimes
with immunity while African presidents go on trial for crimes against humanity for the
same issues. Mills (2012) added, “to date, all of the active cases the ICC is prosecuting
are in Africa” (p. 410). Many scholars also argued that the ICC is inefficient, is solely
concerned with African leaders, and failed to investigate similar cases elsewhere (Igwe
2008; Kastner, 2010; Mills 2012). The AU’s relationship with the ICC and other
international judicial bodies became more controversial in 2008. At its June 30 to July 1,
2008 assembly meeting, the AU “passed a resolution calling on non-African states (and
in particular European Union states) to stop the practice of arresting and trying Africans
for grave offenses under the principle of universal jurisdiction” (Mills, 2012, p. 417).
Some African countries went as far as withdrawing from the ICC on the grounds that the
court mainly preoccupied itself with African leaders. For example, in October of 2016,
Burundi’s legislature approved, with an overwhelming vote, to abandon the Rome
Statute. Similarly, South Africa’s Foreign Minister signed an Instrumental Withdrawal
from ICC on October 19, 2016, and Gambia confirmed its decision to exit the Rome
Statute on October 26, 2016 (Dersso, 2016). This occurred because African governments
accused the ICC of unfairly targeting leaders from the continent.
In addition to fearing punishment for their human rights violations by
international justice apparatuses, some African leaders were also prosecuted for
corruption in their own countries. Moussa Traoré, former president of Mali, was
convicted of corruption in Bamako in 1999, but former President Alpha Oumar Konaré
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later pardoned him. Rutazigwa (2014) described a similar situation:
An example of such a situation was in Zambia, where the late president Levi
Mwanawasa ordered an enquiry into the late President Fredrick Chiluba’s
financial conduct, who was found to have swindled resources from the state
coffers; this was enough to send him to serve a prison sentence, and this has sent a
clear signal to most leaders on the continent that leaving office on legal basis is
another way of making oneself (the incumbent) susceptible to prison sentence.
The same case arose in Malawi, where President Bakili Muruzi, who was replaced
by Bingu wa Mutharika, was subjected to a prison sentence after leaving the
corridors of power. (p. 1)
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom each froze stolen assets from Zambia,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville. Carter (2016) posited that Equatorial
Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang and the Republic of the Congo’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso were
targeted by anticorruption prosecutors in France and the United States, where these
leaders have assets and residential properties. Furthermore, in 2007, a court in London
found Frederick Chiluba, former president of Zambia, guilty of embezzling $46m (£23m)
in state funds (Transparency International, 2011; British Broadcasting Corporation,
2007). The main catalyst for this decision was lack of transparency and accountability,
which is a suitable breeding ground for unrestricted power for political and economic
gain. Chad’s former president Hissene Habre was convicted in May, 2016 for crimes
against humanity and received a life sentence at a groundbreaking hearing in Dakar,
Senegal. This verdict was the first time that a former president has been found culpable in
another African country (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2016c). Due to fear of
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punishment, most African leaders have taken on the presidency as a lifetime profession
and, in some cases, a father passes the position on to his son to avoid prosecution for
human rights and economic crimes.
To summarize, the literature on presidential term limits in Africa and Burundi
revealed a direct link between adherence to presidential term limits and peace and
stability. President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid in Burundi exemplified this notion. As
the literature review noted, lack of checks and balances, weak government institutions,
electoral malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of punishment are all reasons why
President Nkurunziza decided to extend his term beyond the required two terms.
Gaps in the Literature
Generally, the analyses and arguments presented in this section share one unifying
notion—presidential term limit manipulations in Africa, and in Burundi in particular,
continue to be a challenge to democratization, peace, and stability; and, by most criteria,
they are also a recipe for violence. The literature review pertinent to presidential term
limit manipulation in Burundi is diverse and explains some thought-provoking concepts
and dynamics; nonetheless, gaps exist in the literature. For example, two of the major
gaps include lack of research or discussion on conflict resolution practices regarding
presidential term manipulation and the perceptions of Burundians regarding presidential
term limit manipulation.
One reason for the present study was that the current literature only explored this
topic from a comparative political science discipline, revealing political consequences
and dimensions of presidential term limits. To bridge the gap, it is important to examine
this issue through the prism of the field of conflict resolution, which examines strategies
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and practices for resolving conflict.
While previous studies have examined the Arusha agreement and constitutional
interpretations of term limits, the literature has rarely explored the perceptions of
Burundians regarding presidential term limits and peace. Conceptually, this study adds to
the emerging literature on presidential power and how leaders in the Great Lakes Region
are seeking to evade presidential term limits in order to prolong their terms in office.
Theoretical Framework
The conflict in Burundi developed out of a deeply multifaceted political, ethnic,
and socio-economic situation, but it would be a mistake to use a single theory to describe
how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the
perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. In this section, three theories
(elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence theory) weave throughout
useful analyses of the conflict. The theories highlight several key assertions about the
intersection between control of state power, the use of violence to sustain power, ethnic
dynamics, and the critical roles that competing elites play in this conflict. These
theoretical consideration further refine the research question.
Explaining the Conflict with Elite Theory
Gaeteno Mosca, Wilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michaels are credited for
developing the elite theory concept. In their reasoning, power is constantly exerted by a
small elite group. An important concept of elite theory is that all societies are apportioned
into two core groups—a ruling minority and the ruled—all vying for power and class
structure in society (Berberoglu, 2005; Bottomore, 1964; Parry, 1969). In later years, C.
Wright Mills concentrated on power relations and dynamics in society. In The Power
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Elite, Mills (1956) argued that power elites are divided into three fundamental sectors
(political, economic, and military) and that power elites control all three sectors. This is
true in Burundi’s case.
The epistemological context for elite theory is that governing elites or the ruling
class control a substantial amount of wealth, resources, and capacities, occupying highlevel government positions and exercising power through several networks (Berberoglu,
2005; Pakulski, 2012). Another important component of this theory is that all political
and economic structures are controlled and systematized to benefit few elites. Elite theory
is suitable for explaining presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi and the desire
of governing elites or the ruling class to retain power.
At the heart of elite theory lies the main question of how conflict and competition
operate within social groups in society. For the purpose of this dissertation, the researcher
uses Wilfredo Pareto’s "governing elites" and Gaeteno Mosca’s "ruling class"
interchangeably to argue why President Pierre Nkurunziza and CNDD-FDD political
elites or ruling class manipulated the Constitution to stay in power beyond two terms. In
Mind and Society, Pareto (1916) suggested that power elites are devoted to the status quo
and are prepared to use violence in its defense. In Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and
Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence, Uvin (1999) argued that “Violence has
tended to occur at key points of political change when the interests of the elites were
threatened” (p. 263). For Mosca, the central tenet of elite theory is that the ruling class
controls the state apparatus and society in general. In his book The Ruling Class, Mosca
(1939) suggested,
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In all societies… two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that
is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions,
monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the
second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first. (p. 50)
These notions of governing elites or the ruling class are applied in Burundi’s past
and present history. Since Burundi gained its independence, Tutsi elites captured its
political and economic institutions. Hutu marginalization led to many violent conflicts.
Today, CNDD-FDD political elites systematically use their power and positions to extend
their rule, a cause of conflict with the Tutsi minority (International Crisis Group, 2012).
Turner (2007) argued that politics in Burundi are determined by a few powerful elites in
private, without the public knowledge, and that the current condition is the consequence
of ambiguous laws and policies that the elites themselves created. Buttressing this notion,
Hatungimana, Theron, and Popic, (2007), and Nindorera, (2012) all recognized that
Burundi’s civil war emanated from a power struggle perpetuated by the political elites or
the ruling classes to attain and/or stay in power. Ndikumana presented a more pertinent
and theoretically-connected description of Burundi’s conflict (1998). For example,
Ndikumana argued that “the ruling elite has basically ‘privatized’ the state: through
clientism, patronage, and rent seeking, state institutions are used to accumulate wealth
and to serve and protect the interests of individuals and ethnic and regional entities” (p.
30). The governing elites or the ruling class in Burundi constitute the president, highlevel government officials, key cabinet members, close advisers, and high-ranking
military officers who are constantly seeking to control government. Historically, Burundi
has endured many routes of power alteration, from single party, military rule, and multi-
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party forms of politics to imperial presidencies. At the center of Burundi’s problems is a
powerful ruling class that misuses the country’s resources and wealth, obstructing
democratization efforts. Conversely, the governing elites, or the ruling class in Burundi,
created governance systems for their own benefit, and they struggle with each other over
who is most suited to sit on top of the hierarchy. The political elites who have ruled over
Burundi since the end of colonialism saw government as a source of power and personal
enrichment. The aspiration for wealth accumulation and power remains a fundamental
problem in Burundi.
When concentrating on the topic of governing elites in Burundi, it is important to
discuss the vast gap between the governing elites who exercise power and the citizens
they rule. To fully understand Burundi’s governing elites, one must critically look at two
fundamental dimensions of the role that governing elites in Burundi play. These two
dimensions are the methods that governing elites use to hold the reins of power and the
ethnic distribution of power. Both of these dimensions play a critical role in Burundi’s
political structure and power dynamics. In terms of methods used to maintain elites in
power, President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party members orchestrate repression
and intimidation to strengthen their grip on power and state resources. Ahluwalia (2016),
Human Rights Watch (2016a), and Vandeginste, (2015) all agreed that in previous
elections President Nkurunziza deliberately used violence and intimidation during pre–
election phases, election phases, and post-election phases, which compelled opposing
parties to boycott the presidential election, hence improving his chances of retaining
power. According to Daley (2006), “The ongoing violence is attributed to an increasingly
factionalised political elite, based on the multiple cleavages in Burundi society, who
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mobilize ethnicity in their struggle for control of the state” (p. 657). The role of political
elites in Burundi, in some degree, has produced an atmosphere of uncertainty.
The concept of governing elites that Mosca (1939) described places emphasis on
the importance of the desire of the ruling class to control government agencies and
society. Burundi’s CNDD-FDDs are suitable examples of the governing elites, or the
ruling class’, persistent consolidation of power while systematically restricting political
participation. Vandeginste (2015) agreed that Burundian economic, social, and political
structures for the last two decades or more have been controlled by governing elites’
sharing of state resources among their networks. This political marginalization produces
discontent, which leads to the type of violence epitomized in Burundi. Mosca (1939) and
Pareto's (1916) critical examination of elite theory led to the conclusion that President
Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD elites exhibit all the features of the elite theory of
governance and dominance.
In terms of the ethnic distribution of power in Burundi, ethnicity has proven
repeatedly to be a powerful mobilizing force for elites. In his book Inequality and PostConflict Fiscal Policies in Burundi, Janvier Nkurunziza suggested that “ethnic factors
served the interest of the ruling elites responsible for the catastrophic consequences of
their discriminatory policies” (2012, p. 219). In many ways, ethnic resentment and
politics of distrust may be regarded as the chief threats to peace and stability in Burundi.
Tutsis have been a minority in Burundi, but they run the nation’s elite institutes, such as
the military, whereas Hutus constitute approximately 85% of the population but have
held little power, leading to feelings of anger (Kliegman, 2016). In the last decade,
however, these power dynamics have shifted. A Human Right Watch report (2016a)

65
added that although there are several Tutsi in high-level government positions, many of
the important high-level government positions, including security services, were held by
CNDD-FDD party members. Siegle (2015) echoed the same view, arguing that Pierre
Nkurunziza’s ruling CNDD-FDD leaders have been increasingly “employing ethnically
polarizing tactics. Purges among senior military and government officials have largely
been ethnically based” (p. 2). To contextualize Burundi’s political elites, this theory
establishes the critical role of the governing elites, particularly the role that President
Pierre Nkurunziza played in the political development of Burundi, which, essentially, put
the ruling CNDD-FDD elites in a higher position than the mass of the people.
Explaining the Conflict with Intergroup Conflict Theory
Another theoretical approach used to explain the crisis in Burundi is intergroup
conflict theory. Intergroup conflict occurs between different groups because of
differences like race, class, ethnicity, educational levels, or when two or more groups are
vying for power or inadequate resources. In Burundi’s case, competition for power and
resources, and the deep-rooted hostility between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, remains a
cause of violence, mistrust, and political struggle at all levels. Intergroup conflict is
multifaceted—between groups, their self-interests, and their group’s welfare. Given
Burundi’s history of violent ethnic conflict, ethnic groups are easily identifiable. A
variety of political dynamics—ranging from political oppression to ethnic association
and leadership—strengthens strong group connections.
The classic work of Muzafer Sherif provided groundbreaking research into
intergroup conflict theory. Sherif (1951) underscored that conflict arises when two or
more groups are vying for inadequate resources and power. In Sherif’s reasoning, group
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identity and categorization play significant roles in driving conflict. Furthermore, Allport
(1954) and Doise (1978) described the dynamics of group conflict in terms of various
kinds of prejudices. Intergroup conflict thrives on groupings and differentiation. In
Burundi, political elites have used ethnicity to exploit the association between political
allegiances and ethnic divisions. This creates intergroup violence. Understanding how
Hutu and Tutsi have interpreted their conflicted past is essential for understanding the
nuances of their intergroup conflict. For example, in November, 2015, high-level CNDDFDD party leaders started using ethnically inflammatory language, evoking the example
used in the Rwandan genocide. In his speech to supporters in Kirundi, Burundian Senate
President Reverien Ndikuriyo lamented, "on this issue, you have to pulverize, you have
to exterminate—these people are only good for dying. I give you this order, go” (Siegle,
2015, p. 2).
Ethnic conflicts have long been known as among the major threats to political
stability, institutional order, and state cohesion in Burundi. Ethnic radicals on both sides
have used ethnic feelings to underline the risk posed by the other group. On the one hand,
Tutsi extremists have emphasized every Hutu-on-Tutsi act of violence, thereby fostering
group unity against the Hutu threat. From another perspective, Hutu extremists have also
referenced every Tutsi-on-Hutu act of violence, promoting group unity against the Tutsi
threat. In this manner, both groups have strengthened their hold on power, limited state
resources, and the state's powerful apparatus, which has amplified and increased the
stereotypes and prejudices that both groups hold about the other, with mutual fear of
massacre leading to preemptive attacks in the name of self defense (Daley, 2006;
Ndikumana, 1998; Nindorera, 2012). In Burundi’s case, perceptions of past violent
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conflict play a vital role in sustaining and worsening intergroup conflicts. Violent
conflicts in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993 confirmed this notion.
Moreover, social scientists have pinpointed circumstances under which group
identities became destructive. For example, Tajfel and Turner (1979) portrayed how
conflict over the allocation of inadequate resources strengthens self-identification with
the group, causes ethnocentrism, and encourages hostile out-group behavior. Uvin (1999)
stated, “Burundi presents a typical example of how discrimination and unequal access to
scarce resources lead to violence. As the discrimination took place largely along ethnic
lines, the violence and counter-violence became ethnic too” (p. 253). Unequal
distributions of limited resources are prone to exaggerate conflict between majority and
minority groups. As Ndikumana (2005) reinforced, “Distribution of economic resources
and political power may be equal or unequal. Equal distribution of resources promotes
cohesive group dynamics while unequal distribution creates antagonism between the
privileged groups and the marginalized ones” (p. 413). In Burundi, it is clear access to
power also means access to wealth and resources. Marginalization from politics causes
discontent and can lead to ethnic violence. Gurr (1993), for instance, concluded that
resentments stemming from inter-group competition for resources usually incites ethnic
cohesion. Groups deprived of the allocation of resources often share both a common
grievance and a common identity. In Burundi’s case, disparity in the allocation of state
resources and political control through ethnic identity became instruments of conflict.
It is necessary to understand that the existence of multiethnic societies can lead to
intergroup conflict for economic resources, the struggle for political power, and vying for
ethnic domination. The power struggle between Hutus and Tutsis stems from a
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combination of factors, such as competition for scarce resources and governance policies
and practices, which cause economic and social exclusion. The combination of these
factors strengthened ethnic tensions in Burundi, particularly between the elites and the
counter-elite. Arguably, the source of intergroup conflict in Burundi lies in the inclination
of people to benefit psychologically from their group membership.
Explaining the Conflict with Structural Violence Theory
The theory of structural violence provides a practical context for understanding
structural deficiencies that systematically deny marginalized citizens their basic
economic, political, social, and human rights. Galtung (1969), who coined the term and
concept of structural violence, argued that unequal advantage is built into the political,
economic, and social structures that rule societies. In structural violence theory, direct
violence comes in different forms, which may include physical force, killing, torture,
rape, sexual assault, beatings, and verbal violence (Galtung, 1969), while “structural
violence is defined by inequality, particularly when it comes to the distribution of power
in a social structure” (Galtung, 1969, p. 175). Galtung (1969) used a triangle to explain
these three types of violence, assigning structural and cultural violence to the base, the
left, and the right sides of the triangle, with direct violence at the top. Galtung (1969)
argued that direct violence is the immediate result of the preventable failure to meet
people’s basic human needs. In essence, the crisis in Burundi exemplifies Galtung’s
structural violence theory. The human needs of the people in Burundi were long
neglected. When people find it hard to meet essential needs and lack opportunities to
develop to their full potential, they are forced to use direct violence, as happened during
the demonstrations in Burundi.
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The theory of structural violence may be utilized to examine relationships
between structural and direct violence in Burundi. One could argue that structural
violence is the primary cause of direct violence. In Burundi’s case, direct violence was
prompted as a result of conflicts of interest between the ruling CNDD-FDD and
opposition parties. Taylor (2014) confirmed,
Structural violence, inequality, and political killings provide the evidence.
Ordinary Burundians frequently claim a lack of confidence in the state, citing
corruption and the absence of good governance as major concerns, as well as the
threat of further violence that is a consequence of impunity. (p. 198)
It is appropriate to understand the political and economic systems that have
shaped the phenomenon of structural violence. The main components of structural
violence were reinforced by the government forces killing, physical force against, and
beatings of citizens and opposition members in Burundi. These kinds of violent acts
negate democratic principles and stability. Recent political violence in Burundi indicated
that established structures and systems—political, economic, social, and judicial—
usually favor governing elites or the ruling classes, who have the bargaining power to
bypass these structures with impunity. This shows that a disconnect exists between the
government and its people, indicated by the history of repressive autocratic leaders.
The people of Burundi and their political leaders know that the issues at stake in
the months leading up to the 2015 presidential election's violence went far beyond just
the failed political system and oppressive laws that President Pierre Nkurunziza’s and his
party officials established. Oppression negatively affected the people and the socioeconomic, political, religious, and cultural lives of people in Burundi. For instance, after
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President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term in the April,
2015, thousands were killed, and more than 300,000 people fled Burundi. People fled in
fear of mass violence and the threat of a return to civil war, and also from abductions and
torture (ACLED, 2016; UNHCR, 2016). The government failed to investigate effectively
credible allegations of excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, human rights
abuses, and mistreatment by supporters of the CNDD-FDD party’s youth group, the
Imbonerakure. Neither the National Intelligence Service, nor the Burundian National
Police, nor President Nkurunziza or his administration embarked on an effort to hold
these groups accountable (Amnesty International, 2015; Thomas-Greenfield, 2015;
Vandeginste, 2015). Similarly, before the 2010 presidential election, President
Nkurunziza clamped down on the
[f]reedom of movement of opposition leaders, arrested dozens of opposition
activists, and banned all opposition party meetings. The elections were further
marred by political violence that escalated with the kick-off of the presidential
campaign on June 12, including nearly 100 grenade attacks, the killings of at least
two ruling party activists and opposition activist, and arson attacks on at least 35
local offices of the ruling party. (Human Rights Watch, 2010)
These kinds of violence are embedded in the political, economic, and judicial
structures in Burundi. Inequitable access to resources and political power are types of
structural violence that often create direct violence. In Burundi, access to power and state
resources is tantamount to the survival of President Pierre Nkurunziza and his party
officials, and violence is the most effective tactic for silencing his opponents. To reform
this system, Rubenstein (1999) emphasized that reforming political systems would
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bolster opposition parties' contributions to decision-making and would also address deeprooted structural issues.
Galtung (1969) articulated that structural violence has the ability to create and
direct the behavioral effects of certain conflict situations. The behavior of demonstrators
in burning government buildings, police vehicles, and other public property occurred
because of the deep-seated nature of the structural violence involved. Since direct
violence reinforces structural violence, President Pierre Nkurunziza and his security
forces have been getting away with killings because they are protected by the system.
One could argue that the people’s actions were traceable to structural violence since the
people were motivated by institutional direct violence. These kinds of direct violence acts
in Burundi were carried out by government forces and the institutions that are supposed
to protect citizens’ interests. The people of Burundi feel severely undermined by the
structural violence that encouraged cycles of violence from the different institutions of
government.
Structural violence limits individuals’ and groups’ access to legal, political,
social, and economic progress. It grants greater access to privileged groups like
government officials to goods, services, resources, and opportunities, while other groups
are denied (Winter, 2012). Such unequal arrangements are fostered in the fabric of social,
economic, and political structures and systems that control outcomes in Burundi.
Structural violence generally manifests as power imbalance, lack of basic needs, the
refusal of fundamental human rights, unequal access to resources, and marginalization in
policymaking (Ho, 2007).
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As Winter (2012) argued, the concept of structural violence requires examination
in relation to a general societal system structured on the foundation of aggressive political
control; that is, one based on the degree of hostile political restriction imposed on
opposition parties in Burundi. Weak government institutions are some of the sources of
structural violence in Burundi, as they systematically deny, and marginalize citizens from
achieving, their basic economic, political, social, and human rights. Moreover, the
ineffectiveness of security forces (police, military, and intelligence services) and a culture
of impunity exacerbates structural violence. For instance, in Burundi, several opposition
members and their supporters have been killed, jailed, and arrested, and the government
has failed to investigate excessive use of force effectively. This miscarriage of justice
appears to be creating a culture of impunity. Another cause of structural violence in
Burundi is political violence. Political violence often occurs due to the failure of
opposition parties, citizens, and other actors in government to solve perceived or real
grievances. Political violence is motivated by a number of factors: power inequity,
ineffectiveness of security services, culture of impunity, weak penalties, corruption, and
bad governance. These components are all visible in Burundi.
Rubenstein (1999) argued that many of these structural sources of conflict can be
solved through reforming social structures or government institutions and open,
transparent political participation. For example, in Burundi, opposing parties and civil
society groups want strong democratic institutions to protect free space for political
participation, the separation of powers, electoral reforms, respect for presidential term
limits, and an appropriate balancing of economic and political power. If anything,
Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural violence can strengthen the ability of governments
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to hold violent leaders accountable for their actions. The concept of structural violence, in
other words, does not merely develop a logical understanding of the root causes of
political violence phenomena, but it also offers a foundation for effective action to
resolve conflict.
Elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence theory all provide
a conceptual framework for understanding the history, power struggle, inequalities, and
ethnic dynamics of the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in
Burundi. All three theories can explain the root causes and effects of the phenomenon
under study from an interdisciplinary viewpoint.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter merges the literature on term limit manipulation to establish an
understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has
affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. The literature
connects the frameworks and concepts of presidential term limit manipulations,
democratization, and violence. The literature review focused on five reasons for these
phenomena considered most relevant to the research problem: (a) lack of checks and
balances, (b) weak government institutions, (c) electoral malpractice, (d) greed and
corruption, and (e) fear of punishment. These five factors are the main enablers of many
African leaders lengthening their grip on power, and particularly President Pierre
Nkurunziza.
However, more research is needed in the field of conflict resolution to determine
whether identity politics or ethno-politics play any role in conflict and presidential
longevity. Furthermore, elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and structural violence
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theory were all part of the analyzation process in the search for the root causes of the
crisis and an understanding of why the crisis developed. These theories provide a filter
for explaining how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has
affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi.
In Chapter 3, a mixed method research methodology is applied to understanding
the phenomenon under study. Chapter 3 also provides a comprehensive description of the
steps followed to collect and process the data for this research.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
Chapter 3 contains an overview of the research purpose and methodologies
applied in data collections and data analysis stages. This chapter covers the synopsis of
the philosophical framework for the research, case study, research question, validity and
reliability; and ethics and reflexivity.
Overview of Research Methodology
The researcher chose qualitative and quantitative approaches to examine how the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace
and stability among people in Burundi. Creswell (2005) inferred that qualitative research
methods are mainly helpful for exploring the deep meaning of a specific experience and
to understanding that people link these experiences to their lives. For example, Bogdan
and Biklen, (2003), Creswell (2005), Denzin and Lincoln (2000), and Yin (2009) argued
that qualitative research methodologies are mainly important for discerning the meaning
that individuals give to the events they experience. For Stake (1995), qualitative
methodology is necessary when the types of research questions asked involve
examination. Both Patton (2002) and Seidman (1991) maintained that qualitative research
gives the researcher a comprehensive backdrop to what is going on relative to the subject.
Strauss and Corbin (1998) stressed that qualitative research allows the researcher to study
experiences, such as feelings, which are hard to reveal or study via quantitative research
methods. Qualitative research occurs using case studies (Stake, 1995), phenomenology
(Moustakas, 1994), grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006), ethnography (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 2007), or narrative (Riessman, 2008). Whichever approach is chosen, Smith,
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Flowers, and Larkin (2009) added, “Qualitative research is time-consuming, laborintensive, and both imaginatively and emotionally demanding” (p. 42). A mixed methods
case study methodology was suitable for this dissertation as it promoted a clear
understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has
affected the perceptions of peace and stability of the people in Burundi.
Furthermore, the researcher used quantitative survey questionnaires to collect data
from Burundians. Yin (2013) and Creswell (2013) asserted that survey research was
useful for collecting a sizable amount of data and offering a far-reaching view of the
phenomenon under study. Denscombe (1998) indicated that a quantitative survey
approach is particularly helpful to finding data centered on a representative sample and
generalizing those data to a large group or groups. For the purposes of this study, an
independent t-test was used to determine whether a statistically significant difference
existed between people in Burundi. At the end, the researcher integrates quantitative and
qualitative methods so that these different approaches shed light on the phenomenon
under study.
Philosophical Foundation
Applied in this dissertation, centered within the social constructivist paradigm,
was a case study method used to understand how the conflict surrounding presidential
term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in
Burundi. Qualitative case study research offers two popular approaches. The first, which
Merriam (2009) and Stake (1995) proposed, is a constructivist model, while the second,
by Eisenhardt (1989), Flyvbjerg (2011), and Yin (2012), is a post-positivist viewpoint.
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Both approaches added to the development of theoretical frameworks for the
methodology.
Patton (2001) asserted that qualitative research examines a “real world setting
[where] the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest” (p.
39). According to Stake (1995), “Most contemporary qualitative researchers nourish the
belief that knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. The world we know is a
particularly human construction” (p. 99). Merriam (2009) and Stake (1995), who based
their case study methods on a social constructivist paradigm, argued that constructivism
believes that people create the meaning of experiences and events and create the realities
in which they take part. Furthermore, in qualitative case study research, a social
constructivist paradigm reinforces a transactional approach, where the researcher
develops a particular relationship with the phenomenon under study. Qualitative case
studies also connect the researcher and the participants (Merriam, 2009; Stake, 1995).
This dissertation was based on understanding how the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perceptions of peace and stability
among people in Burundi. Participants constructed their perceptions based on individual
and shared experiences. For this dissertation, the researcher conducted ten interviews,
reviewed pertinent documents, and conceptualized the data to make sense of how
research participants constructed their individual views of the conflict in Burundi.
Case Study
To understand how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation
affected the perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi, it was imperative
to conduct a case study. Case studies facilitate the exploration and explanation of
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multidimensional phenomenon, which allows for the collecting of several viewpoints
from a variety of sources. Muvingi and Duckworth (2014) stated that case study research
is fitting for exploring multifaceted social phenomena such as conflicts and the most
effective actions to end or resolve them. As such, the researcher used a case study
approach to explore and understand the phenomenon under study. A case study is fitting
when (a) a researcher wants to answer how and why questions, (b) the researcher cannot
influence participants’ feelings or the data, (c) the context or phenomenon under study is
important, or (d) there is lack of clarity explaining the relationship between the
phenomenon and the context (Yin, 2003, 2013). Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) described
the case study method as an approach of study in which the researcher studies an
individual, group, event, program, or process. Furthermore, Stake (1995) and Yin (2003)
used several terms to define various case studies. Stake (1995) outlined case studies as
instrumental, intrinsic, or collective. Yin (2003) classified case studies as exploratory,
explanatory, or descriptive, and he distinguished between holistic case studies, single
case studies, and multiple case studies. For this study, the researcher applied an
exploratory and an explanatory case study design to understand the phenomenon. An
exploratory case study is generally useful for examining circumstances wherein the
action assessed has no well-defined, particular established results (Yin, 2003), whereas an
explanatory case study design usually answers questions to describe supposed causal
connections in everyday life that are very difficult for experimental or survey approaches
to ascertain (Yin, 2003).
Stake (1995, 2000) and Yin (2003) claimed that researchers using a case study
gather comprehensive information via multiple sources of data gathering methods over a
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specified duration of time. The researcher collected data via phone calls and audio Skype
sessions, in-depth interviews, online-based surveys, and document reviews. Yin (2009)
categorized five essential parts of a successful case study research design: (a) research
questions; (b) purpose of the study; (c) unit of analysis; (d) the logic that connects data to
propositions; and (e) the criteria for interpreting findings. The research questions address
"how" and "why" type questions. In this study, the researcher asked how President Pierre
Nkurunziza’s decision to manipulate the Constitution affected the perceptions of peace
and stability among people in Burundi. The second part of a case study research approach
is describing the main reason for the study. The main purpose of the dissertation was to
understand how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the
perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. The third part of a case study
research method is describing the unit of analysis, which defines the case. The unit of
analysis in this study was Burundians’ views of the current conflict. The fourth part of a
case study approach is linking research data to propositions. The proposition in this study
was that the impact of presidential term limit manipulation on peace and security in
Burundi would differ along ethnic lines, but not significantly along gender lines. The
researcher linked data to propositions after the data collection stage as themes developed.
The researcher also matched subject matter that emerged in the data to the main
propositions of the study. The fifth part of a case study approach is setting standards for
the purpose of translating results. After developing the themes, the researcher gained
understanding of results, which helped to determine suggestions for future study.
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Research Questions
As the purpose of this dissertation was to understand the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi, it was fitting to frame a research
question to help inquire into the root causes of violence. To understand this phenomenon,
it was appropriate to ask the following research questions.
Qualitative Research Question
1. How has term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability
of people in Burundi?
Sub-Questions
1. Why did President Nkurunziza manipulate Burundi’s Constitution to stay in
power?
2. How has term limit manipulation affected Burundians?
3. How can Burundians avoid more violence and create a pathway to peace and
stability?
Quantitative Research Questions
1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
Hypotheses
Based on the above research questions, the following hypotheses were created:
H01. There is no significant difference between Hutu and Tutsi perceptions of
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
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H11. There is a significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
H02. There is no significant difference between men and women in perceptions of
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
H12. There is a significant difference between men’s and women’s perceptions of
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
Data Collection Methods
The mixed-methods design followed a convergent, parallel design: Quantitative
and qualitative data were collected simultaneously and then integrated. The goal of using
quantitative data is to rationalize, strengthen, and offer more background to qualitative
results. Yin (2009) detailed a well-organized case study research gain from using various
data sources, which effectively safeguarded the study. Baxter and Jack (2008) noted, “In
a case study, data from multiple sources are then converged in the analysis process rather
than handled individually. Each data source is one piece of the ‘puzzle,’ with each piece
contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the whole phenomenon” (p. 554). For
this study, the researcher used three data sources: (a) online-based survey questionnaires,
(b) open-ended, in-depth phone/Skype interviews; and (c) a document review. The
integration of various data enhances findings and supports an understanding of the case.
Using multiple data sources is also useful for answering research questions and helps
readers to understand the history of, and viewpoints on, the phenomenon under study
(Creswell, 2003, 2013).
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Quantitative Data Collection
The researcher obtained data using online survey questionnaires representative of
Burundians. Online survey questionnaires were used to support the qualitative data on
how term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in
Burundi. Of the 200 people recruited to take part in the online survey, 153 participated.
The online survey questionnaires comprised 15 mixed questions on a 5-scale Likert
measurement––Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree, 2, Neutral = 3, Agree = 4, Strongly
Agree = 5 (see Appendix A). The online survey was administered electronically using
Survey Monkey. A web link to the SurveyMonkey websites was included in the email.
SurveyMonkey offers participants guidelines on how to take and submit the survey. The
researcher was also able to use the SurveyMonkey website to assess the online survey
completion frequencies the entire data collection process. The researcher used Statistical
Package for Social Science software Version 20.0 (SPSS) to analyze online survey
questionnaires.
All participants met the inclusion criteria in this study in that they were all
Burundians, both male and female, and over the age of 18 at the time of taking the
survey. All of the participants who consented to take the survey varied in age, ranging
from 18 to 45 years. All participants communicated with the researcher in English.
Online survey participants also included both Hutus and Tutsis, the two predominant
ethnic groups in Burundi and Twa. However, some of the participants selected “Other,”
as this could mean mixed-ethnicities—individuals with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother
or vice versa. The only exclusion criterion in this study was that participants who did not
speak or read English were excluded.
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Due to the severity of the crisis in Burundi, the researcher used two research
gatekeepers and several organizations in Burundi to help with recruiting participants who
were relevant to the phenomenon under study. The organizations were the Association
Saint François d'assise, IBurundi, both civil society groups from Burundi, and
BurundiFacts, a pro-government group. The objective was to gather diverse views of the
phenomenon under study. The research gatekeepers were Burundian nationals—one a
refugee in Kenya and the other living in Burundi. Before data collection, both
gatekeepers were briefed on any risks associated with this study and privacy concerns.
After the gatekeepers and Association Saint François d'assise, IBurundi, and
BurundiFacts provided 200 names, the researcher applied simple random sampling. That
is, the researcher randomly selected 175 participants out of the 200 names using a table of
random numbers. Out of the 200 names provided, 110 were males and 90 were females.
The researcher contacted them via email, phone, WhatsApp, or Skype to explain the
nature of study. At the end of this process, 153 participants (103 males, 49 females and 1
“other”) agreed to take part in the online survey. The researcher will detail the
underrepresentation of females in chapter 5 of the study limitations section.
Forty-eight hours before they took the online survey, the researcher sent consent
forms to participants detailing the purpose of the study and the potential risks of
participating in the study (see Appendix B). The researcher electronically sent survey
links to each individual participant’s email address. On average, the online survey took
about 10 minutes to complete. All online survey participants in this study voluntarily
agreed to participate.
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Qualitative Data Collections
For the qualitative data collection, interviews and document analysis were the
main approaches to data collection. For the interview, the sampling criteria was based on
choosing participants who experienced the conflict and who were in favor of or against
President Nkurunziza’s third term bid. Purposeful sampling techniques were applied to
recruit participants. In purposeful sampling, the focus is on certain features of a
population who are of interest to answer research questions (Creswell, 2013). In addition
to knowledge and experience, availability and willingness to share experiences and views
are crucial in purposeful sampling (Bernard, 2002).
For the interview portion, the researcher used open-ended, semi-structured phone
and Skype interviews. The interview comprised 10 questions (see Appendix C). The
researcher initially began interviewing on June 19, 2017 and completed the last interview
on October 11, 2017. All interview participants met the inclusion criteria in this study in
that they were all Burundians and male or female over the age of 18 at the time of taking
part in the interview. All the participants who consented to the interviews varied based on
age, ranging from 18 to 35 years. All participants communicated with the researcher in
the English Language. Similar to the online survey participants, interviewees were also
composed of Hutus and Tutsis, the two predominant ethnic groups in Burundi, or “other.”
The only exclusion criterion for this phase of the study, as for the last, was that
participants who did not speak or read English were excluded. The participants in the
interviews were drawn from the same population as the online survey population. The
researcher recruited participants who had characteristics pertinent to the phenomenon
under study.
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The researcher also contacted these participants via email, phone, WhatsApp, or
Skype to explain the nature of study. Of the 14 people recruited from the pool of online
survey participants, 10 agreed to interviews. Forty-eight hours before the study, the
researcher sent consent forms to the interviewees detailing the nature of the study and the
potential risks of participating in the study (see Appendix D). With participants’
approval, the researcher audio recorded the interviews and then transcribed them
following each interview. Interviews were approximately 28 minutes on average. All
interviewees in this study voluntarily agreed to interviews about the phenomenon.
Because of the severity of the crisis, participants were assigned alphabetical letters to
protect them from potential harm due to participating in this study.
The researcher applied Merriam’s (2009) interview approach to elicit
demographic information and to reveal how the conflict surrounding presidential term
limit manipulation affected the interviewees’ perceptions of peace and stability in
Burundi. Esterberg (2002) noted that an interview is usually considered an exchange
between the interviewer and interviewee, whereby the interviewer inquires and the
interviewee answers. Stake (1995) suggested that using interview data allows for the
triangulation of data attained from additional sources, which boosts the reliability of
study results. The researcher followed the six question criteria that Merriam (2009)
proposed for case study research: (1) experience/behavior, (2) opinion/belief, (3) feeling,
(4) knowledge, (5) sensory, and (6) background/demographic. Using these six criteria are
important to the research question because they allow participants to share their
experiences, especially how they feel and how they interpret their views. The researcher
avoided leading questions in order to encourage participants to answer freely and openly.
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The researcher followed up with questions when needed to encourage the participants to
elaborate on a response.
Since the interviews occurred via phone/Skype, the researcher applied active
listening skills to capture what participants were saying. During the interviews, the
researcher was twice faced with delays due to a poor Internet connection. The researcher
rescheduled several interviews at different days and times. Moreover, the researcher
explained pertinent information regarding the main purpose of the study, together with
information about himself, with each participant to build the trust and rapport essential an
interview. This allowed participants to be comfortable, which was important for an ideal
interviewing atmosphere. The researcher also asked each participant if he or she had
additional questions and concerns about the nature of the study or research techniques.
While interviews and online survey questionnaires were the main approaches of
data collection, the researcher also gathered and examined documents to obtain meaning,
gain understanding, and corroborate participants’ experiences. Documents used as part of
the study included: Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty
International Reports, International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports,
newspapers, and transcripts from United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on
Burundi. In addition to the authenticity, accuracy, credibility, and representativeness of
selected documents, decisions in selecting documents were based on the research
question and sub-questions and the theoretical perspectives germane to the study. For
Afrobarometer data, the researcher only searched for documents that covered surveys
done on Burundi about term limitations, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation agreement,
and democratization over the past five years. For ACLED, the researcher only used
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documents that examined violence related to term limits and ethnic violence from 20152018. For Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, and
International Crisis Group Reports, the researcher used annual data from 2010-2018 on
Burundi. Some of the key words used to identify relevant components of the documents
included ethnic violence, gender-based violence, violence by security forces,
Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. For UN data, the researcher
examined documents that covered term limitations, the Arusha agreement, ethnic
dynamics, increased militia violence, armed opposition violence, refugee issues, and
security issues. For newspaper data, the researcher analyzed reports linked to term limits,
gender-based violence, ethnic matters, and violence by security forces, Imbonerakure
youth militia, and armed opposition groups. All these documents were accessed from the
organizations’ respective websites.
Quantitative Data Analysis
The researcher used the Likert scale to measure feelings, values, and opinions
with the online survey questionnaires (Likert, 1932; Norman, 2010) with the response
options Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree. To prepare the
data for analysis, Likert scale responses were recoded into numeric values as follows:
Strongly Disagree = 1, Disagree, 2, Neutral = 3, Agree = 4, and Strongly Agree =5.
Descriptive statistics, such as the demographic characteristics of participants, were
provided. In addition, an independent t-test was used to determine whether a statistically
significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi, as well as female and male,
opinions on how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected
the perception of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Moreover, Levene’s test
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for equality of variances was conducted for each t-test. When Levene’s test is significant,
it indicates significant differences in variance, thereby indicating that the homogeneity of
variances assumption is violated. When the homogeneity of variance of assumption is
violated, a corrected, more conservative t-test is used, one that is explicitly designed for
instances in which equal variances are not assumed (Field, 2013; Wright & London,
2009). Descriptive statistics explain descriptions of a particular data set by offering short
summations about the sample and measures of data.
Qualitative Data Analysis
Data analysis for the qualitative component in this mixed-methods case study
research proceeded as follows. As Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested, qualitative
research studies entail a constant collaboration between data collection and data analysis.
This includes reducing and organizing significant amounts of collected data to understand
their meaning. Unlike for quantitative analysis, there are no agreed upon procedures for
qualitative analysis. For example, Marshall and Rossman (2006) suggested that
qualitative data analysis does not develop in a linear manner. Creswell (2013) and Strauss
and Corbin (1998) advised researchers on good practices and techniques to enrich the
validity of qualitative studies. These data analysis techniques were used to make sure that
findings from this study were valid, credible, and dependable.
The researcher applied thematic analysis to code the data collected. A thematic
approach is suitable for theorizing through several cases, finding shared thematic
components across research participants and the events they report (Braun & Clarke,
2006; Creswell, 2013). This procedure also demanded exhaustive reading and re-reading
of transcripts to look for similarities and differences, which allowed the researcher to
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build themes and categories. To guide the data analysis stage, the researcher utilized
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six steps of data analysis procedure. In step one, the
researcher familiarized himself with the data. This included completely engaging the data
by first transcribing the interviews then reading and re-reading the transcripts to
understand the material and viewpoints conveyed. In step two, the researcher started
generating initial codes, identifying preliminary initial codes that were important. In step
three, the researcher searched for themes. This process included the interpretative
analysis of key themes. Step four involved reviewing the themes. In this stage, the
researcher classified the initial themes and inquired into whether to integrate, isolate, or
reject them. Step five was defining and naming the themes. This involved refining and
describing the themes and possible subthemes within data. Step six was producing the
report. This final step included writing the report by using themes extracted from the
data.
Following each interview, the researcher placed transcripts into Microsoft Word
documents and thoroughly reread the transcripts line-by-line to make sure that they were
detailed and correct. Chapter 4 will include a thorough description of the coding and
theme development. The researcher used open and axial coding to analyze the data
(Corbin & Strauss, 2007).
The categorizing stage involved using categorical groping to create themes and
sub-themes. By classifying groups for comparison, the researcher gave each group of
words a theme applying Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis program, enabling themes and
sub-themes to emerge. Interviewees’ personal information was omitted and replaced by
an assigned alphabet letter to safeguard their privacy. Using both computer-assisted data
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analysis coupled with manual checks improved the trustworthiness, credibility, and
validity of findings.
The document analysis involved reading through the data obtained from ACLED,
Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, International Crisis Group
Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts from the United States
Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. This procedure entailed a thorough, more
focused rereading and analysis of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Corbin & Strauss,
2008; Silverman, 2000), and the researcher took a closer look at selected data and
performed coding and category building. This process included thematic analysis.
Thematic analysis involves pattern identification within data and themes developing into
categories for examination (Creswell, 2013). After identifying relevant documents, the
researcher placed data into Microsoft Word documents. The findings section will show a
detailed report of the coding and theme development. Open and axial coding was also
used to examine the data, which enabled themes to develop on their own (Corbin &
Strauss, 2007). The next stage included a categorizing stage, which included categorical
groping to create themes and sub-themes. The researcher again used Atlas.ti to help with
the classifying and grouping of themes and sub-themes.
Validity and Reliability
One of the core principles of any research study is the reliability and validity of
the data and results. Reliability concerns the consistency, dependability, and replicability
of the results obtained (Nunan, 1999). As already noted, an independent t-test was
utilized in the quantitative portion of this study to determine whether a statistically
significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi, as well as between male and
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female, perceptions of the crisis. The online survey questionnaire consisted of five
demographic questions and fifteen thematic questions. The researcher used a Likert scale
for the online survey questionnaires. According to Babbie (2007), a “Likert scale is a type
of composite measurements developed in an attempt to improve the levels of
measurement in social research” (p. 171). Obtaining similar results in quantitative
research is rather straightforward using a Likert scale because data are presented in
numerical form (Nunan, 1999).
Validity in qualitative research means whether the research really measures that
which he or she planned to measure and to how accurate the research findings are
(Golafshani, 2003). For example, Yin (2013) advised researchers to use three sources of
data collection and analysis for case studies to improve the validity and reliability of
studies. The three sources include several data sources, building a case study file, and
maintaining a sequence of verification. Yin (2013) further stressed that the triangulation
of data is one approach that a researcher can use to tackle problems of validity.
The importance of triangulation is that it minimizes biases, particularly the
problem of relying on one data collection method. Patton (2002) supported the use of
triangulation, noting that “triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. This
can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative and
qualitative approaches” (p. 247). In the triangulation stage, the researcher looked for
uniformities in data sets and ensured that all aspects of the phenomenon were included in
the examination and that all aspects were thoroughly examined. To check for validity
within the qualitative data, the researcher followed Merriam’s (2002) concept of member
checks by showing interviewees a copy of their interview transcripts and asking them to
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validate the correctness of the content. Finally, the researcher maintained a chain of
evidence, which helped him to track the information from the study database to the
research question and the concept it was intended to examine. This process enabled the
researcher to verify that the conclusions that the researcher drew from the data were
reliable.
Ethics and Reflexivity
In every research study, ethical implications exist, such as participants’ safety,
confidentiality, potential benefits, biases, and prejudices. Thus, the researcher assumed
responsibility for ensuring that all relationships and materials investigated were respected
at all times. Berg (2009), and Guillemin and Gillam (2004) defined ethics in research as
following guidelines of acceptable and unacceptable conduct in research, which includes
matters of privacy, the safety, and the confidentiality of data.
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) described reflexivity as a tool for understanding
data and its collection and for understanding the type of ethics in qualitative research
methods and the ways that ethical practice in research is accomplished. Research
comprising human participants begins from an understanding of ethical tension
(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). It is incumbent upon the researcher to uphold participants’
rights to confidentiality and privacy and right to be free from physical and mental harm
during and after the study. Therefore, in both the interview and online survey consent
forms, the researcher summarized the purpose of the study, how he would protect the
research participants’ anonymity, and what measures would occur to secure interview
audio recording and survey questionnaires when the study was completed. Research
participants were informed that they had the option of either stopping the interview or
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withdrawing from the research study altogether. To avoid coercion or inducement,
participants in the study were not compensated. According to Bentley and Thacker
(2004), compensating participants to take part in research raises concerns about inducing
participants into taking part in a study that they would not participate in otherwise or
influencing participants’ answers to research questions. As part of the ethics protocol, the
researcher conducted himself within the guidelines and conceptual frameworks of ethical
practice in research and Nova Southeastern University guidelines when exchanging
confidential information electronically. The researcher ensured that all data from
newspapers, websites, memos, archival records, transcripts of interviews, and annual
reports came from valid and credible sources and that they characterized the phenomenon
in the most accurate possible way.
Before submitting to the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the researcher
completed the mandatory Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Ethics
Training Program offered through Nova Southeastern University. This study was
conducted with approval from, and in compliance with, Nova Southeastern University
IRB, project number 2017-373 (see Appendix E). Before starting the interview and the
online survey questionnaire, respondents were provided with written consent forms
expressing their agreement before taking part in this study. Research respondents were
additionally asked to verify they were over 18 years of age.
Another ethical issue of concern was the researcher’s personal biases on this
topic. As an advocate of presidential term limits, democracy, and good governance in
Africa, the researcher might hope to prove that manipulating constitutions, such as by
amending term limits to stay in power, created political violence and instability in many
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African countries. The interpretation of data was at risk of being influenced by the
researcher’s biases, which would affect the validity and reliability of the findings. To
address this issue, the researcher adhered to high ethical standards and transparency
throughout the research. Perkins and Baxter (2011) agreed that researchers should be
aware of their own feelings, motives, and biases and identify possible preconceptions
before these impact their studies.
Given the researcher’s views on this topic, he applied several bracketing
techniques to mitigate his biases. Gearing (2004) described bracketing as “a scientific
process in which a researcher suspends or holds in abeyance his or her presuppositions,
biases, assumptions, theories, or previous experiences to see and describe the
phenomenon” (p. 1430). Tufford and Newman (2010) reinforced that “bracketing is a
method used by some researchers to mitigate the potential deleterious effects of
unacknowledged preconceptions related to the research and thereby to increase the rigor
of the project” (p. 81). A methodical examination of different aspects of bracketing helps
researchers to recognize their biases and find ways to mitigate them within their chosen
qualitative research methods (Fischer, 2009; Gearing, 2004; Tufford & Newman, 2010).
During the data collection phase, the researcher wrote memos and abstract notes
that clarified his thoughts and views. Writing down memos and notes following each
interview enabled the researcher to deeply engage with data and helped him to document
his personal biases about the subject under study. The researcher used bracketing during
each interview session and each transcription to expand his understanding and
engagement with the participants and the data. Thus, “bracketing interviews can increase
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the researcher’s clarity and engagement with participants’ experiences by unearthing
forgotten personal experiences” (Tufford & Newman, 2010, p. 86).
During the data analysis phase, the researcher used reflexive journaling. As
Fischer (2009) explained, “reflexivity provides self-awareness, including awareness of
how one has participated in developing particular understandings” (p. 588). Before
undertaking this study, the researcher identified his preconceptions and made notes of
them throughout the research process. Using this method throughout the entire research
process alleviated the risk of the researcher leaning toward his own preconceptions and
interpretations. Ahern (1999) added that adopting reflective journaling could improve a
researcher’s ability to maintain a reflexive standpoint. Using bracketing during the data
analysis phase enabled the researcher to balance his biases and helped to bring both major
themes and negative circumstances to the surface. Bracketing also helped the researcher
to maintain self-awareness throughout the data collection, data analysis, and
interpretation phases.
Summary and Conclusion
Chapter 3 provided a summary of the methodology applied in the study and shed
light on the mixed methods case study approach. The chapter provided a discussion of
employing semi-structured interviews, survey questionnaires, and document review as
the main data sources. Chapter 3 also provided an explanation of the approach used for
the study, a mixed method case study design positioned within a constructivist model,
which utilized constructivist data examination approaches. The researcher also explained
the ethical concerns of the ethics protocol specified by Nova Southeastern University’s
IRB committee. The researcher addressed specific issues linked with online survey
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questionnaires, interviewing, transcribing, and coding and analyzing interview and
document data. Also discussed in the chapter were methodological triangulation, validity
and reliability, and researcher reflexivity during the transcribing, coding, and analyses
processes. In Chapter 4, the findings of the study are presented.
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Chapter 4: Research Findings
Discussion of the Research Findings
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation affects perceptions of peace and stability among
people in Burundi. Understanding this phenomenon was extremely important because the
current crisis in Burundi affects economic conditions as well as peace and stability. The
mixed-methods approach used required the collection of online survey questionnaires,
interviews, and documents to measure the perceptions of Burundians. The mixedmethods design followed a convergent, parallel design: Both quantitative and qualitative
data were collected independently and integrated in the analysis stage. The goal of the
qualitative data analysis was to rationalize, strengthen, and offer more background to
quantitative results.
Quantitative Data Analysis
In this chapter, the results are explained and the data are presented by research
category (i.e., quantitative data are presented first, followed by qualitative data). Data
were triangulated to check the reliability and strengthen the results. For example, Tables
3-7 feature the demographic information of participants. Table 8 lists an in-depth analysis
of Hutu and Tutsi perceptual differences regarding the conflict using an independent ttest to determine whether a statistically significant difference existed. Table 9 shows a
detailed analysis of gender differences and participants’ perceptions of the conflict. An
independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference existed
between female and male perceptions of the conflict. The quantitative portion of this
study addressed the following research questions:
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RQ 1. What are the differences in perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi towards
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
RQ 2. What are the differences in perceptions between men and women towards
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation?
Of the 20 online survey questions, five of the questions requested demographic
information from the participants. The researcher ran an independent t-test analysis for 15
of the online survey questions to determine whether a statistically significant difference
existed between Hutus and Tutsis as well as gender perceptions of the crisis.
First, ethnic conflict has overshadowed the lives of Burundi’s people as far back
as 1962, when the country attained independence from Belgium. For example, a
significant feature of the political makeup in Burundi entails more than four decades of
on-and-off intractable conflict over control of power and access to resources, wealth, and
economic opportunity along with a history of inequitable policies between the Tutsi
minority and the Hutu majority. Secondly, it is critical to uncover gender perceptions
since armed conflict and its outcome touch women’s lives in ways that vary from the
effects on men. For example, during the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, women and girls
were affected disproportionately.
Of the 200 people recruited to take part in the online survey, 153 participated.
Below, Table 3 contains the frequencies for age demographics of the online survey
participants. In terms of the age distribution of participants, six groupings were created
(18-25 years old; 26-35 years old; 36-45 years old; 46-55 years old; 56-65 years old; and
66 and older). The largest age group was 18-25 years (n=75, 49%) and second largest age
group was 26-35 years (n=61, 39.9%), followed by 36-45 years (n=17, 11.1%). No
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respondents aged 46 and older responded to the online survey. The researcher only ran
analysis on Hutu-Tutsi differences as well as gender differences. This is because identity
seems to be the most significant factor in the conflict.
Table 3
Age Distribution of Participants
Range
18-25 Years old
26-35 Years old
36-45 Years old
46-55 Years old
56-65 Years old
66-or older
Total

Frequency
75
61
17
0
0
0
153

Percent
49
39.9
11.1
0
0
0
100

Table 4 comprises the frequencies for the gender demographics of the online
survey participants. Concerning gender demographics, the majority of the sample
identified as male (n=103, 67%), followed by female (n=49, 32%) and other (n=1, 0.7%).
Even though women constitute over 50% of Burundi’s population, more men than
women responded.
Table 4
Gender of Participants
Gender
Male
Female
Other
Total

Frequency
103
49
1
153

Percent
67.3
32
0.7
100

Table 5 illustrates the frequencies of ethnicity of the participants surveyed. The
sample was close to evenly split between individuals who identified as Hutu (n=76,
49.7%) and Tutsi (n=68, 44.4%). Individuals who identified as other (n=8, 5.2%) were
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those with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother, or vice versa, and only one (n=1, 0.7%)
identified as Twa.
Table 5
Ethnicity of Participants
Ethnicity
Hutu
Tutsi
Twa
Other
Total

Frequency
76
68
1
8
153

Percent
49.7
44.4
0.7
5.2
100

Table 6 shows the highest level of education completed among participants,
measured at a six-level variable (high school, technical/vocational training, bachelor's
degree, master's degree, professional degree, and doctoral degree). There was an even
split between those who identified as having a bachelor’s degree (n=52, 34%) and those
who had technical/vocational training (n=53, 34.6%). Furthermore, a small percentage of
participants responded that they held a master’s degree (n=15, 9.8%), and no participants
earned either a professional or a doctoral degree.
Table 7 shows the occupation level of participants. “Unemployed” was the largest
occupation category (n=56, 36.6%) and “student” was the second largest occupation
category (n=42, 27.5%). Respondents who identified as self-employed were the third
largest occupation category (n=22, 14.4%), “private sector” was the fourth largest
occupation category (n=16, 10.5%), and “government” was the fifth largest occupation
category (n=12, 7.8%), followed by “other” (n=5, 3.3%).

101
Table 6
Education Level of Participants
Level of Education
High School
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree
Technical/Vocational Training
Professional Degree
Doctoral Degree
Total

Frequency
33
52
15
53
0
0
153

Percent
21.6
34
9.8
34.6
0
0
100

Table 7
Occupation of Participants
Occupation
Government
Private sector
Self-employed
Student
Unemployed
Other
Total

Frequency
12
16
22
42
56
5
153

Percent
7.8
10.5
14.4
27.5
36.6
3.3
100

An independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference
existed between the two groups, Hutus and Tutsis (see Table 8). The 15 online survey
questions were relevant to the research question and they also unearthed Burundi’s past
conflicts, which entailed governance issues, the protracted history of the power struggle,
lack of equal opportunities to access political power, and violent ethnic divisions between
Hutus and Tutsis. Participants used a scale ranging from 1=Strongly Disagree to 5=
Strongly Agree. Table 8 illustrates some significant differences between the two groups’
responses to all of the questions.
On the question, I support presidential term limits, the resulting t-test was
significant t(138.538) = -8.63, p < .001. This result indicated that Hutus and Tutsis had
different opinions on this matter, with those who identified as Hutu (M = 2.50, SD =
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1.447), indicating greater disagreement and Tutsis (M = 4.34, SD = 1.101), indicating
greater agreement. In terms of whether President Nkurunziza's third term bid violated the
Arusha agreement, a significant difference existed between Hutus (M = 1.92, SD =
1.129), who indicated greater disagreement, and Tutsis who indicated agreement (M =
4.41, SD = 0.981), t(142) = -14.057, p < 0.001. Opinions differed between Hutus and
Tutsis regarding the question, violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third term
bid. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.32, SD = 1.073) had stronger disagreement
than Tutsis (M = 4.40, SD = .831), t(139.212) = -12.080, p < .001. The question
Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis also resulted in
different opinions. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.32, SD = 1.098) had stronger
disagreement than Tutsis (M = 4.06, SD = 1.035), t(142) = -9.771, p < .001.
Perceptions were once again divided on the statement Presidential term limits
should be taken out of the constitution with the results of the t test showed that Hutus (M
= 3.47, SD = 1.419) had stronger agreement than Tutsis (M = 1.59, SD = 1.136), t(142) =
8.735, p < 0.001. With regard to the question, The crisis has enduring impact on the
population including persistent fear. The t-test results for this question showed that Hutus
(M = 2.67, SD = 1.063) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 4.06, SD = .731),
t(133.449) = -9.206, p < .001. Likewise, opinions were divided on the statement; The
current crisis will make Burundi more volatile. The t-test revealed that Hutus (M = 2.57,
SD = .984) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 3.82, SD = .897), t(141.950) =
-8.023, p < .001. Furthermore, Hutus (M = 2.39, SD = 1.223) showed more disagreement
with the statement Government forces are responsible for the violence than Tutsis (M =
4.25, SD = .998), t(142) = -9.902, p < .001. Opinions were also divided on the statement,
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Armed opposition groups are responsible for the violence. The results of the t test
showed that Hutus (M = 4.30, SD = 0.589) had stronger agreement than Tutsis (M = 3.35,
SD = 1.243), t(93.279) = 5.749, p < 0.001.
Table 1
Hutu and Tutsi Perceptions of the Conflict
Sig.
(2-tailed)
***
p<.001

Mean
Difference
-1.838

142

***
p<.001

-2.491

12.080

139.212

***
p<.001

2.081

-9.771

142

***
p<.001

-1.743

1.419

8.735

142

***
p<.001

1.885

1.59
2.67

1.136
1.063

-9.206

133.449

***
p<.001

-1.388

Tutsi

4.06

0.731

Hutu

2.57

0.984

-8.023

141.95

***
p<.001

-1.258

Tutsi
Hutu

3.82
2.39

0.897
1.223

-9.902

142

***
p<.001

-1.855

Tutsi
Hutu

4.25
4.30

0.998
0.589

5.749

93.279

***
p<.001

0.950

Tutsi

3.35

1.243

Questions

Ethnicity

M

SD

t

df

I support Presidential
Term Limits

Hutu

2.50

1.447

-8.630

138.538

Tutsi
Hutu

4.34
1.92

1.101
1.129

14.057

Tutsi

4.41

0.981

Hutu

2.32

1.073

Tutsi

4.40

0.831

Hutu

2.32

1.098

Tutsi

4.06

1.035

Hutu

3.47

Tutsi
Hutu

President
Nkurunziza's Third
Term bid violated the
Arusha agreement
Violence has
increased due to
Pierre Nkurunziza
third term bid
Presidential term
limit manipulation is
the root of the current
crisis
Presidential term
limits should be taken
out of the constitution
The crisis has
enduring impact on
the population
including persistent
fear of attack
The current crisis will
make Burundi’s more
volatile
Government forces
are responsible for
the violence
Armed opposition
groups are
responsible for the
violence

As with the other statements, The Imbonerakure youth militia group is
responsible for the violence yielded significantly more disagreement among Hutus (M =
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2.01, SD = 1.400) than Tutsis (M = 4.13, SD = 1.495), t(142) = -8.781, p < 0.001.
Differences in opinion were also found with the statement, President Nkurunziza third
term in office risk causing a new civil war. The t-test indicated that Hutus (M = 2.34, SD
= .946) expressed more disagreement than Tutsis (M = 3.84, SD = .857), t(141.974) = 9.957, p < .001. Perceptions were divided on the statement, The current crisis disrupted
my life. The t-test disclosed that Hutus (M = 2.47, SD = .824) stated more disagreement
than Tutsis (M = 3.85, SD = .718), t(141.904) = -10.732, p < .001.
Moreover, dissimilarities in perceptions between groups were present in responses
to the statement, The government is working to improve peace and security. The t-test
showed that Hutus (M = 4.49, SD = .663) expressed more agreement than Tutsis (M =
2.97, SD = 1.184), t(102.663) = 9.331, p < .001. Differences in opinions were also
present with the statement, The government lacks the capacity to guarantee security. The
t-test showed that Hutus (M = 1.63, SD = .670) expressed greater disagreement than
Tutsis (M = 2.91, SD = 1.255), t(99.765) = -7.510, p < .001. Finally, no significant
difference occurred between Hutus (M = 4.16, SD = 1.317) and Tutsis (M = 4.46, SD =
1.014), t(138.993) = -1.530, p =0.128) in responses to the statement, Participants to the
crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis. This means there were no
differences between Hutus and Tutsis. Additionally, looking at the mean values for each
group, it can be concluded that both Hutus and Tutsis tended to agree with this statement.
In Table 9, a detailed analysis of the gender differences of participants is
presented. An independent t-test determined whether a statistically significant difference
existed between female and male perceptions of the conflict. Forty-nine participants
identified as female and 103 participants identified as male. One participant identified as
“other” and was excluded from analysis. The participant was excluded
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because the researcher was interested in the differences between men and women.
Questions were recoded into numeric values as follows: Strongly Disagree = 1; Disagree,
2; Neutral = 3; Agree = 4; Strongly Agree =5. Table 9 illustrates some significant
differences existed between the two groups in some of the questions.
With regard to the statement, I support Presidential Term Limits. The resulting ttest was not significant t(106.073) = 0.963, p = .338. This implied that females (M = 3.59,
SD = 1.442) and males (M = 3.34, SD = 1.636) did not have statistically significant
different perceptions of this statement. Similarly, the statement, President Nkurunziza's
third term bid violated the Arusha agreement resulted in a t-test that was not significant
t(104.954) = 1.060, p = .291. That is, females (M = 3.35, SD = 1.508) and males (M =
3.06, SD = 1.691) did not have statistically significant differing opinions about this
statement.
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Table 2
Gender Differences
Questions

Gender

M

SD

t

df

I support Presidential Term
Limits
President Nkurunziza's Third
Term bid violated the Arusha
agreement
Violence has increased due to
Pierre Nkurunziza third term
bid
Presidential term limit
manipulation is the root of
the current crisis
Presidential term limits
should be taken out of the
constitution
The crisis has enduring
impact on the population
including persistent fear of
attack
The current crisis will make
Burundi’s more volatile
Government forces are
responsible for the violence

Female
Male
Female

3.59
3.34
3.35

1.442
1.636
1.508

0.963

106.073

Mean
Difference
0.252

1.06

104.954

0.289

Male

3.06

1.691

Female

3.59

1.153

1.572

120.585

0.349

Male

3.24

1.511

Female
Male

3.45
3.00

1.100
1.462

2.106

121.980

Female

2.39

1.511

0.886

150

Male
Female

2.63
3.63

1.615
0.951

2.037

119.153

Male

3.26

1.228

Female

3.41

0.888

1.667

125.619

Male
Female

3.12
3.67

1.223
1.231

2.395

111.787

Male
Female

3.13
4.00

1.480
1.000

1.239

150

0.223

Male
Female

3.78
3.43

1.057
1.744

1.845

150

0.564

Male

2.86

1.771

Female

3.22

0.848

1.286

133.920

0.224

Male

3.00

1.276

Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female

3.35
3.11
3.76
3.71
2.16
2.31
4.35

0.948
1.084
1.146
1.257
1.007
1.260
1.165

1.328

150

0.240

0.218

150

0.046

0.776

115.896

-0.147

0.408

150

0.085

Male

4.26

1.212

Armed opposition groups are
responsible for the violence
The Imbonerakure youth
militia group is responsible
for the violence
President Nkurunziza’s third
term in office risks causing a
new civil war
The current crisis disrupted
my life
The government is working
to improve peace and security
The government lacks the
capacity to guarantee security
Participants to the crisis
should engage in dialogue to
resolve the crisis

Note. N-144 *p<.05.*05. **p<.01, ***p<.001

Sig.
(2-tailed)

*p<.05

0.449

-0.243

* p<.05

0.371

0.292
* p<.05

0.547
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Equally, the statement, Violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third
term bid resulted in a t-test that was not significant t(120.585) = 1.572, p = .119. This
meant that females (M = 3.59, SD = 1.153) and males (M = 3.24, SD = 1.511) did not
have statistically significant different opinions on this matter.
For the statement, Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current
crisis, the resulting t-test was significant t(121.980) = 2.106, p = .037, suggesting that
females (M = 3.45, SD = 1.100) showed more agreement with this statement than males
(M = 3.00, SD = 1.462). In terms of the question regarding whether Presidential term
limits should be taken out of the constitution, the resulting t-test was not significant t(150)
= -0.886, p = .377. This indicated that females (M = 2.39, SD = 1.511) and males (M =
2.63, SD = 1.615) did not have statistically significant differing perceptions on this
matter. The statement, The crisis has enduring impact on the population including
persistent fear, the resulting t-test was significant, t(119.153) = 2.037, p = .044. This
showed that females showed more agreement (M = 3.63, SD = 0.951) than males (M =
3.26, SD = 1.228) on this issue. Likewise, for The current crisis will make Burundi more
volatile, the resulting t-test was significant, t(125.619) = 1.667, p = .098. This inferred
that females (M = 3.41, SD = 0.888) showed more agreement with this statement than
males (M = 3.12, SD = 1.223). Likewise, for Government forces are responsible for the
violence, the resulting t-test was significant, t(111.787) = 2.395, p = .018. This meant that
females (M = 3.67, SD = 1.231) showed more agreement with this statement than males
(M = 3.13, SD = 1.480).
With regard to the statement, Armed opposition groups are responsible for the
violence, the t-test result was not significant, t(150) = 1.239, p = .217, suggesting that
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females (M = 4.00, SD = 1.000) and males (M = 3.78, SD = 1.057) did not have
statistically significant different opinions on this matter. For the statement, The
Imbonerakure youth militia group is responsible for the violence, the resulting t-test was
not significant t(150) = 1.845, p = .067. This meant that females (M = 3.43, SD = 1.744)
and males (M = 2.86, SD = 1.771) did not have significant differing perceptions on this
matter.
With regard to the statement, President Nkurunziza’s third term in office risks
causing a new civil war, the resulting t-test was not significant, t(133.920) = 1.286, p =
.201. This meant that females (M = 3.22, SD = 0.848) and males (M = 3.00, SD = 1.276)
did not have statistically significant differing perceptions on this statement. The
statement, the current crisis disrupted my life, the resulting t-test was not significant,
t(150) = 1.328, p = .186. This showed that females (M = 3.35, SD = 0.948) and males (M
= 3.11, SD = 1.084) did not have statistically significant different perceptions of this
matter. For the statement, The government is working to improve peace and security, the
t-test result was not significant, t(150) = 0.218, p = .827. This meant that females (M =
3.76, SD = 1.146) and males (M = 3.71, SD = 1.257) did not have statistically significant
differing perceptions of this matter. For the statement, The government lacks the capacity
to guarantee security, the t-test result was not significant, t(115.896) = -0.776, p = .440.
This meant females (M = 2.16, SD = 1.007) and males (M = 2.31, SD = 1.260) did not
have statistically significant different perceptions of this statement. Finally, for the
statement, Participants to the crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis, the ttest result was not significant t(150) = 0.408, p = .684. This suggested that females (M =
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4.35, SD = 1.165) and males (M = 4.26, SD = 1.212) did not have statistically significant
differing perceptions on this matter.
The researcher used two hypotheses outlined in chapter 3. Below are the complete
hypotheses results from the online survey. The researcher used t-test to determine
whether a statistically significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi as well as
female and male perceptions of the conflict.
H01. There is no significant difference between Hutu and Tutsi perceptions of the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
H11. There is a significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
Based on hypothesis one (1), the null hypothesis H01 is rejected. Thus, there is a
significant difference between Hutus and Tutsis perceptions of the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation.
H02. There is no significant difference between men and women perceptions of
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
H12. There is a significant difference between men and women perceptions of
the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation.
For hypothesis two (2), the researcher did not find sufficient support to reject the
null hypothesis.
Quantitative data summary. The purpose of the quantitative data analysis was
to examine how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affects the
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perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi. Data were collected through
an online survey for the quantitative section. An independent t-test determined whether a
statistically significant difference existed between Hutu and Tutsi as well as female and
male perceptions of the conflict. In examining the data for Hutus and Tutsis, the results
indicated that some statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in
their responses to all of the questions. That is, Hutus and Tutsis viewed this crisis along
ethnic lines. Overall, Hutus supported President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third
term, while Tutsis opposed President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term. Hutus
blamed the violence on armed opposition groups, while Tutsis blamed members of the
youth movement of the ruling party, Imbonerakure, and security forces for the violence.
With regards to some questions, perception of females and males were different. For
instance, on issues like whether term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis,
whether the crisis has enduring impact on the population including persistent fear of
attack, and whether government forces are responsible for violence, the mean values
showed that women agreed more with these statements than men. Also, the mean values
showed that women agreed more with term limitations and the Arusha agreement more
than men. However, in most of the questions, there were no gender differences observed.
Qualitative Interview Data Analysis
The quantitative data results showed statistically significant differences between
Hutus and Tutsis, as well as some significant gender differences, with regard to attitudes
about the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation. For the qualitative
phase of the study, qualitative data were collected with interviews and data from
Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports,
International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts
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from the United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. The purpose was
to obtain meaning, gain understanding, and corroborate the survey information with
participants’ experiences.
Of the 14 people invited to participate, 10 agreed to complete interviews. Due to
the severity of the crisis, participants were assigned alphabet letters to protect them from
potential harm due to participating in this study. A demographic analysis of participants
is shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Demographics of Interviewees (n = 10)
Demographics
Age
18-25 Years old
26-35 Years old
36-45 Years old
46-55 Years old
56-65 Years old
66 Years or older
Gender
Male
Female
Other
Ethnicity
Hutu
Tutsi
Twa
Other
Level of education
High School
Technical/Vocational training
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree
Doctoral degree
Occupation
Self-employed
Student
Government
Unemployed
Private sector
Retired
Other

n

%
4
6
0
0
0
0

40
60
0
0
0
0

6
4
0

60
40
0

4
4
0
2

40
40
0
20

0
0
8
2
0
0

0
0
80
20
0
0

0
3
1
2
4
0
0

0
30
10
20
40
0
0
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Out of the 15 interview questions, five questions gathered demographic
information from participants. The majority of interviewees were 26-35 years old (n=6,
60%) and 40% were 18-25 years old (n=4, 40%). No respondents aged 36 or older were
interviewed even though they were recruited. In terms of gender distribution, the majority
of interviewees identified as male (n=6, 60%) and 40% identified as female (n=4). For
ethnic distribution, the numbers were evenly divided between Hutus (n=4, 40%), and
Tutsis (n=4, 40%). Interviewees who identified as “other” (n=2, 20%) were individuals
with a Tutsi father and a Hutu mother, or vice versa. No interviewee identified as Twa.
Concerning education levels, the majority of interviewees identified as having a
bachelor’s degree (n=8, 80%) and 20% identified themselves as holding master’s degree
(n=2, 20%). No interviewee had earned only a high school graduation,
technical/vocational training, professional, or doctoral degree. In the occupation category,
private sector employment was the largest occupation category (n=4, 40%) and students
were the second largest occupation category (n=3, 30%). Interviewees identifying as
unemployed were the third largest occupation category (n=2, 20%), government
employees were the fourth largest occupation category (n=1, 10%), and no interviewee
identified as self-employed or retired.
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) analysis process was applied to the 10 interview
transcriptions for the purpose of understanding the lived experiences of each of the
interviewees from their personal accounts. The researcher applied thematic analysis to
code the qualitative data collected because that approach suits questions connected to
participants’ experiences or participants’ opinions and perceptions. Braun and Clarke’s
(2006) six steps were used for categorizing, examining, and reporting the qualitative data
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using thematic analysis. The six steps are as follows: (a) familiarizing oneself with the
data, (b) generating initial codes, (c) searching for themes, (d) reviewing themes, (e)
defining and naming themes, and (f) writing the report.
Interview participants were asked to answer 10 interview questions about their
experiences with the conflict. The questions were as follows:
1. Tell me about your experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term
limit manipulation?
2. How have President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations affected you?
3. Why do you think President Pierre Nkurunziza extended his term in office?
4. Did President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations contribute to violence? If
yes, how so?
5. What does presidential term limits means to you?
6. What do you perceive as some of the consequences of term limit manipulation?
7. How should Burundians deal with President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in
office?
8. Could you reflect on the devastating cost to Burundi caused by President Pierre
Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term in office?
9. How has your family been affected by the crisis?
10. Is there anything else you would like to offer that I did not ask?
After each interview, the researcher placed transcripts into a Microsoft Word
document and reread transcripts line-by-line. Open and axial coding was applied to
analyze data. Seven key themes were uncovered from the thematic analysis of interview
data: (a) importance of term limits, (b) concern of ethnic violence, (c) economic impact,
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(d) sense of fear and insecurity, (e) culture of impunity, (f) violation of Arusha agreement
and the Constitution, and (g) culture of greed and corruption. While themes were
described as separate, a great similarity existed between them. Moreover, interviewees’
answers to questions repeatedly touched on multiple themes. In those instances, interview
data were explained where they clearly belong. Table 11 shows a summary of the themes
and sub-themes established from the interview data. Data are presented with
interviewees’ quotes from transcripts used to support and refine the qualitative data
analysis process.
Table 11
Themes and Sub-Themes from Interview Transcript
Theme
Importance of term limits

Economic impact

Concern of ethnic violence,

Sense of fear and insecurity

Culture of impunity

Sub-themes
Need for two-term limits
Dictatorship
Respect for term limits
Democracy
Rule of law
Lack of jobs
Refugee crisis
People fled Burundi
Economy affected
Foreign investors left
Businesses closed their doors
Fear of ethnic violence
Ethnic issues
Fear of civil war
Hutu and Tutsi representation
Fear
Insecurity
Refugee issues
Fled the country
Many people died
Gender violence
Cycle of violence
Lack of report on civilian deaths
Violence by Imbonerakure militia
Violence by armed opposition groups
Lack of rule of law
Violence between police and youth
Violence against demonstrators
Some people sabotaged the government
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Violation of Arusha agreement and the Constitution

Culture of greed and corruption

Human rights violations
Violated the Constitution
Arusha agreement violated
Lack of clarity in the Constitution
Constitutional issues
Constitution violated
Lack of respect for the Constitution
Greed
Corruption
African leaders are greedy and corrupt
Power comes with lots of opportunities

Theme 1: Importance of term limits. The concept of term limits refers to a
limitation on the number of years that a president can serve in an elected office. The
current crisis in Burundi is due, in part, to President Nkurunziza’s desire to seek a third
term despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s Constitution. Interviewees expressed
different perceptions on, and prescriptions for, the need for two-term limitation in
Burundi. For example, interviewees viewed two-term limits as curbing dictatorship as
well as a prerequisite to democracy and good governance. For instance, interviewee H
linked the importance of term limits to democracy and argued that term limits are
important to preventing dictatorship. He suggested,
Term limits for president, for me, is very important in democracy or in democratic
country. Here, we are refereeing to leadership that we are having in Africa or in
other countries. Somebody in power start to rule, have an agenda or having a
project; if his first term expires, people will evaluate him. If he does it well, he
has a chance to go for another term. If citizens like him, they will vote for him
again. But, in order to avoid dictatorship . . . it is important to have term limits. In
order to bring new ideas, new projects, term limits are important for that. (Age
35)
Interviewee D supported this line of argument, stating,
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We have this text that regulates the way a country functions. The way . . . the law,
which we have to abide by. So, I think that, personally speaking, term limits . . . is
a way or a sign of saying that a country is democratic or not democratic. (Age 26)
For interviewee C, term limits were an important component of the Arusha
agreement and of Burundi’s Constitution. This interviewee believed that term limits were
necessary to check abuses of power. He extensively detailed the importance of term
limits by arguing,
For me, it means, I now have to put it in the context of Burundi. Why they put
third term . . . or term limits in Arusha agreement in our Constitution. That is,
basically . . . you can find in Burundi’s history the fact that we went from
dictators to dictators. So, the negotiators at the Arusha talks, they had that in
mind. Bringing term limits in the text was to ensure that we don’t fall back into
the abuse of power. So, for me, the term limit in Burundi’s context is really to
fight against the abuse of power that we have experienced in the past regime.
People staying in power . . . without holding elections or without being
accountable to anyone because no one voted for them; they just took power
through violence. Basically, to have term limits . . . for us, it really helps to
safeguard Burundi’s democracy. I will try to avoid going into the broader
meaning of term limits because it depends on the different context. As exactly,
our leaders, now they tend to kind of argue when we talk about term limits. They
bring examples of Germany or UK, where they have parliamentarian systems, but
without term limits. I think . . . for me to explain the meaning of presidential term
limits, I want to explain that in the context of Burundi. (Age 30)

117
Furthermore, interviewee E believed that leaders should serve their mandates and
step down to allow other leaders to bring new ideas. She maintained,
Well, like, any leader or government elected is supposed to run for a certain
period and, later, he may give that position to another one to continue to bring
new things to the lives of the people. So, the term limits, I think, are necessary;
otherwise, the president will stay for a long time. They need to retire; they need to
give the place to another; we need other people: we need to see other leadership
because they are not the only people that are able to save the country. This is why
I think term limits are necessary. (Age 24)
Interviewee E provided a recommendation to avoid the recurrence of this kind of
violence in Burundi. She suggested,
Maybe we should extend to avoid some problems . . . it’s my opinion . . . because
if we have that thing that comes around every 5-year, each 5-year we don’t know.
It will be a circle, and it may never end; maybe for 10 years or forever. (Age 24)
These diverse perceptions of the importance of two-term limits suggested that term limits
are imperative to Burundians. From this assessment, it appears that term limits are an
important component of democracy and good governance.
Theme 2: Concern of ethnic violence. This theme captured each of the
interviewees’ concerns about ethnic violence and the longstanding ethnic struggle for
control of power and state resources in Burundi. Ethnic violence, in this context, means
violence between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. Although the crisis in
Burundi is often described in relation to political conflicts and division, it is not
completely grasped without studying ethnic problems. While previous bouts of ethnic
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violence were expressed in ethnic terms, the current violence hinges on political
divisions. Interviewees were concerned that the violence could turn into an ethnic
conflict. Previous ethnic crises in Burundi left a lasting effect on the people, including
persistent fear of violence, communal division, and arbitrary violence. Many of the
interviewees underscored this notion. For instance, interviewee I associated it with social,
political, and psychological issues related to the current crisis. She stated,
…You know, people hate each other right now because . . . like the Hutu and
Tutsi. Like, oh, the Hutu are in power, okay; now we have to revenge. You see
revenge in the long run, and also hatred towards Hutu and Tutsi, and everything is
not good for the country. It is a very bad idea, and it has challenges because it
affects people economically, socially, politically, and psychologically. (Age 21)
Interviewee H looked at the ethnic problems through a political lens.
He suggested:
In some political contexts, also, he is there to do revenge of what happened in
1972. His father was killed; that happened. It happened to other people, but now
in his speeches, in his statements, he has been declaring that, he has been
declaring that he will revenge. He will show what people did, especially the Tutsi
regime, what they did to Hutu. So, that’s also revenge in political context. (Age
35)
Interviewee C provided historical context for the Hutu-Tutsi violent history. He
contended,
in 1972 . . . there was massacre against the Hutu in Burundi. So, I think
psychologically, that plays . . . is still playing a huge role in the way the
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government or the people in government are currently reacting. So, it’s a mix of
revenge . . . on their parents or people that were closed to them. I think they are
trying to say: “Okay, we are going to stay in power as much as possible.” (Age
30)
Interviewee E (age 24) discussed the Hutu and Tutsi power dynamics, which were
central to the crisis in Burundi. She argued, “now, they are talking about ethnicity, saying
that the Tutsi ruled for so long, and now is time for Hutu to rule. And they say that . . .
they say that now Hutu should rule as long as they want.” For interviewee G (age 27), the
Imbonerakure youth wing threatened to renew ethnic wounds left by the civil war and
decades of sporadic ethnic killings before that. She stated,
We see many people who are caught without reason; I mean legal reasons. And I
can say that, um, they target people to achieve their goals. Those Imbonerakure
have to stop attacking, and most of those women and girls attacked are Tutsi.
Interviewee B (age 25) described Burundi’s ethnic problems as a problem of the
past generations. He argued,
When they came in power, they brought all these ideologies that my generation
doesn’t have. For instance, the issue around ethnicity; in my generation, these are
actually not our issues. These are issues of our parents that have been passed
through.
Interviewee F (age 22) interpreted the ethnicity problem differently. She strongly
believed that this crisis had nothing to do with ethnicity and stated,
It didn’t have anything to do with ethnicity, frankly speaking. Because the media
or the opposition, they say, “Oh the Hutu . . . because he is a Hutu, he wanted to
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destroy the Tutsi. I don’t know they want to do that . . . they are preparing; he is
keeping the power because he is keeping the term. He is adding the third term
because they wanna . . . they are preparing the genocide, and they wanna do it, but
it’s just untrue. The decision was made by the president and his party. And, in his
party, there are Hutu and Tutsi; there are all ethnicities represented in the CNDDFDD. It doesn’t have anything to do with that. That’s my opinion. And I think the
crisis . . . the crisis has nothing to do with ethnicity.
It became clear that the deeply rooted ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic
groups created a foundation of fear, mistrust, violence, and political division at all levels.
Fear of massacre by ethnic adversaries led many Burundians to flee to neighboring
countries. This ethnic feeling behind the conflict is deep-rooted in struggles for state
power and access to resources.
Theme 3: Economic impact. This theme elucidates economic conditions and
their consequences resulting from the current crisis. Some economic issues that
interviewees highlighted ranged from declines in foreign aid, foreign trade, and
investments as well as the influx of Burundian refugees to neighboring countries in
search of better livelihoods. Essentially, all interviewees agreed that the economy was
impacted due to the crisis. Interviewee A summed this up by underscoring
life becoming different in terms of lots of investors left the country, and people
who fled the country are the people who own businesses. The middle class and
expats also left the country. Foreign aid was stopped, for a large part, on many
aspects like government and NGOs. Even NGOs suffered from the crisis. The
exchange rate dropped dramatically. So, all of that really comes down to
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economics and life just becoming really hard on everyone. And investors, and all
the people who are actually interested in investing in Burundi in some way or the
other, not being interested anymore, given that Burundi was a poor country to
begin with. (Age 30)
It is important to note that Burundi’s economy has depended on aid from western
donors, which was suspended in an attempt to get President Pierre Nkurunziza to
negotiate with opposition and civil society groups. In this context, interviewee D (age 26)
added,
Burundi is a poor country. . . . Half of the annual budget of Burundi is coming
from the European Union aid. Yes, it is the EU, which supports the annual budget
of Burundi. So, this, um, has caused the economy to decrease. In 2015, a dollar
could be bought for 1,680 Francs, but, today, it has gone up and is at 2,690
Francs. So, this is practically a devastating cost because the local money has lost
it value, and this affects the economy. The other thing is that there have been
many NGOs that have closed; this created unemployment. People had to sell their
cars; people had to change to see how they can abide. For instance, a father who
used to get a salary of 5,000 Burundian Francs and the NGO closed, he doesn’t
provide for the family. So, this has affected many families, and some are aware of
life to flee to go into refugee camps.
Interviewee F (age 22) argued that Burundi lost human capital due to the crisis,
with qualified Burundians fleeing the country due to violence and poor economic
conditions. This interviewee mentioned, “So, ah, the economy is low because there is
insecurity, and what I can say is that when even Burundians, when their businesses are
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not going well, they go to invest in another country, and that’s a lost.” In a similar vein,
interviewee G (age 27) believed,
Economically, many people are running away from the country. And, many
businesses are closing since the demonstration started. And, um . . . investment
and, so, when businesses closed their doors, many people stayed at home, and I
think people don’t go to work because there is no money. People started to leave
Burundi; they are becoming sick . . . you know.
Interviewee J (age 33) concurred,
There are many Burundians who are in foreign countries now because of the
crisis. And, it also affected the economy of the country. People are not investing
as they were doing before. This situation affected the economy of the country.
The society also . . . because people were trying to invest, but the crisis stopped
them.
Interviewee I (age 21) also agreed, “People keep fleeing the country . . . what does that
mean? When people flee the country, meaning, um, human capital is lost.”
Interviewee H (age 35) also agreed,
By chasing out a big number of people, like a director who could contribute in
managing the life of the country . . . now they are in exile. By chasing away, also,
a big number of poor citizens, those one who are in refugee camps in Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, and even in other countries in Europe. This is a loss for a
country because these are capital; these are people, who could produce for the
country, who are producing outside.
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The perception was that people leaving Burundi affects the economy. Perceptions
related to this theme showed that Burundi’s economic activities were seen as interrupted
and trade within regional and local markets as distressed. Most of the elements explaining
economic deterioration since the crisis began in April, 2015 were a result of the departure
of foreign investors, foreign aid, and NGOs. The influx of Burundians to neighboring
countries slowed down business and sped up the loss of human capital.
Theme 4: Sense of fear and insecurity. The theme of fear and insecurity
explained another outcome of the mounting repression that is driving Burundians into
neighboring countries. Fear and insecurity, in this context, meant the anxiety and fear that
people experienced because they felt uncertain and vulnerable. It also refers to economic
insecurity among Burundians. This theme captured interviewees’ deep feelings about
their lives and how they have dealt with the crisis. All of the interviewees mentioned
fearing that their lives were at risk for supporting the government or because of the
perception that they supported opposing parties. The interviewees also cited economic
insecurity as a reason that Burundians were fleeing. For instance, interviewee D argued,
A father who used to get a salary of 5,000 Burundian Francs and the NGO closed,
he doesn’t provide for the family. So, this has affected many family, and some are
aware of life to flee to go into refugee camps. (Age 26)
Interviewee E echoed the same view. She claimed, “Families are torn apart . . .
and there is high-level poverty. It’s very obvious that people are not comfortable in
economic situation and also about security” (Age 24). Interviewee A (age 30) linked
refugee issues to fear and insecurity. This interviewee believed that people were fleeing
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because they feared for their lives or were targeted because of their opposition to
President Nkurunziza’s third term. He stated,
I didn’t choose to live in the states. My situation is getting little better, but I had a
good job; I had my own non-profit, which was growing a lot. I was independent; I
was well off financially; things happened, and I just had to move and start my life
over, which hasn’t been . . . it’s very hard. Yeah, um, I am in exile now, and I am
starting my life over because of that term and everything that happens. This
affected lots of my friends who were protesting; a lot of them are in exile now.
Interviewee participant B (age 25) referred to the same condition. He believed,
My brother lost his job in 2015 and decided to go to Rwanda. There, he found a
job, but he got to be terminated and came back to Burundi, and now he is actually
jobless. He is actually 32 years old. He is back in Burundi because he could not
sustain himself in Rwanda, being jobless. So, he is back in Burundi. And I had
lots of family members who have fled. Some of them are in Rwanda, some of
them are in Uganda. And those who could . . . they have fled to Europe and the
western world, where they don’t even want to come back to Burundi.
Interviewee I (age 21) linked fear and insecurity to violence and psychological
issues. She contended,
Obviously, people died and then… properties destroyed, houses were burned,
people were killed. Um, people were not working. You see now there are so many
who are psychologically unstable you know because of the memories that they
have because of their relatives were killed in front of their eyes. It has very great
impact.

125
Several interviewees mentioned the violence committed by Imbonerakure youth
militia, which is the armed wing of the CNDD-FDD ruling party. Several interviewees
accused this group of terrorizing, and instilling fear in, Burundi. For instance, interviewee
C (age 30) claimed,
So, we saw the past regime using the army to cling to power. We saw the past
regime using youths to kind of target political opponents. We saw past regime
using torture, we saw past regime using mass graves to kind of, you know trying
to cover-up evidence of human rights violations.
Interviewee H (age 35) blamed both the Imbonerakure youth militia and armed
opposition groups. On one hand, he argued,
My family was affected, of course, because, like, where I am from in Gitega
province, the second town of Burundi, my family has been investigated several
times by the militia Imbonerakure or people belonging to the intelligence asking
where them where I am. My sisters were threatened several times and then they
decided to flee to Rwanda because they were planning to take them to jail and
rape them. So, in Bujumbura, the capital, where I was living at my aunt’s house, I
was attacked three times there. The house was stoned, the roof was broken, then
we had . . . you know, they did it again. Okay, so, that’s… you see, they were
affected in terms of properties; they were affected in terms of threats.
On the other hand, interviewee H also believed that “the violence was also seen where
some group of young people belonging to opposition parties’ used grenades and weapons
to also fight policeman, to fight military, to fight other civilians belonging to ruling
party.”
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Furthermore, interviewee J (age 33) explained the fear that he endured at the peak
of the protest:
I was afraid of what was happening. It was not easy to see how everything was
going bad. Lots of people were killed . . . yes, so many people died because of the
crisis. Everybody was afraid . . . everything was slow; people were saying that
maybe the war was going to occur. So, it was like I was afraid of that situation.
Interviewee G (age 27) discussed her experience at the height of the
demonstration, accusing the Imbonerakure youth militia of instilling fear in Burundi. She
explained,
Yes, in the first month of the demonstrations . . . it was very hard to move around.
It was scary to go out because of fear, because of insecurity. . . . I can say people
are running and they are scared to stay here because those men who are in power
are killing people and people are scared to stay here. So, yes, socially we have . . .
there is also an issue and human rights are not respected. We see many people
who are caught without reason, I mean legal reasons. And I can say that, um, they
target people to achieve their goals. Those Imbonerakure have to stop attacking;
and most of those women and girls attacked are Tutsi.
This theme shed light on the constant fear and insecurity among the interviewees. Many
interviewees described the climate of fear that drove hundreds of thousands of
Burundians to flee their country. Interviewees agreed that government forces,
Imbonerakure youth militia, and some armed opposition groups committed human rights
violations. The interviewees linked insecurity to lack of economic opportunities that
prompted Burundians to flee to neighboring countries.

127
Theme 5: Culture of impunity. The term “culture of impunity” describes the
condition in Burundi where impunity, over the years, became institutionalized and
systematized. Broadly, it means that leaders can get away with anything. The concept is
opposed to the idea of the rule of law, with the result that victims and survivors never
obtain justice and perpetrators are never brought to justice. In essence, the absence of
justice eliminates a vital deterrent to future perpetrators. Interviewees discussed their
perceptions of the culture of impunity from different viewpoints.
Interviewee C (age 30) used historical context to discuss the culture of impunity.
He stated,
We saw the past regime using youths to kind of target political opponents. We
saw past regime using torture, we saw past regime using mass graves to kind of,
you know trying to cover-up evidence of human rights violations. We saw people
fleeing the country because of the crisis. We are trying to understand the Burundi
conflict, the current Burundi crisis…within the historical context.
Interviewee A (age 30) explained, at great length, the lack of rule of law. He feared that
the president not following the law could set the precedent of encouraging lawlessness.
He argued, “It’s just lack of rule of law; just lawlessness and people fearing that if that
guy is supposed to be the leader and doesn’t follow the laws that were established by the
leadership, why should I follow the law?” Interviewee B (age 25) equated the lack of rule
of law and presidential impunity with the president using his position of authority in an
abusive manner. He explained,
It creates a bad ideology around impunity, and also the fact that actually if you are
in power, you have a hand in whatever is around: accountability, transparency,

128
and people’s freedom. So, manipulating term limits does give to people who are
actually the younger generation the perception that we live in a country where just
being in power, you can do whatever you want. Nobody will come after you, or
you don’t need to be accountable for A, B, C, or D. So, I think it’s a bad practice
that affects a lot.
Several interviewees alluded to the violence conducted by government forces, the
Imbonerakure youth militia, and some armed opposition groups. The interviewees
believed that violence prolonged the method of extra-judicial killings and political
assassinations. Interviewee G (age 27) accused the Imbonerakure youth militia of
targeting Tutsi men. She argued,
Those young men had guns, you know, and they started to arrest young people
who are not part of Imbonerakure who are not from CNDD-FDD. And most of
those young men, most of them were men, and most of them were Tutsi.
Similarly, Interviewee H (age 35) argued that the government failed to stop the
Imbonerakure youth militia from committing human rights violations––including
killings, unlawful detentions, and torture––against perceived government opponents.
Furthermore, he stated that the president
created another danger for the country because he armed a group of civilians, this
militia—Imbonerakure—that he created. This is danger for the society. It is
danger also for himself. . . . You wake up and see bodies that were killed. Another
consequence is impunity. Impunity has given freedom for people to kill whoever
they want. No one is controlling; justice is not working. So, at the end of it, there
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is no powerful institution, there is no strong institution in the country. We don’t
have a country rule by a serious institution.
Interviewee B (age 25) blamed security forces for targeting civilians. He alleged,
“The regime could send the police in the streets and they were shooting at people and the
army targeting specific people and disappearances.” Interviewee J (age 33) accused
armed opposition groups for the violence. He described armed opposition to violence this
way: “The opposition used grenades to attack the police and the military, and the police
went after them. And they killed military people, police, and civilians. It was a crazy
situation. And nothing happened.”
This theme encompassed a broad range of issues, ranging from the lack of rule of
law, violence carried out by security forces, violence by the Imbonerakure youth militia,
violence by armed opposition groups, and human rights abuses. The failure of the
government of Burundi to deliver justice and accountability meant that individuals
suffered serious violations of their rights yet received no justice or amends.
Theme 6: Violation of Arusha agreement and the Constitution. At the core of
the current crisis is the legality of President Nkurunziza’s third term bid. The interviews
related to this theme assessed the relevance of the Arusha agreement and Burundi’s
Constitution in light of his third-term bid. Both the Arusha agreement and Burundi’s
Constitution have provisions about term limitations, but this provision was strongly
debated by both supporters and opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid. On
the one hand, opponents of President Nkurunziza’s third term-bid argued that under the
Constitution and the Arusha agreement framework presidents can only seek election for
two terms in office. On the other hand, supporters of President Nkurunziza argued, his
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first term did not count toward the two-term limit since he was appointed by parliament
in 2005. Interviewees extensively discussed their perceptions on this issue. For instance,
interviewee A (age 30) explained,
I was against the third term, but I wasn’t for the opposition either. I wouldn’t have
cared if Nkurunziza’s party gave us another candidate regardless of how corrupt
they are or whatever. I just wanted Nkurunziza not to get a third term because that
just violates the Constitution.
Interviewee B (age 25) worried that the president would eliminate term limits
from the Constitution entirely, which could usher in authoritarian rule. He stressed, “My
fear would be that they changed the Constitution, then we go to the authoritarian regime
that we had in the previous. So, it means that the Arusha agreement would be thrown in
the dustbin.” Interviewee C (age 30) believed,
Nkurunziza’s aspiration to third term basically questioned the Arusha agreement,
which basically ended a decade-long civil war. So, Nkurunziza’s bid for a third
term basically attacks the social contract, as we called it at times, among
Burundians.
Furthermore, interviewee H (age 35) discussed the importance of Arusha
agreement, and the Constitution, which he believed were violated by the president. He
stated,
Presidential term limit is written in the Constitution and in the Arusha agreement
that no president should rule more than two terms. That sentence is enough. And,
also, you know, ruling is about law. What is written . . . everybody considered
what is written in the Constitution to be the law. So, just considering that, what
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was said before even himself or in his ruling party . . . it was said that the other
candidates . . . ah, you know, but at the end of the day he came himself.
Interviewee J (age 33) had a different perception of President Nkurunziza’s thirdterm bid. This interviewee claimed that the Arusha agreement and the Constitution were
not clear about term limits. He argued,
According to the Constitution of Burundi, the president was right . . . because the
Constitution was not clear. So, it was like, what he was saying was the
Constitution . . . even the opposition was saying the Constitution was not clear.
According to the Constitution, in one way, it was like, what we were saying about
term limits
. . . the president has rights. It was not easy to say that the president was wrong
about the third term according the Constitution. His third term is right because he
has rights to run again. Even the Arusha agreement was not clear about term
limits. This brought confusion between the opposition and the government. But
the Constitution was not clear, and the Constitution is more important than the
Arusha agreement.
Interviewee D (age 26) shared the same perception about the lack of clarity in the
Constitution about term limits. He suggested,
There was the Constitution and there is an article in it, where it is written how
many terms are limited for a presidential term. But the problem is, it was not clear
or indicated how these terms are to be run.
Interviewee J (age 33) reiterated this view:
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Maybe, for me, as the Constitution was not clear, Burundians could let President
Pierre Nkurunziza run for another term and then look for how to correct this error,
which was the Constitution. Because when you start to analyze the Constitution,
you can see that there is an error in the Constitution. The Constitution was stated
in a way that the opposition went against him. So, Burundians could understand
each other to correct the error in the Constitution.
This theme encompassed different perceptions about the Constitution and the
Arusha agreement. Some interviewees indicated that inconsistency between the Arusha
agreement and Burundi’s Constitution created violence.
Theme 7: Culture of greed and corruption. The last theme in the qualitative
interview portion covered the culture of greed and corruption. Greed and corruption are
defined by the desire for money or power, which often guarantee political elites full
control over their economies and its rents. This concept suggests that politics in Burundi
are synonymous with wealth and the quest for power. Interviewees stressed the economic
and social costs associated with greed and corruption in Burundi.
Some interviewees believed that President Nkurunziza extended his term in office
because of an appetite for power, greed, and corruption. For instance, interviewee C (age
30) implied that one of the reasons for the president to extend his term was economics.
He stated,
If you see the level of corruption at the government level or around Nkurunziza,
that would be one factor. The fact that they can amass lots of money . . . with
them being in power. It sounds to me like not logical, but I would use logical for
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the purpose of understanding. . . . In their thinking . . . if they leave power, they
would be losing those opportunities to have access to those resources.
Interviewee H (age 35) explained in detail the reason that President Nkurunziza
extended his term in office. He believed that the reason was the misuse and selling of
Burundi’s natural resources to companies. He stated,
Another point of cause is about the economy. This is somebody that I said that
came from the bush, who doesn’t care about others. Somebody who wants to take
all common goods, all common goods, which should be shared by all members of
Burundians. He wants to enjoy all this goodness of Burundi. Burundi is a country,
which has nickel, which had gold, which has many resources, which has many
good lands; good fertile land, which has petrol in Lake Tanganyika. All of these
he will be enjoying, and he signed a contract with powerful countries and people.
So, he wants to enjoy all this goodness.
Interviewee G (age 27) argued a similar viewpoint:
I think it was for his own ambitions, his personal ambition. He was just . . . um, he
just wanted to stay there to keep the power, so that him and the people who are
with him could use the country’s resources . . . um, as they want.
Interviewee F (age 22) connected greed and corruption to power. She also viewed
greed and corruption as a wider problem in Africa. She explained,
You know the majority of African leaders love power, if I can say that. No one, I
don’t know, no one wants just pass power to others. And, you understand, on one
hand is understanding because it gives them the immunity, wealth, honor, and all
kinds of material benefits.
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With respect to this theme, interviewees’ perceptions of greed and corruption
ranged from the of exploitation of natural resources and the importance of holding
political power, which guaranteed that President Nkurunziza and his political elites could
maintain full control over the economy and its rents.
Interview Data Summary
The purpose of the qualitative interview data analysis was to examine how the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace
and stability among people in Burundi. Data were collected through open-ended and
semi-structured phone and Skype interviews. It was clear that the crisis in Burundi had
different moving components, but throughout the qualitative interviews, participants
acknowledged the consequences of the crisis to their lives. Themes that emerged from
these interviews included the need for term limits, concern about ethnic violence,
economic impacts, the sense of fear and insecurity, the culture of impunity, the violation
of Arusha Accords and the Constitution, and a culture of greed and corruption.
Interviewees established that these issues contributed to the country’s violent history and
argued that if the political crisis was not resolved, violence risked repeating itself. These
themes revealed the long-standing violent history of Burundi and a greater awareness of
vulnerability among Burundians regarding the current crisis. Some interviewees broadly
expressed views on one or several of the themes, while some interviewees made specific
contributions regarding all themes. Accordingly, all 10 interviewees’ opinions were
described in this study.
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The purpose of the next section, the qualitative document analysis, was to support
interviewees’ lived experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term limit
manipulation.
Document Analysis
For the document analysis, data were collected from Afrobaromater, ACLED,
Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty International reports, International Crisis Group
reports, United Nations Security Council reports, newspapers, and transcripts from the
United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. Open and axial coding was
applied to analysis of the data. This portion of the data analysis, using thematic analysis,
revealed five key themes: (a) importance of term limits, (b) cycle of impunity, (c) climate
of fear, (d) fear of ethnic crisis, and (e) refugee crisis. Data are presented with quotes
from documents to strengthen and enhance the qualitative data analysis process. Table 12
shows a summary of the themes and sub-themes established from the documents.
Theme 1: Importance of term limits. Term limits are defined as measures to
limit the number of years that a leader can hold office. Many of the documents analyzed
the importance of presidential term limits. Burundi’s Constitution only allows a president
to serve a maximum two five-year terms. President Nkurunziza and his supporters
maintained that he was first appointed by parliament in 2005, instead of through universal
suffrage, and that he was, therefore, qualified to run again. This was the origin of the
current crisis. ACLED (2016) detailed the opposition to President Nkurunziza’s third
term:
Opponents of a third term cite term limits stipulated by Article 96 of the
Constitution and adherence to the Arusha Accords, which ended the civil war
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fought from 1993 to 2005 by providing constitutional checks on monopolies of
power by any one party or ethnic group. (p. 3)
Table 12
Themes and Sub-Themes from Data Sources
Theme
Sub-themes
Importance of term limits Checks and balances
Two-term limits and democracy
Arusha Accords
Democracy over dictatorship
Cycle of Impunity
Corrupt judges
Violence by security forces
Violence by Imbonerakure
Violence by armed opposition groups
Corruption within courts systems
Weak justice system
Court ruled in favor of third term
Lack of trust in public institutions
Climate of fear
Gender violence
Repression against demonstrators
Government crackdown on civil society groups
Imbonerakure youth wing forced people to protest for the government
Violence by armed opposition groups
Violence by Imbonerakure
Fear of Ethnic Crisis
Ethnicity issues
Hutu-Tutsi violence
Ethnic issues
Fear of ethnic violence
Refugee crisis
Influx of refugees
Burundians fled to neighboring countries
Refugee issues

In her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Thomas-Greenfield,
(2015) argued that President Nkurunziza’s third term violated the Arusha agreement. She
stated that President Nkurunziza’s “decision to pursue a third term also clearly violated
terms of the 2000 Arusha agreement, which led to the end of the Burundian Civil War
and became the foundation for relative peace and security over the past decade” (p. 2).
Afrobarometer’s study supported this argument. Bentley et al. (2016) argued that
president Nkurunziza’s actions “stand in sharp contrast to the convictions that Burundi
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citizens expressed in the most recent Afrobarometer survey, in September-October 2014,
including support for democracy, for free and fair elections and for limiting presidential
terms to a maximum of two.” (p. 1). Bentley et al. (2016) argued, “A majority of
Burundians (62%) favor a two-term limit on presidential mandates, as provided for by the
Constitution of Burundi” (p. 2). A previous Afrobarometer study indicated, “Only 51% of
Burundian citizens supported presidential term limits” (Afrobarometer, 2015, p. 1). In
contrast, at his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nimuraba (2015)
argued that “people in the countryside do not care about presidential terms or the nuances
of constitutional law. They likely know nothing about what Arusha Accords say about
presidential term limits” (p. 4). In a report featured on Reuters, Manirabarusha (2016)
wrote that Burundi could eliminate presidential term limits from its Constitution since
“Justin Nzoyisaba, chairman of CNDI, a commission set up by Nkurunziza last year to
canvas public opinion on Burundi’s political system, said late on Wednesday that most
Burundians wanted term limits abolished” (Manirabarusha, 2016, p. 1).
Siegle (2015) examined the implications of term limit manipulation on a
continental level. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he stated,
The outcome of the term limits battle in Burundi also has political implications
for the rest of Africa. Since 2000, a dozen African leaders have tried to
circumvent term limits that were instituted to limit the monopolization of power
and foster a culture of democratic transitions in Africa. (p. 3)
An ACLED (2016) report also addressed term limit manipulation on a continental level.
The report stated, “Burundi’s initial riots and protests starting in April 2015 mirror that of
other African countries where long-standing presidents have attempted to defy or
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constitutionally remove term limits” (p. 2). Furthermore, Siegle (2015) connected
President Nkurunziza’s desire to run for a third term to greed and corruption. He
believed,
In addition to the natural desire of many leaders in positions of authority to extend
their time in power, Nkurunziza’s efforts to retain control of the presidency likely
stem from a Burundian political economy that rewards senior officials financially.
Access to political power in Burundi allows for considerable control over public
procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and
reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments. (Siegle, 2015, p. 3)
The question of the constitutionality of President Nkurunziza’s third term was
entirely central to the current crisis. Analysis of theme revealed that the issue of term
limits would further entrench and divide the Burundian population, which will almost
undoubtedly weaken the fragile peace and stability of Burundi.
Theme 2: Cycle of impunity. The theme of the cycle of impunity covered the
lack of consequences or lack of rule of law in Burundi leading to a culture of impunity.
Among the overarching issues related to this theme included violence carried out by
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. This theme
uncovered the systematic corruption within the justice system. Concern exists among
Burundians that members of government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and
armed opposition groups involved in human rights abuses during protests were not held
accountable. The government failed to launch an investigation or to prosecute members
of government forces who were blamed for violence, rape, and killings. The government
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also failed to investigate claims of killings, harassment, and the intimidation of
individuals by Imbonerakure youth militia and armed opposition groups.
Thomas-Greenfield (2015) argued that the cycle of impunity in Burundi was one
of the major reasons for the continuing crisis. She stated,
The government has not taken action to seriously investigate credible allegations
of human rights violations and abuses by members of the ruling party youth wing,
known as the Imbonerakure, the Burundian National Police, and the National
Intelligence Service, nor has the government taken action to hold these same
groups accountable. (p. 2)
The United Nations Security Council (2017) Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi
also alluded to the culture of impunity. The report revealed that the “alleged perpetrators
of human rights violations continue to benefit from total impunity. Very little effort has
been made to investigate human rights abuses committed by State agents or the
Imbonerakure.” (p. 7). Taking a similar view, a report by Human Rights Watch (2017b)
detailed the cycle of violence and the lack of efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. It
stated,
Burundi ruling party’s youth league, the Imbonerakure, have brutally killed,
tortured, and severely beaten scores of people across the country in recent months,
Human Rights Watch said today. The killings and other ill-treatment reflect the
widespread impunity for Imbonerakure members and the government’s
unwillingness to prosecute or rein in the group. (p. 1)
A report by Amnesty International (2017a) also implicated armed opposition
groups in violence against government officials and civilians. The report revealed:
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In early 2016, there were regular grenade explosions in Bujumbura followed by
targeted killings. On 22 March Lieutenant Colonel Darius Ikurakure, an army
officer implicated in numerous human rights violations, was shot dead inside the
army's headquarters. On 25 April gunmen fired on the car of General Athanase
Kararuza, killing him, his wife Consolate Gahiro and his assistant Gérard
Vyimana and fatally wounding his daughter Daniella Mpundu. The previous day
Human Rights Minister Martin Nivyabandi and Diane Murindababisha were
injured in an attack. On 13 July unidentified gunmen killed Hafsa Mossi, a former
minister and member of the East African Legislative Assembly. A senior
presidential adviser, Willy Nyamitwe, was injured in an assassination attempt on
28 November. (p. 2)
This account suggested that perpetrators of human rights abuses frequently enjoy
immunity due to lack of proper investigation and punishment.
A Human Rights Watch (2018) report agreed: “Impunity for serious crimes
committed in Burundi remains the norm. The justice system is manipulated by ruling
party and intelligence officials and judicial procedures are routinely flouted” (p. 5).
Moreover, the weak justice system in Burundi is often blamed for its lack of will to
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of violence. Amnesty International (2017a)
concurred:
Victims of human rights violations continued to face serious challenges in
accessing justice. Journalist Esdras Ndikumana was tortured in August 2015 and
filed a complaint at the Supreme Court in October 2015. No progress was made in
the case in 2016. (p. 3)
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Wambua and Logan (2017) of Afrobarometer suggested:
Perpetrators have enjoyed near-impunity from a weak judicial system pressured
into silence or collaboration. A notable example was described by former
Constitutional Court Vice President Sylvère Nimpagaritse, who after fleeing to
Rwanda said the high court’s judges had come under “enormous pressure and
even death threats” to rubber-stamp as legal a disputed third term for President
Pierre Nkurunziza in 2015. (p. 1)
In detailing another case, Human Rights Watch (2017b) stated,
One man said he filed a complaint with the police in February 2016, after two
policemen raped his wife. They told him he was “staining the image of the
security forces.” After police threatened him and Imbonerakure members beat
him up, he withdrew the complaint. (p. 2)
Examination of this theme revealed that there is no culpability for gross human
rights abuses in Burundi. The several accounts related to this theme showed that state
security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups have
perpetrated serious human rights violations. This theme also clarified that the justice
system in Burundi lacks impartiality and, consequently, that the Burundian government is
neither willing to nor capable of conducting efficient investigations or prosecutions.
Theme 3: Climate of fear. The theme of the climate of fear emphasized the
constant climate of fear in Burundi. A climate of fear is defined as the perception that
individuals or groups may enflame fear in the general population in order to attain
political objectives. In the context of Burundi, this entails fear imposed by security
forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups. Several of the
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documents indicated that the mounting level of human rights violations have caused deep
and widespread fear among Burundians. The International Crisis Group (2016) report
suggested that the “political strategy to dismantle the accord and the return of violent
rhetoric and tactics reminiscent of the civil war have generated great fear within
Burundian society” (p. i). Likewise, the Human Rights Watch (2017b) report implied,
“Burundians live in fear of the next attack, afraid to speak out to denounce the killings,
torture, and other abuses” (p. 1). The same report also stated, “victims of rape and sexual
violence who said they had recognized members of the Imbonerakure who had raped
them. Some women were targeted because their husbands or male relatives were
members of opposition parties such as the FNL” (Human Rights Watch, 2017b, p. 4).
Siegle (2015) argued, some Burundians feel a greater sense of vulnerability. He
argued,
The foundation for genocide—the mindset climate of fear, and polarization—has
been laid. Some Burundians have said the level of apprehension is now worse
than during the civil war. Then, most of the killing was between armed
combatants. Now civilians are also being targeted, causing a greater sense of
vulnerability. (p. 2)
Amnesty International (2017a) emphasized intimidation conducted by
Imbonerakure youth militia: “throughout the country, the Imbonerakure put pressure on
people to join it or the ruling CNDD-FDD and carried out campaigns of intimidation
against those who refused” (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 2). Human Rights Watch
(2017b) revealed, “Many people refuse to file judicial complaints against Imbonerakure
members because they fear them and have lost confidence in the justice system, which
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they believe is unable to help the victims and may be involved in abuses” (p. 2).
Furthermore, Human Rights Watch (2017b) “learned of several additional incidents of
abuse, but victims were afraid to speak about what they or family members had suffered.
Many said they feared reprisals from ruling party members if they spoke about the
abuses” (p. 2). These kinds of intimidation tactics caused profound and pervasive anxiety
among Burundians.
In her U.S. Congressional testimony, Thomas-Greenfield (2015) suggested,
“Some elements opposed to President Nkurunziza have conducted targeted attacks on
government officials, police officers, and civilians. These actions also threaten to escalate
the situation and spark more widespread violence” (p. 3). This cycle of violence instills
fear in the general population. Again, Siegle (2015) detailed the cycle of violence
between security forces and armed opposition groups. He observed,
In the face of this intimidation and exodus, peaceful protests have waned, and
violent reprisals have emerged. In early August, a well-coordinated rocket attack
killed the most feared military figure in the country, General Adolphe
Nshimirimana. Reflecting an apparent decapitation strategy, several other senior
military figures have also been assassinated or targeted. Several dozen police
officers have also been attacked. In apparent retaliation, civil society and
opposition political leaders or their family members have been killed. (pp. 1-2)
The same view was supported by Thomas-Greenfield (2015), who reported,
Many of those attempting to flee have reported violent confrontations by party
militias and police while en route. Since the crisis began in April 2015,
amorphous groups of armed opposition actors have also carried out violence
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against the security services and key targets in Bujumbura, and in Burundi’s
border areas, further exacerbating the conflict. (p. 3)
Another Human Rights Watch report (2018) underscored violence carried out by
armed opposition groups. The report indicated that
[l]ocal journalists and human rights activists reported several grenade attacks and
killings believed to have been committed by armed opposition groups. Other
armed opposition attacks appeared to be more targeted and covert. (p. 4)
It is abundantly clear from the reports that the crisis in Burundi developed into a
retaliatory conflict among government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed
opposition groups and that this instilled fear among Burundians.
Theme 4: Fear of Ethnic crisis. The theme of fear of ethnic crisis refers to the
existing fear of ethnic conflict among Burundians. More disturbing have been ethnic
displays of violence emerging in Burundi. Political elites on both sides may be exploiting
memories of past traumas for political goals, which could exacerbate the crisis.
Concerning fear of ethnic crisis, mass ethnic violence has not been extensive in the recent
crisis. However, the AU, UN, Burundians, scholars, and policymakers are afraid that
persistent ethnic concern could deepen violence in the near future. The ACLED (2016)
report concurred: “because of Burundi’s recent conflict history, some, including the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, have warned that the
ethnic dimensions of the conflict ‘are flashing red’” (p. 1). An International Crisis Group
report (2016) reported that President Nkurunziza’s third term brought issues of ethnicity
to the forefront. The report stated, “while many Burundians and the international
community believed the ethnic problem had been solved with the Arusha accord, it has
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returned to the fore with President Nkurunziza’s third term” (International Crisis Group,
2016, p. i).
In an Op-ed for the Washington Post, Jones (2015) wrote,
The government uses ethnic rhetoric presumably to signal to the opposition the
potential violence that could come their way and incite citizens to participate in
violence. The opposition uses ethnicized rhetoric to push for international
intervention, which has the potential of changing the makeup of government. (p.
3)
The United Nations Security Council (2017) Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi
also mentioned how
political figures have used inflammatory and hate-filled language in speeches, on
social media, in communiqués and in the press, calling on the population to
‘protect’ the country against so-called traitors and plotters allegedly trying to
destabilize Burundi. (p. 9)
In Burundi, a key source of ethnic conflict is memories of past traumas, which increase
fear and anxiety. These feelings, in turn, create a toxic pattern of doubt and suspicion that
leads to ethnic violence. The Amnesty International’s (2017a) report implied that
“the fragile cohesion between different ethnic groups resulting from the implementation
of the Arusha Accords was destabilized by the political crisis. Incendiary rhetoric from
high-level officials increased tensions towards the end of the year” (p. 3). Siegle (2015)
substantiated this concept by arguing,
In an effort to mobilize support among the Hutu majority, the CNDD-FDD has
been increasingly employing ethnically polarizing tactics. Purges among senior
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military and government officials have largely been ethnically based. In
November CNDD-FDD leaders began invoking ethnically incendiary language,
recalling the pattern employed in the Rwandan genocide. (p. 2)
In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nimuraba (2015) argued for
a different point of view regarding the ethnic dynamics in Burundi:
The shared struggle that both Hutu and Tutsi now experience is endangered by a
small number of older people who retain vivid memories of ethnic hate the violent
it spewed. These few sadly try to embed their fears among younger generations.
(p. 4)
Examination of the theme of fear of ethnic violence comprised diverse approaches
to conceptualizing fear of ethnic crisis among Burundians. In Burundi, past ethnic
conflict was the main source of fear and anxiety.
Theme 5: Refugee crisis. Examination of the last theme in this qualitative data
analysis, that of the refugee crisis, showed that the refugee crisis was a great concern to
Burundi’s neighbors. Due to border configurations in the Greater Lakes Region, leaders
of neighboring countries gradually became concerned that the crisis could have a
spillover effect across their borders. This theme emphasized insecurity, sociopolitical
concerns, and socioeconomic issues, which were the reasons that Burundians fled to
neighboring countries for safety and better livelihood.
For example, as the International Crisis Group (2016) reported,
Some 250,000 Burundians have fled, including a significant portion of the
political and economic establishment as well as civil society activists. The flight
has drained Burundi of its most dynamic citizens and exposed divisions between
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the regime on one hand, and the army, the capital and the Tutsi community on the
other. (p. i)
Amnesty International (2017b) reported that Burundian refugees continue to have a real
fear of abuse by security forces and Imbonerakure youth movement. The report stated,
Approximately 100,000 people fled Burundi in 2016, bringing the total number of
Burundian refugees who had fled the ongoing crisis to over 327,000. The Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 139,000
people were internally displaced due to the crisis and natural disasters. People
trying to flee were abused and robbed. Members of the Imbonerakure were
largely responsible, although refugees also accused people in police and military
uniforms. (p. 6)
A UNHCR (2017) report described the humanitarian crisis by claiming, “Burundian
refugees remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance and support in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania” (p.
1).
The fragile situation in Burundi is creating a constant influx of refugees to
neighboring countries. The United Nations Security Council (2017) report of the
Secretary-General on Burundi underscored some interrelations between the ongoing
crisis within the country and concerns for economic decline, youth employment, and
Burundians fleeing to neighboring countries. The report claimed:
The key macroeconomic indicators show a decline in gross domestic product
growth, a significant loss of foreign exchange reserves and a sharp drop in public
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investment. Public debt increased to over 50 per cent in 2016. Unemployment
rates are soaring, especially among youth. (p. 9)
Another issue that has played a critical role in spilling conflict from one country
to another in the Great Lakes Region was forced migration resulting from conflict, as a
consequence of which Burundi’s neighbors worried about security issues and bearing the
economic burden of the crisis. Due to the ethnic and border configuration of the region,
refugees could easily bring conflict into neighboring countries, as there are parallel ethnic
relationships within the Great Lakes Region. Kanyangara (2016) supported this view,
arguing that
the Great Lakes Region has experienced situations where refugees were able to
trigger significantly more destabilizing dynamics by impacting directly on ethnic
relations in their host countries, or by building a base for rebel group mobilization
and operations. (p. 8)
Furthermore, Thomas-Greenfield, (2015) noted, “The crisis in Burundi has also
beset its neighbors with refugees continuing to cross into Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda,
and the DRC, and at times exacerbated existing regional tensions” (p. 7). Siegle (2015)
shed light on the broader implications of economic burden on the entire region. He
claimed, “already the Burundi crisis has placed a burden on its neighbors with 223,000
refugees—mostly in Rwanda and Tanzania. During the 1993-2005 civil war there was
870,000 Burundian refugees, exacting a prolonged economic burden on the region” (p.
3).
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This theme emphasized the broader implications of the refugee crisis in Burundi
for the entire Great Lakes Region. The document reviewed in this section revealed the
inherent humanitarian and economic problems of the conflict.
Document Analysis Summary
The purpose of the qualitative data analysis was to examine how the conflict
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perception of peace and
stability among people in Burundi. The documents used in this section included
Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports,
International Crisis Group Report, United Nations Reports, newspapers, and transcripts
from United States Congressional Testimony Hearing on Burundi. Themes that emerged
from this section included the importance of term limits, the cycle of impunity, the
climate of fear, fear of an ethnic crisis, and the refugee crisis. The specific documents
analyzed included four Afrobarometer reports on Burundi, the ACLED 2016 country
report, the Human Rights Watch Report 2017, the Human Rights Watch Report 2018, the
Amnesty International Report 2017, the Amnesty International Report 2016, the
International Crisis Group 2016 report, four testimonies before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Subcommittee on the political and security crisis in Burundi, the
United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Washington Post, and Reuters News.
Examination of these documents disclosed a long-standing violent history in Burundi and
a greater understanding of insecurity among Burundians concerning the current crisis.
Open and axial coding was applied for theme development. This process included
becoming familiar with the data, generating initial codes, analyzing themes, and defining
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themes. Some documents broadly contributed understanding of one or several of the
themes, while some documents made equal contributions to all of the themes. Analysis of
data in this section revealed that the root causes and dimensions of conflict in Burundi
were multifaceted and that the country’s fragile peace is at stake, as is peace in the
Greater Lakes Region as a whole.
Methodological Triangulation
Methodological triangulation is defined as the integration of quantitative and
qualitative methods so that different perspectives can shed light on a phenomenon. An
integration of quantitative and qualitative methods is often understood to assist in
supporting the claims that may result from a study (Patton, 1990). The mixed-methods
approach for this study included the triangulation of online survey questionnaires,
interviews, and document analysis to measure how the conflict surrounding presidential
term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability among people in
Burundi. The goal of the qualitative data analysis was to rationalize, strengthen, and offer
more background to quantitative results. Triangulation reduced bias by acting as a check
or balance against data from only one method (Patton, 1990).
Quantitative results indicated that a statistically significant difference existed
between Hutus’ and Tutsis’ perceptions of the conflict. For instance, on issues of who
supports term limits, whether a third-term bid violated the Arusha agreement, whether
term limits should be taken out of the Constitution, who is responsible for the violence,
whether the crisis will have an enduring impact on the population, including a persistent
fear of attack, and whether the current crisis will make Burundi more volatile.
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Examination of these questions through the documents reflected some of the themes that
were uncovered in both the interview and document analysis.
In analysis of data when split between Hutus and Tutsis, the results indicated that
some statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in their
responses to all of the questions. However, both Hutus and Tutsis viewed this crisis along
ethnic lines. These and other findings in the quantitative analysis enriched the notion of
ethnic dynamics, fear and insecurity, the importance of term limits, the culture of
impunity, and violations of the Constitution and the Arusha agreement, which was
mentioned in the interviews and discussed in the document analysis. In terms of gender
differences, the results showed significant differences between female and male
participants. For almost all of the questions, women were opposed to violence by
government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups more than
men. Across the board, women expressed greater support for term limitations and the
Arusha agreement than did men. Furthermore, most women’s concerns about the conflict
were not based on party or ethnic lines, while men saw the same issues along party and
ethnic lines. That is, Tutsi men blamed Imbonerakure youth militia for the violence,
opposed President Nkurunziza’s third term bid, and supported the Arusha agreement
while Hutu men blamed armed opposition groups for the violence, supported President
Nkurunziza’s third term bid, and opposed the Arusha agreement.
Both the interview transcripts and the document analysis produced consistent and
convergent results. The qualitative data analysis elucidated similar aspects of how the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perceptions of
peace and stability among people in Burundi. The qualitative data analysis produced
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eight combined key themes: (a) the importance of term limits, (b) violation of the
Constitution and the Arusha agreement, (c) a climate of fear and insecurity, (d) a concern
for ethnic violence, (d) a culture of impunity, (e) economic impacts, (f) the refugee crisis,
and (8) the culture of greed and corruption.
The qualitative data corresponded with, explained the quantitative data, and
helped to categorize the common themes. The qualitative data analysis also facilitated an
understanding of conflict resolution frameworks and interventions. The quantitative
results allowed for an understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term
limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and stability among people in
Burundi while the qualitative results generated rich information relevant to the
phenomenon under study. In terms of matters of ethnicity, there were several parallels
between the quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data highlighted the
importance of presidential term limits, the Arusha agreement, volatility, fear, insecurity,
ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis, and violence by security forces,
Imbonerakure, and armed opposition groups. These issues were viewed along ethnic
lines, and they have common characteristics. That is, the politics of ethnicity or identity
politics helped Hutus and Tutsis to mobilize their bases in conflict situations. An
important factor of this polarization also exists in the correlation between power struggle
and the politics of ethnicity in Burundi.
Similarly, the qualitative results emphasized the importance of presidential term
limits, the Arusha agreement, the longstanding ethnic dynamics, fear and insecurity,
violence by security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups.
The qualitative results revealed that the mains cause of political violence in Burundi is
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fear, ethnic animosity, and power struggle. Political leaders used fear and ethnic
resentment for their own gains. As such, the social issues examined in the themes
explored here are exploited as grounds for promoting shared values, beliefs, or concerns,
as well as a means of achieving security.
In terms of gender differences, there were similarities and differences between the
quantitative and qualitative data. In the quantitative results, there were significant
differences between female and male perceptions of the conflict. For example, the
women interviewed, in general, did not perceive the conflict along ethnic lines. Instead,
they blamed the violence on government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed
opposition groups. By contrast, men viewed the conflict primarily along ethnic lines.
Most of the Hutu men interviewed blamed armed opposition groups for the violence,
fear, and insecurity and accused government forces and Imbonerakure youth militia of
fomenting the violence. The quantitative results for gender differences showed how
Burundian men and women perceived this conflict. As suggested earlier, a possible
reason for gender differences on this matter could be that armed conflict and its aftermath
touches women’s lives in ways that vary from their effects on men.
Moreover, the qualitative data generated similar results between men and women.
Both men and women underscored the importance of presidential term limits, the Arusha
agreement, the longstanding ethnic dynamics, the culture of impunity, economic impacts,
refugee issues, fear and insecurity and violence by security forces, Imbonerakure youth
militia, and armed opposition groups.
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Chapter Summary
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to present results that stemmed from the analysis of
the online survey data, the interview data, and the document data. In this mixed method
design study, the researcher used online survey questionnaires to determine whether a
statistically significant difference existed between Hutus and Tutsis, as well as gender
differences, regarding how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation
affected peace and stability in Burundi. For the interview portion, the researcher used
open-ended and semi-structured phone and Skype interviews to understand the conflict.
For the document review, data were used from Afrobaromater, ACLED, Human Rights
Watch Reports, Amnesty International Reports, an International Crisis Group Report,
United Nations reports, newspapers, and transcripts from United States Congressional
Testimony Hearing on Burundi.
The researcher corroborated the findings derived from the data via the
triangulation method, matching the results of the online survey responses, interviews, and
documents. The findings verified the importance of presidential term limits in Burundi,
the Arusha agreement, ethnic dynamics, and fear and insecurity among Burundians. In
the following chapter, the results presented in this chapter are broadly discussed,
connected to the literature and the theory. Furthermore, a conflict resolution framework,
the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research will be presented.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
This study examined how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit
manipulation has affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in Burundi.
Chapter 5 will review the results and interpretations of this study, their connection to the
literature, and their connection to theory. It will also present a conflict resolution
framework, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.
Discussions and Interpretations of Findings
The quantitative data showing Hutu and Tutsi opinions on how presidential term
limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in Burundi
indicated that statistically significant differences existed between the two groups in
response to all of the questions asked of them. For instance, the quantitative results
suggested that Tutsi respondents blamed government forces and Imbonerakure youth
militia for the violence in Burundi, while Hutus blamed armed opposition groups for the
violence. In addition, more than the Hutu respondents, the Tutsi respondents had higher
rates of support for term limitations and believed the Arusha agreement and the
Constitution were violated. Further, Tutsi believed, more than Hutus, that the current
crisis would make Burundi more volatile. Additionally, Tutsi respondents had higher
agreement with the view that the crisis has an enduring impact on the population,
including persistent fear, than Hutus. It is important to note that, historically, political
divisions and ethnic divisions have overlapped. For instance, “Burundi’s past conflicts
have stemmed from divisions between social groups, primarily along ethnic lines,
between Hutus and Tutsis, but [were] intertwined with social and institutional control,
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economic opportunity, and a history of discriminatory policies” (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2015, p. 1). The results suggested that Hutus and Tutsis viewed the current
crisis along ethnic lines. Studies by Daley (2006), Ndikumana (2005), and Uvin (1999)
on ethnic divisions in Burundi implied that identity politics or ethno-politics have served
both Hutus and Tutsis in their struggle for power and access to resources. It also served
both groups in their effort to attain security in conflict situations.
The quantitative results supported the findings related to some of the themes in
the qualitative analysis. That is because, due to violence conducted by government
forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups, Burundians are
concerned about ethnic violence, fear and insecurity, refugee issues, and the culture of
impunity. The quantitative results also suggested that Hutus and Tutsis had differing
opinions on which groups are responsible for the violence. These findings aligned with
Vandeginste’s (2011, 2015) studies on long-standing ethnic divisions within Burundi.
She argued that ethnicity, engineered in a manner that benefits political elite interests and
ethnic resentment, is a learned phenomenon that develops from political struggle and the
unfair distribution of resources. It is important to note that the role of political elites or
governing elites in Burundi, to some degree, created some of these long-standing ethnic
divisions. In his book, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Posner (2005) explained
that politics revolve around identity politics and that politicians play the ethnic card for
purposes of political mobilization. Clearly, the issue of ethnicity is contrived in a manner
that helps ruling or governing elite interests in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi looms with
further division as allegations of ethnicism are directed to both Hutu and Tutsi politicians.
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Daley (2006), Ndikumana (2005), and Vandeginste (2015) provided a better
explanation for ethno-politics and violence in Burundi. In their conclusions, they claimed
that ethnicity, power struggle, and violence have been the main divisive principles in
Burundi given their successive strategies of marginalization and exclusion. In a larger
sense, the quantitative results suggested that historical animosities and resentments
between Hutu and Tutsi still exist. This conclusion substantiated several of the themes
drawn out of the qualitative analysis, which referred to concern for ethnic violence, a
climate of fear and insecurity, and the culture of impunity.
In analyzing how gender differences in attitudes toward presidential term limit
manipulation affected perceptions of peace and stability of people in Burundi by gender,
the results suggested that women’s perceptions of the conflict differed from those of men.
Namely, respondents tended to blame the violence on government forces, Imbonerakure
youth militia, and opposition armed groups more than men. Women respondents had a
higher agreement that presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis
than males. Women respondents also believed that the current crisis would make Burundi
more volatile than did men. Additionally, women had a higher agreement that the crisis
has enduring impact on the population, including persistent fear, than men. These
findings are relevant to previous research on gender perceptions of war and violence
showing that women are more likely to condemn violence and to strive for nonviolent
resolutions than men. McKay (1998) argued that since women are especially affected by
armed conflict, they encounter tremendous challenges in contexts of war and violence.
Another explanation for this, according to Wilén (2014), is that women in Burundi are
opposed to violence due to the devastating effects of armed violence on women. As
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stated earlier, after the twelve-year ethnic civil war (1993-2005), Burundian women
suffered greatly both during and after the cessation of violence; this could be a reason
that Burundian women’s perception of the conflict differed from those of men.
Further, the findings of this research supported previous research on how women
cope in post-conflict societies. Wilén’s (2014) report on gender narratives in Burundi
suggested that women show broader support for issues related to peace and reconciliation
than do men. The quantitative results also verified Rackley’s (2005) findings that
although both men and women recognize the adverse impact of armed conflict on civilian
well-being and the social fabric, there remains a key gender gap in perceptions of armed
conflict and safety. The qualitative data––which suggested that because of the violence
carried out by security forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition, most of
the women in this study were concerned about ethnic violence and the culture of
impunity and were highly conscious of fear and insecurity––supported previous results
related to male and female perceptions of the crisis. Burundian women were more likely
to condemn violence and to support the Arusha agreement and term limitations than were
men.
The qualitative data analysis revealed similar characteristics of how the conflict
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perceptions of peace and
stability of people in Burundi. The findings of the qualitative data will be discussed
accordingly. In both the interviews and the document analysis, the findings indicated that
term limits maintain significant oversight of the concentration of power, support
democracy, and safeguard continuing stability. For instance, an interviewee mentioned
that term limits are seen as precursors to multiparty democracy and as a deterrent to
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dictatorship. Another interviewee mentioned that term limits prevent institutional
corruption. This concept confirmed Yarwood’s (2016) and Afrobarometer’s (2015)
conclusions about the importance of term limits. They argued that civil society groups
and citizens are progressively asking for a more accountable government and that
Africans desire democracy and support presidential term limitations.
Another important concept that one interviewee expressed was that the president
and his CNDD-FDD party officials were likely to introduce the abolishment of
presidential term limits. One interviewee stated that the president was trying to change
the Constitution so that he could rule forever. In the past, the government attempted to
change the Constitution but failed. Recently, the ruling CNDD-FDD party officials
initiated a reform process to eliminate presidential term limits. If the reform is approved,
it would give President Nkurunziza and the ruling CNDD-FDD unlimited rule (Uwimana,
2017; Vandeginste, 2016). This action raised alarms among opposition leaders and
regional negotiators who maintained that the current crisis and environment are not
suitable for constitutional change.
The qualitative data findings underscored the significance of the Arusha
agreement and the Constitution. At the center of the current crisis lies the issue of
safeguarding the Arusha agreement and the Constitution. The legality of President
Nkurunziza’s third term bid generated conflict across Burundi. Third-term opponents
frequently used political arguments against his actions while third-term supporters used
constitutional legality and the rule of law to support his actions. Many interviewees stated
that concerted efforts by President Nkurunziza and his party loyalists to undercut the
Arusha agreement and Burundi’s Constitution created significant violence. Previous
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studies supported this point, noting that the root cause of the current crisis in Burundi was
President Pierre Nkurunziza’s desire to run for a third term despite a two-term limitation
in Burundi’s Constitution and the Arusha agreement. President Nkurunziza’s third term
was a violation of both the Constitution and the essence of the Arusha agreement, signed
in 2000, which set presidential term limits at two terms, ended Burundi’s civil war, and
engaged a strong peace-building architecture to prevent future conflict (Green, 2015;
Nantulya, 2015; Zamfir, 2016).
Furthermore, one interviewee mentioned the importance of the Arusha agreement
in balancing power between ethnic groups in Burundi. The interviewee argued that the
Arusha agreement paved the way for an ethnic balance of power and implemented a
power-sharing system. Another interviewee reverted to the idea that President
Nkurunziza’s controversial decisions, combined with his broader contempt for the
country’s Constitution, made Burundi volatile. Another interviewee mentioned that
President Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FDD party officials are committed to increasing
their control over political institutions and security services, which is against the Arusha
agreement. Nantulya (2015) validated these concerns, stating that some of the hardliners
in the ruling party deemed some of the Arusha frameworks illegal and incapable of
solving the current crisis.
An analysis of interviews and documents established that Burundians are living
under a climate of fear and insecurity. For example, ACLED (2016), Amnesty
International (2017a), and Human Rights Watch (2018) reports verified this claim, each
stating that government forces targeted demonstrators in Bujumbura’s Tutsi minority
neighborhoods. Almost all opposition leaders, prominent civil society group members,
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human rights activists, and independent journalists fled Burundi because of statesanctioned pressure, oppression, and surveillance. Similarly, armed opposition groups
engaged in a series of killings that mainly targeted CNDD-FDD party officials, members
of security forces, and Imbonerakure youth militia. Interviewees, and several of the
documents reviewed, emphasized the cycle of violence in Burundi. One interviewee
mentioned how security forces and Imbonerakure youth militia in Bujumbura, Burundi’s
capital, targeted him and that a similar incident occurred in Gitega province. These
incidents made him flee Burundi for Kenya. Another interviewee mentioned how armed
opposition groups frequently targeted ruling party officials, the security forces, or
government sympathizers. According to this interviewee, patterns of violence like this are
putting ordinary Burundians at risk and instilling fear and insecurity. For instance,
frequent grenade attacks in Bujumbura have caused several deaths and many injuries.
The Human Rights Watch (2018) report substantiated this view, claiming numerous highlevel assassinations targeted at CNDD-FDD party officials and prominent security
officials, including army Chief of Staff Prime Niyongabo, who survived, and chief of the
intelligence services, General Adolphe Nshimirimana, who was assassinated.
A review of interviews and documents confirmed these concerns about ethnic
violence in Burundi. Many Burundians fear that if the current crisis is not resolved, it
may turn on an ethnic dimension. Findings from the qualitative data analysis showed that
violence by government forces, Imbonerakure youth militia, and armed opposition groups
could turn into ethnic violence if the violence continues. The violence and killings on
both sides have made Burundi increasingly unstable. One interviewee detailed how
Burundi’s history played a role in Burundians leaving in mass numbers to seek safety. He

162
argued that, psychologically, past ethnic violence affected the ways that people think and
react. Anti-government and pro-government rhetoric that has regularly correlated with
ethnic identity could destabilize the political system. This kind of ethnic rhetoric is
especially troubling in light of the fact that conflicts in Burundi in earlier decades were
portrayed by across-the-board ethnic killings (Jones, 2015; Vandeginste, 2016).
As the violence continues, there is fear it could devolve into a full-scale civil war.
An interviewee revealed that President Nkurunziza could succeed in reversing history
and establishing a Hutu-controlled regime, which is against the Arusha agreement.
Additionally, another interviewee explained how the ruling CNDD-FDD elites represent
a small social base and how they use ethnic-social discourse to infuse fear in the
population. Most of the interview data and documents addressed ethnic patterns of
violence that appear to be developing on both sides. Historically, both Hutu and Tutsi
elites have used ethnic cues for political purposes. In Burundi, politicians and other elites
have used ethnicity to manipulate and exploit ethnic ties to form alliances.
Additionally, for decades, the power base of the small faction of the Tutsi
governing elite was based on fear, resentment, and repression of the Hutu majority, and
the military has mainly orchestrated the violence. Thus, political, economic, and social
biases became more rigid against Hutus, whereas the power of many Tutsis significantly
increased (Uvin, 1999; Vandeginste, 2016). An interviewee warned that Hutus should
prevent Tutsis from ever returning to power. There is a concern among many Tutsis
about revenge from the ruling Hutu government. As marginalization, power imbalances,
and unequal access to resources took place along ethnic lines, the violence and counterviolence also developed into ethnic violence. Fear of ethnic violence was relevant in the
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current crisis, and political division overlaps with ethnic division. One reason why
conflict in Burundi occurred is the early introduction of ethnicity as a factor of access to
resources and power, beginning in the colonial period.
Another ongoing issue outlined in both the interviews and documents was the fact
that the government of Burundi took inadequate action to hold the people responsible for
human rights violations. The majority of the interviews and the document reviews
confirmed that violence, murder, and rape persist among Burundians running away from
the conflict. An Amnesty International (2017b) report indicated that between two to three
women were raped each week, and there were reports of militias attacking opposition
members in refugee camps in DRC and Tanzania. One interviewee recalled how the
Imbonerakure youth militia threatened his sisters with rape several times, which
eventually led them to flee to Rwanda. The conflict created, according to the interviewee,
circumstances in which violence against women in general became more widespread. In
such cases, violence against women is carried out to instill fear in local communities or in
opposing armed groups. For Burundian women, the effects are mainly dire.
One interviewee stated that for Burundi to move forward, the country must shed
its history of violence and address its culture of impunity. Impunity Watch (2015) held
that a lack of government will to effectively address Burundi’s violent past produced a
culture of impunity for gross human rights violations and severe violations of
international criminal law, and Uvin (1999) argued, “The issue of revenge is closely
connected with that of impunity, a central feature of life in Burundi” (p. 264). Another
interviewee mentioned the history of security service and judiciary failures to locate and
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prosecute perpetrators of violence. According to the interviewee, this experience, among
other things, created a cycle of retributive killings.
Furthermore, the lack of rule of law encourages corruption and violence.
Interviewees expressed this concept many times. For instance, one interviewee mentioned
that impunity gives President Nkurunziza and top-level CNDD-FDD party members
immunity and all kinds of material benefits. A study by International Crisis Group (2012)
entitled Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis detailed that elites’ access to public and
private resources. The results of the study showed that corruption issues concerning highlevel CNDD-FDD officials and state officials were unpunished and that this could further
fuel social and political anger. Some interviewees and documents reviewed indicated that
greed and corruption are significant grievances of Burundians. Corruption is one of
Burundi’s major challenges, and corruption among high-level government officials are
known to many Burundians. Transparency International ranks the country high in
corruption, at 157 out of 180 as the most corrupt country (Transparency International,
2018). Mbogo (2012) stated, “Corruption scandals involving CNDD-FDD dignitaries and
state officials have watered down hope of a change in governance and more equitable
wealth distribution. The deepening corruption crisis is discrediting post-conflict
institutions and fueling social and political resentment” (p. 1). One interviewee stated that
when President Nkurunziza came to power in 2005, many Burundians hoped that he
would end corruption and improve economic developments, but they lost hope.
An International Crisis Group (2012) study reported that despite President
Nkurunziza’s support for anti-corruption programs, his government defunded its own
programs, placed political burdens on courts and anti-corruption taskforces, and
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influenced state institutions to benefit party elites. An interviewee mentioned the amount
of corruption and greed at the government level and around Nkurunziza as one of the
factors that influenced the president to extend his term. The interviewee further argued
that when the president and his top party members were in power, they amassed a great
deal of money; if they left office, they would lose access to those resources and
opportunities. Corruption creates impunity and weakens the rule of law. Several
interviewees mentioned the idea that being an elitist provides one with multiple kinds of
immunity. The endless cycle of corruption affects the entire government system––from
social, political, and economic systems––and is a substantial impediment to economic
development. Grievances associated with greed and corruption have been influential for
rallying support for demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s third-term bid.
Evidently, decades of impunity for corruption in Burundi have bred a lack of trust
amongst Burundians.
The qualitative data also underscored the economic impact of the current crisis on
Burundians. The economic issues that interviewees underlined ranged from a decline in
foreign aid, foreign trade, and investments and the influx of Burundian refugees to
neighboring countries in search of better livelihoods. Research has shown that the
conflicts have large and substantial aggregate effects on macroeconomic symbols, such as
GDP, foreign trade, and investments (Collier, 1999; Martin, Mayer, & Thoenig, 2008;
Mueller & Tobias, 2016). Given Burundi’s history, the current crisis plays a significant
role in shaping the macro-level economy. Falisse (2015) added that trade with
neighboring countries and local markets was significantly interrupted and that the
government of Burundi recently assessed that the crisis cost at least $32.7 million in
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material destruction. Furthermore, the conflict only worsened Burundi’s underlying
economic issues, and the economy shrunk by 4.1% in 2015.
The data from both interviews and document reviews summarized the diverse
channels and means through which the conflict can affect growth and development.
These consequences comprised declines in employment and investment and an influx of
refugees to neighboring countries. For instance, one interviewee revealed how life in
Burundi became difficult because many investors left the country: Foreign aid ceased,
NGOs stopped their programs, and the exchange rate plummeted. Another interviewee
stated, for example, that a father who worked for an NGO and “earned 5000 Burundian
Francs” was unable to provide for his family because the NGO for which he worked
closed its doors. The interviewee further believed that this phenomenon affected many
families and that some were aware of difficulties, which made them flee to refugee
camps. Green (2015) substantiated these findings, arguing that “Burundians are leaving
or losing their jobs as development partners pull out,” and “every time someone loses a
job, that’s 12 people who are living off that, benefitting from that income” (p. 640). One
interviewee mentioned that young people were not only migrating because of injustice,
but also because of poverty. The economic impact of the crisis drove thousands of
Burundians to seek better livelihoods in neighboring countries. The violence caused
hundreds of thousands to flee, adding to problems in the agricultural labor markets and
prolonging uncertainty and political violence, which have triggered many donors to stop
their aid programs (Falisse, 2015; Green, 2015). Likewise, the violence forced foreign
investors to leave. Indeed, since the conflict began, western donors have cut their aid to
Burundi, whose annual budget depended on 49% of foreign aid (Falisse, 2015). One
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interviewee substantiated this account by alluding to the fact that Burundi is a poor
country and that “half of the annual budget” of Burundi came from EU aid. These issues
were believed to be the cause of the influx of refugees.
Another issue of concern related to the refugee issue was that Burundi’s neighbors
worried about refugee issues within their borders. Many documents reviewed for this
study noted the possibility of violence spilling over to neighboring countries. Amnesty
International (2017b) also expressed concern about rebel activities in Tanzania, where
rebel groups recruit and train, oftentimes engaging in cross-border attacks from
Tanzanian territory. Kanyangara (2016) used recent history to explain how conflict in the
Great Lakes Region moved from one region to another. He argued that “conflicts in Great
Lakes Region countries have always been interconnected. Although conflicts tend to be
intrastate in the beginning, due to strong cross-border dimensions and transnational ethnic
identities these conflicts have often spread to destabilize the whole region” (p. 2).
Previous refugee crises in the Great Lakes Region produced new conflicts around the
region via cross-border assaults. This was the case in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for
example. After the genocide, Hutus fled to the DRC with their arms, began to attack
Rwanda, and subsequently formed an armed group (Kanyangara 2016; Khadiagala,
2006).
To support the findings from this study, it was essential to compare the
quantitative and qualitative data, including the online surveys, interviews, and documents
reviewed. Triangulation of these data showed that the findings of this were reliable and
valid. Data triangulation and interpretation indicated that Burundians were divided along
ethnic lines and that gender differences about how the conflict surrounding presidential
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term limit manipulation affected perceptions of peace and stability among people in
Burundi. Both the quantitative and qualitative data revealed that inequities between and
within identity groups, together with patterns of identity-based deprivation, tend to
produce conflict in Burundi. Further, the findings of this study suggested that
marginalization, ethnic divisions, power imbalance, and unequal access to resources in
Burundi often lead to violence. What is clear about the current crisis is that a large
number of Burundians are worried about ethnic conflict, gender-based violence, the
culture of impunity, and a climate of fear and insecurity because of ethnic patterns of
violence that seem to be developing.
Connection to the Literature
The findings from this study corroborated scholarly findings on presidential term
limit manipulations, democratization, and governance. The literature review provided
five justifications for why African leaders––in this case, President Nkurunziza––cling to
power: (a) lack of checks and balances, (b) weak government institutions, (c) electoral
malpractice, (d) greed and corruption, and (e) fear of punishment. The participants in this
study mentioned some of these justifications.
Studies by Ndikumana (1998) and Gurr (1970) concluded that political conflict
increased with perceptions of lack of equal opportunities to access political power, the
ethnization of politics, inequality, marginalization, and pervasive corruption all
conceivably bolstered citizens resorting to violence. Burundi’s history of ethnic violence
overlapped with power struggles, which have been predominately driven by ethnic
tensions with roots in repression and marginalization. For instance, interviewee E (age
24) linked problem this to the lack of equal job opportunities. She argued, “This thing

169
about ethnicity. It’s really hard work for people to apply for jobs. Because ethnicity has
been a problem for so long but now it’s like really out in in the open.” Another
participant expressed similar views. Interviewee C (age 30) added, “The other factor is . .
. the power. I mean, power corrupts, as they say. So, looking at Burundi’s history that
was dominated by Tutsi led government or Tutsi regime . . . now having a regime that
was previously in . . . took arms against the established previous government.”
Interviewee E (age 24) also believed that the benefits of being in power were why the
president decided to run for a third term. She argued, “He wanted to stay in power
because once you are in power today . . . you are in power, tomorrow you may be afraid
to lose the position you had.” These notions suggest that power struggles resulting in
political, economic, and social marginalization were the primary drivers of violence in
Burundi.
The results also confirmed Carter’s (2016), Tangri and Mwenda’s (2010), Igwe’s
(2008), and Baker’s (2002) findings that the reason that African leaders stayed too long
in power was because of fear of punishment for their human rights violations and
corruption. Interviewee B (age 25) explained at length how corruption and ethnicity were
reasons that President Nkurunziza extended his term beyond the required two-terms:
The regime had actually . . . has been . . . a lot around corruption but also, you
know, when they came in power, there was this discussion around ethnicity . . .
from our history where the Tutsi faction that has been in power and because we
have been threatened for so long. So, the country should remain in the hands of
the Hutu ethnicity. So, I think there were those two involved—corruption and fear
of being persecuted on these grounds.
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Interviewee H (age 35) mentioned that President Nkurunziza was afraid to “leave
power because of what he stole, because of many people that he killed. Because of
whatever he did. He sees that once he leaves power, he will be followed by the justice; he
will be taken to court.” The argument was that leaders are sometimes afraid of potential
investigations and prosecution by succeeding governments, mainly when they have
committed economic crimes or unlawful acts of killing and jailing political opponents
and dissenters. Interviewee G (age 27) also believed that economics contributed to
President Nkurunziza extending his term in office. She stated, “Yes, for economic
reasons, but also . . . Um . . . he was… they know, after they quit, the crimes they did. So,
that’s another reason that they have to stay there to keep the power.” Interviewee C (age
30) suggested, “The level of corruption at the government level or around Nkurunziza, so
that would be one factor: the fact that they can amass lots of money with them being in
power.”
On the issue of lack of checks and balances and weak institutions, Lebas (2016),
Cranenburgh (2011), and Vencovsky (2007) concluded that the complete concentration
of power in the executive branch encouraged impunity and weakened democracy, which
suppressed opposition parties, making it impossible for political parties to function. The
findings from this study confirmed these perceptions. Interviewee B (age 25) expressed
that the lack of checks and balances and weak institutions in Burundi encouraged
authoritarianism. He concluded, “I think it’s a bad practice that we are actually
promoting. We are promoting dictatorship, and we are not actually reflecting democratic
values that people can actually build upon them and go.” Interviewee F (age 22) believed
that the lack of checks and balances, and weak institutions, supported impunity. She
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concluded that unlimited power “gives them the immunity, wealth, honor, and all kinds
of material benefits.”
The findings from this study corroborated the literature. This section identifies the
causes of the current crisis and explains their different dynamics, which have created
inequality and exclusion in Burundi. If the conflicts in Burundi have their roots in
historical factors, bad governance, weak institutions, corruption, ethnic divisions, legacies
of authoritarianism, socio-economic crisis, poverty, human rights violations, and politics
of marginalization, then any effort to mediate the conflicts should transcend the ideas of
inclusive government and institutions that will manage ethnic divisions, inequalities,
marginalization, and good governance.
In reality, past Burundian conflicts, as discussed previously, were typical of
political associations expressed in ethnic terms. From a historical point of view, postcolonial Burundi inherited divisive arrangements of power within particular ethnic
groups, setting the ground for conflict and competition along ethnic lines. Burundi’s postcolonial elites prolonged this history of divide-and-rule to safeguard their interests and
power, and Burundi’s weak institutions are incapable of, or unwilling to, playing the role
of impartial authorities between competing identity groups.
Despite the correlation between the politics of ethnization and violent conflict in
Burundi, it is clear that identity groups have a fundamental role to play in conflict
resolution and peace building. As the construction of identity seems to be the most
dominant factor in Burundi’s conflict, durable peace and security depends on reforming
the emphasis on identities as building blocks of post-conflict reconstruction and in
conflict resolution methods. Successful conflict prevention and resolution in Burundi will
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involve the development of more established and evenhanded social, economic, and
political institutions.
Connection to Theory
The findings from this study supported the theoretical framework used to
understand this conflict. This study used three theories (elite theory, intergroup conflict
theory, and structural violence theory) to weave together useful analyses of the
Burundian conflict. All three theories shed light on the intersections among the control of
state power, the use of violence to sustain power, ethnic dynamics, inequality,
marginalization, and the critical role that competing elites played in this conflict. The
participants in this study referred to some of these issues as the root causes of conflict in
Burundi. The competition for political power and control of Burundi’s resources have
long been an avenue for conflict to develop along ethnic lines.
In terms of elite control in Burundi, Mills (1956), Berberoglu (2005), and
Pakulski (2012) concluded that an important component of elite theory was that all
political and economic structures were controlled and systematized to benefit few elites.
In Burundi, the ethnic distribution of power is a powerful mobilizing force for elites. The
concept of governing elites, Mosca (1939) argued, put importance on the ruling class’s
desire to control government agencies and society in general. As Uvin (1999) noted,
“Hutu (anti-Tutsi) ethnicity and its institutionalization in public policy were key
components of the ruling elite’s strategy of legitimization and control over the state.
Whenever this elite was threatened, it exacerbated ethnic divisions to thwart
democratization and power sharing” (p. 253).
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Burundi’s CNDD-FDD party is a suitable example of the governing elites or the
ruling class’s persistent consolidation of power while systematically restricting political
participation. For example, Interviewee G (age 27) argued that the president and
members of the political elites “just wanted to stay there to keep the power, so that him
[sic] and the people who are with him could use the country’s resources.” On the question
of why President Nkurunziza extended his term in office, interviewee D (age 26) also
believed that being part of the political elite enabled the president to manipulate the
system easily. He argued, “He is among the elites of the ruling party and he is also the
president.” As Ndikumana (2005) and Uvin (1999) concluded, political elites controlled
Burundian economic, political, and social configurations for the last five decades or
more, distributing state resources among their inner circles. This kind of marginalization
produced discontent, which led to the violence seen in Burundi’s history.
Moreover, the findings were also consistent with those of Gurr (1993), Sherif
(1951), and Uvin (1999), who that asserted conflict occurs when two or more groups are
vying for inadequate resources and power. According to this analysis, ethnicity or group
identity and categorization have played a significant role in driving conflict. The results
of this study have revealed that relationships between ethnicity and opportunities are
evident in political competition. As Interviewee E (age 24) mentioned,
Saying that the Tutsi ruled for so long and now is time for Hutu to rule. And they
say that . . . they say that now Hutu should rule as long as they want. This is what
it is all about and sometimes it is difficult for people from other ethnicities to get
jobs because this is something they take into account: this thing about ethnicity.
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It’s really hard work for people to apply for jobs. Because ethnicity has been a
problem for so long, but now it’s like really out in the open.
Given Burundi’s history of violent ethnic conflict, ethnic groups are simply
identifiable and very important to politics. Gurr (1993) implied that groups that are
deprived of the distribution of resources often share both a common grievance and a
common identity. In Burundi’s case, disparities in the allocation of state resources and
political control through ethnic groups became an instrument of conflict. Interviewee C
reiterated this perception, arguing that there is
fear that the Tutsi minority might again claim power or come to power in the near
future . . . because of the fact that Hutu might lose power. The other factor is also
history: what happened in 1972. There was massacre against the Hutu in Burundi.
So, I think psychologically, that plays . . . is still playing a huge role in the way
the government or the people in government currently reacting. (Age 30)
Interviewee B (age 25) also alluded to this belief, stating that “ethnicity . . . from
our history where the Tutsi faction that has been in power and because we have been
threaten for so long. So, the country should remain in the hands of the Hutu ethnicity.”
The politics of ethnicity have long been recognized as one of the main causes of
instability in Burundi, and both Hutus and Tutsi interviewed used ethnic feelings to
highlight the risk posed by the other group. For interviewee H (age 35), President
Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party
Created chaos in the country by killing many people, by bringing up issues of
ethnicity, which was already forgotten by civilians, but now he brought it up
again. That is now created weakness in the army; because the army and the police
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are divided even though you find them together. . . . Some in their minds they
belong to opposition, others they belong to ruling party.
The results from this study also echoed Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural
violence. Galtung argued that direct violence comes in different forms, which may
include physical force, killing, torture, rape, sexual assault, beatings, and verbal
violence. Many of the interviewees expressed this concept. On the one hand, interviewee
J (age 33) stated, “Many people died, and many people fled the country. The opposition
used grenades to attack the police and the military, and the police went after them. And
they killed military people, police, and civilians.” On the other hand, interviewee G (age
27) blamed the Imbonerakure youth militia for the violence. She contended, “those
Imbonerakure have to stop attacking, and most of those women and girls attacked are
Tutsi.” Interviewee H (age 35) equally blamed both government forces and armed
opposition groups for orchestrating violence. He argued, “You see both sides produced
violence. So, that third term brought violence, but I can’t say that is the source of
violence. I would say that it was a trigger because the roots causes are more than the third
term.” In the recent political violence in Burundi, the police, the military, Imbonerakure,
and armed opposition groups carried out violence with impunity. Evidently, structural
violence was embedded in the social, political, and economic structures of Burundi.
Inequitable access to resources and political power were types of structural violence that
created direct violence.
Issues of ethnicity, culture of impunity, fear and insecurity, violence, and the
struggle for power and resources were widely discussed in the qualitative interviews. One
important aspect of the ongoing violence was the role of the political elites in Burundi,
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who use ethnicity to drive their quest for power and control of state resources. It is clear
that, in Burundi, access to power also means access to wealth and resources.
Marginalization from politics in Burundi causes discontent and often leads to ethnic
violence.
Conflict Resolution Framework
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability among
people in Burundi. The conflict in Burundi entails governance issues, a protracted history
of power struggle, a lack of equal opportunities to access political power, violent ethnic
division between Tutsis and Hutus, and structural violence. Ethnic division and identity
politics are deeply rooted in Burundi’s social and political fabric. Following its
independence from Belgium in 1962, several civil wars erupted that killed hundreds of
thousands of innocent Burundians. Since then, political arrangements in Burundi continue
to have an ethnic factor. In essence, ethnic divisions or identity politics have brought
about conflict between ethnic groups, as Hutu and Tutsi tribes compete with each other
for control of economic and political power. According to Burton (1990), identity is the
most important and highest of human needs, which explains why it triggers most of the
conflicts. This form of deep-rooted conflict is among the most difficult to mediate as it
requires both major political and societal changes.
Almost three years after the crisis began, the situation in Burundi remains very
unstable, and the country struggles to find a durable solution. The AU, EU, UN, and
leaders around the Great Lakes Region are all concerned that the conflict in Burundi
could have a spillover effect and destabilize the region. As such, it is important to
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understand the nature of the conflict in order to establish the most suitable and practical
methods and mechanisms for conflict resolution. Burundi presented an interesting case of
conflict resolution due to its history of violence.
In their work on conflict resolution, peace building, reconciliation, and intergroup
conflict, Assefa (1996, 1998) and Nnoli (1998) argued that since political violence has
potentially adverse effects on socio-economic and political development, peace building
and reconciliation are essential to preventing further violence. Over the past decades,
conflict resolution and peace building frameworks have become extremely relevant in
discussions and debates across Africa and beyond. Accordingly, conflict resolution and
peace building methods have played an important role in resolving the root causes of
conflicts across Africa as seen in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa,
and so forth.
First, conflict resolution seeks to understand the root causes and the main
dynamics of conflict in order to establish suitable resolutions. Second, conflict resolution
involves changing relationships and conditions such that the resolutions that conflicting
parties develop are sustainable in both the short and long term. The root causes of the
conflict in Burundi are multifaceted. Unequal access to national and natural resources,
lack of equal opportunities to access political power, protracted violent ethnic division,
structural violence, and marginalization are among some of the dynamics that propagate
conflict in Burundi. These matters motivate tangible or perceived inequities and
resentments amongst ethnic groups, which oftentimes results in, among other things,
violence. In the case of Burundi, the conflict resolution method must require taking
several steps, such as transforming state institutions, socio-economic development, and
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democratization. Attaining such resolutions will involve tackling the systematic structural
violence in Burundi. Based on this argument, it is imperative to develop a robust peace
framework to address the current Burundi conflict. One could argue that the Arusha
power-sharing agreement, which ended Burundi’s decade-long civil war, must be a
reference point for the current conflict. The Arusha agreement reformed the historical
ethnic configuration of Burundi and ended the marginalization of Hutus from politics.
Further, the Arusha agreement specifically addressed ending impunity for gender-based
violence and crimes against humanity. The basic requirements of this framework offer
the socio-political and economic structure for peace and stability in Burundi.
With respect to finding a solution to the current conflict, an immediate renewal of
dialogue must include all stakeholders to rebuild the trust lost between the parties. For
example, the EAC inter-Burundi dialogue efforts under the leadership of President
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, have
not yielded any sustainable agreement. This is due, in part, to President Nkurunziza’s
refusal to include the real stakeholders in the conflict, including armed opposition groups,
CNARED, civil society groups, religious groups, media groups, women, and youths in
the negotiations. The fundamental purpose of any negotiation is to engage adversaries
across the negotiating table; President Nkurunziza views this process differently. Clearly,
without the involvement of all parties to the negotiations, including armed opposition
groups involved in assaults on the security forces and government officials, a political
solution to end the almost three-year conflict is unlikely. Proposed changes to the
Constitution in May, 2018 could lead to even more unrest. Any proposed amendment to
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eradicate presidential term limits runs against the constitutional spirit of the Arusha
agreement.
For Burundi to attain a sustainable peace, it must focus on building democracy
and ensuring socio-economic development for all Burundians, regardless of ethnicity and
gender. Assefa (1996) and Nnoli (1998) argued that democratization and socio-economic
development practices were considered important components in peace building and
conflict resolution. This practice is expected to remove all adverse characteristics related
to the root causes of the conflicts: dictatorial and authoritarian inclinations, the politics of
ethnicity, practices of social discrimination, tyranny, and marginalization. This, in turn,
will expand multi-party politics, civil society groups, and freedom of the press and
speech. In this manner, the government of Burundi can redress past and present
economic, social, and political marginalization. Such an initiative could also mitigate
future conflicts. Moreover, socio-economic development grounded on beliefs in equality
across the board is likely to lower poverty and unemployment and increase the standard
of living of the majority of Burundians. Under such circumstances, conflicts can
significantly be reduced in Burundi.
Even if the current conflict is resolved, ending the cycle of violence will be
difficult without addressing issues of ethnicity, the culture of impunity, fear and
insecurity, gender-based violence, the struggle for power, refugees, and greed and
corruption. The results of this study related to gender suggest that the efforts of
Burundian women cannot be ignored in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. A
report by Lindborg (2017) argued that “women participants in peace processes are
usually focused less on the spoils of the war and more on reconciliation, economic
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development, education and transitional justice—all critical elements of a sustained
peace” (p. 1). As such, women’s roles in peace negotiations and the transformation of
Burundian society will be fundamental to sustaining peace, economic and social growth,
and reconstruction.
Identity conflict in Burundi has existed for decades. Since its independence in
1962, Burundi experienced several events of mass ethnic violence, including massacres
in 1972, 1988, and 1993. These events created bitter memories, crystallized Hutu and
Tutsi violence, and produced an atmosphere of perpetual mutual fear. Throughout the
1993 to 2005 civil war, fighting between Burundi’s the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu
and the Tutsi, left approximately 300,000 people dead. The quantitative results of this
study indicated that Hutus and Tutsis viewed the crisis along ethnic lines. Additionally,
the findings from the interviews and document analysis suggested that previous ethnic
violence in Burundi has had a long-term effect on the population, including a continuous
fear of violence and ongoing communal division. Similarly, Ndikumana (2010) added,
“Deeply seated fear, hatred, mistrust and feelings of revenge characterized the
relationship between Hutus and Tutsis and have been shaping Burundi political, social
and economic structures ever since” (p. 269). Arguably, ethnic tensions in Burundi have
been driven not merely by belief systems, but generally by ethnicity or by political elites
or governing elites’ capability of provoking ethnic resentment for their personal gain.
Further, various scholars indicated that ethnic dynamics in Burundi are the main
drivers of conflict. Assefa (1996), Mpangala (2004), Ndikumana (2005), and Nnoli
(1998) all agreed that the competition for control of the Burundian state has long been an
avenue where conflict turns out to be ethnic. Specifically, ethnic background and
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opportunities usually move hand-in hand and manifest in political struggles. To mitigate
the unequal distribution of power and access to resources, which seem to be drivers of
conflict in Burundi, the government must also promote equality across ethnic groups as
stated in the Arusha agreement. As Ndikumana (2005) argued, attaining economic and
political stability in Burundi will involve the formation of institutional mechanisms that
address the history of inequality of access to political and economic power across ethnic
groups. By focusing on equal distribution, Burundi can foster lasting peace.
Intergroup conflicts encompass both objective and subjective components, both of
which require addressing effective de-escalation (Assefa, 1996). This is achieved through
third-party intervention. Since intergroup conflicts are so multifaceted, especially in
Burundi, a viable reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis must begin with a
comprehensive conflict analysis. This method should entail a complete change in
structures and systems. The politics of reconciliation and justice should be adopted at
both the local and national levels as well as between the two main ethnic groups, and they
should be part of the development of democratization to prevent future ethnic conflict.
The AU, UN, EU, and EAC can play a key role in ensuring that ethnic reconciliation is
sought in a way that will address decades of impunity and historical grievances. Such an
initiative would be based on the common interest of the people rather than interests of a
minority elite.
Moreover, the transformation of state institutions should encompass transforming
the security sectors and the Imbonerakure youth militia of the ruling CNDD-FDD, who
are believed to function under orders of intelligence services and national police. Equally,
armed opposition groups must also stop targeting government officials, security officials,
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and civilians. Such a transformation should change ideologies and structures so that
Burundi can return to normalcy. To complement this, the government of Burundi must
allow an outside observer mission that guarantees an end to security forces,
Imbonerakure, and armed opposition violations. In this regard, the government of
Burundi should accept the AU’s 5,000 peacekeeping force for Burundi, as proposed in
December, 2015. Arguably, a peacekeeping mission in Burundi is necessary to avoiding
the lessons of failures in Sierra Leone and Rwanda.
As previously discussed, the Burundian political arena mostly functions according
to rules familiar to the elite. That is, a violent political arena can still be functional for the
country’s elites as long as the violence remains managed internally and by elite
unanimity. Many Burundians and leaders around the region worry that the current crisis
in Burundi could turn into a competition that has a spillover effect. Various efforts to
promote dialogue, including EAC inter-Burundi dialogue under the leadership of
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Benjamin Mkapa, former president of
Tanzania, remain unsettled. In the case of Burundi, the question of the legality of a third
term was vital in the current crisis. That said, the long-term solution to the current crisis
would involve the formation of institutional structures to solve or correct the history of
disparity in access to power and resources across ethnic groups.
Limitations of the Study
Some limitations existed in this study. The first limitation was the language
barrier. Although Kirundi is the language of the majority of Burundians, Burundi is
considered a Francophone country, which means that French is the official language,
while the selection of participants was based on people who were fluent in English. A
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large number of Burundians were excluded from this study, therefore, because only a
small part of the population is proficient enough to read, write, or speak the English
language in a manner that allows them to interact with the researcher.
The second limitation was the sample size. Several reasons existed for the sample
size, one of which was the language barrier. The second limitation for sample size is the
underrepresentation of females in the online survey portion. The fundamental reason for
women’s underrepresentation in this research is fear of reprisals for taking part in this
study. Gender-based violence is one of the most widespread human rights abuses in
Burundi. The other reason for women’s underrepresentation in this research is gender
disparity in education. That is, fewer women than men are proficient enough to read,
write, or speak the English. While the sample size was proper for this study’s purpose, it
was conceivable that it may not provide an accurate depiction of all Burundians’ views of
how the conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affects the perception
of peace and stability among people in Burundi.
The third limitation of the study was the researcher’s personal beliefs and biases
on this topic. As a supporter of presidential term limits, democracy, and good governance
in Africa, the researcher might hope to oppose manipulating constitutions, such as by
amending term limits, which creates political violence and instability in many African
countries. To address this issue, the researcher maintained self-awareness throughout data
collection, data analysis, and interpretation phases of the study. For instance, the
researcher used bracketing during the data analysis phase to enable him to balance his
biases.

184
This study was primarily concentrated on Burundi, meaning that the sample size
was selected to gain an understanding of how the conflict surrounding presidential term
limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and stability of people in Burundi.
Consequently, the conclusions from this study are not generalizable beyond this study.
Future research should examine what was not addressed in this study. Certainly,
however, the results of this study will be useful in the field of conflict resolution and
peace studies.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results of the study provided an important understanding of how the conflict
surrounding presidential term limit manipulation affected the perception of peace and
stability among people in Burundi. Since it is challenging to examine everything in one
study, the need for more research on presidential term limit manipulations in Africa is
imperative given the recent violence related to term limit manipulations in the Greater
Lakes Region. Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends the
following studies:
 a comprehensive study with a focus on the role of identity politics or ethnopolitics in presidential longevity;
 a study with a focus on how term limit manipulations in the region influence other
African leaders to follow suit;
 a study with a focus on how good governance ensures peace and stability; and
 a study with a focus on the intersection between multi-party democracy,
inclusion, and political violence.
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Chapter Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine how the conflict surrounding
presidential term limit manipulation has affected the perception of peace and stability
among people in Burundi. The current conflict in Burundi involves governance problems,
a prolonged history of violent ethnic division between Tutsis and the Hutus, lack of equal
access to resources and power, and systematic structural violence. Results in this study
indicated fear and insecurity, but the issue also stretches to include economic security and
the practicality of livelihoods, greed, corruption, accountability, and the failure and
reluctance of the government to truly deal with past and current impunity.
Using a mixed-method case study approach, the researcher obtained detailed
information from research participants and document reviews. Quantitative data indicated
that statistically significant differences existed between Hutus and Tutsis as well as
between genders related to the phenomenon under study. The qualitative data analysis
revealed similar characteristics. Eight combined key themes were developed from the
thematic analysis of the interview and document analysis: (a) importance of term limits,
(b) violation of the Constitution and Arusha Accords, (c) the climate of fear and
insecurity, (d) concern for ethnic violence, (e) a culture of impunity, (f) economic impact,
(g) a refugee crisis, and (8) a culture of greed and corruption. These themes unearthed the
long-standing violent past of Burundi and a better understanding of fear and insecurity
among Burundians concerning the current crisis. The findings from the interviews mainly
supported data gathered from the online survey responses and documents. The results of
the study, concerning disputes and conflicts related to term limit manipulation,
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democratization, and governance, provided knowledge applicable to the field of conflict
resolution and peace studies
These findings also verified previous studies on governance, democratization,
political violence, and power struggles. For example, the literature review was essential
as it connected backgrounds and concepts of presidential term limit manipulation,
governance issues, democratization, and violence. According to the literature review, it
was stated that the lack of checks and balances, weak government institutions, electoral
malpractice, greed and corruption, and fear of punishment were reasons or factors for
access to power and sustaining it. The theories presented in the literature review made
several key claims about the connection between control of state power, the use of
violence to sustain power, ethnic dynamics, and the significant role that competing elites
play in the conflict. The three theories—elite theory, intergroup conflict theory, and
structural violence theory—provided analysis of the root causes of the crisis and helped
to reveal why the crisis developed.
Burundi’s current crisis has unfolded through almost three years of growing
violence and repression. The situation in Burundi remains very volatile and the country
struggles to find a long-term solution to the current crisis. Currently, the country is
marked by political violence, targeted assassinations, and accusations of torture. Large
numbers of Burundians fled the country because of fear and insecurity. The biggest
impact of the current conflict in Burundi is not only the increase in refugee arrivals in
neighboring countries, but also the regionalization of the conflict in the Great Lakes
Region, as armed groups function out of both Tanzania and the DRC. Although accounts
of overt violence have reduced, human rights groups have underscored a rise in killings,
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enforced disappearances, and torture predominantly conducted by security forces and the
CNDD-FDD Imbonerakure youth militia. Armed opposition groups are also part of this
web of violence. Several high-level assassinations have targeted government or security
officials, including high-level military officials. These retaliatory killings increasingly
concerned President Nkurunziza and his CNDD-FDD party, and some party officials
used ethnic rhetoric to gather support. This kind of ethnic rhetoric is alarming because
previous conflicts in Burundi were categorized by across-the-board ethnic massacres. As
the conflict continues, there is real concern that it could turn into civil war, which could
destabilize the region.
The conflict resolution framework provides significant suggestions for explaining
the root causes of the conflict in Burundi and approaches to attain durable peace. First,
the Arusha agreement ushered in a significant political change. Its power-sharing
arrangement improved Burundi’s past ethnic structure of government and ended the
marginalization of the majority Hutus from government. The Arusha agreement deserves
respect, and emphasis must be placed on additional programs that improve equality
throughout ethnic groups and support institutional accountability. Secondly, regional
peace dialogues have been unsuccessful, with neither President Nkurunziza nor the
deeply divided opposition parties making any sincere propositions about viable long-term
solutions. It is also unlikely that negotiations will yield meaningful resolutions if key
parties to the conflict are excluded. If serious negotiations fail to chart a conflict
resolution roadmap, severe consequences will result in the Great Lakes Region as the
opposition becomes more rebellious and hundreds of thousands continue to live in
refugee camps. Without a peaceful resolution imminent, and with President Nkurunziza’s
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desire to eliminate presidential term limits, the risk is high for further violence turning
into all-out war.
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire
Introduction and demographic information
How old are you?
What is your sex?
What is your ethnicity?
What is your level of education?
What is your occupation?
Survey questionnaire
Please read the following statements and clearly and honestly circle the most correct response.
Use the scale below. Your feedback is greatly appreciated!
1=Strongly Disagree

2=Disagree

3=Neutral

4=Agree

5=Strongly Agree

1. I support presidential term limits
1
2
3
4
5
2. President Nkurunziza’s third term bid violated the Arusha agreement
1
2
3
4
5
3. Violence has increased due to Pierre Nkurunziza third term bid
1
2
3
4
5
4. Presidential term limit manipulation is the root of the current crisis
1
2
3
4
5
5. Presidential term limits should be taken out of the constitution
1
2
3
4
5
6. The crisis has enduring impact on the population, including persistent fear of attack
1
2
3
4
5
7. The current crisis will make Burundi’s more volatile
1
2
3
4
5
8. Government forces are responsible for the violence
1
2
3
4
5
9. Armed opposition groups are responsible for the violence
1
2
3
4
5
10. The Imbonerakure youth militia group is responsible for the violence
1
2
3
4
5
11. President Nkurunziza third term in office risk causing a new civil war
1
2
3
4
5
12. The current crisis disrupted my life
1
2
3
4
5
13. The government is working to improve peace and security
1
2
3
4
5
14. The government lacks the capacity to guarantee security
1
2
3
4
5
15. Participants to the crisis should engage in dialogue to resolve the crisis
1
2
3
4
5
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Appendix B: Online Survey Participation Consent Letter

Online Survey Participation Consent Letter for the Research Study entitled:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA: A MIXEDMETHOD CASE STUDY OF CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI
Funding Source: None
IRB protocol #: 2017-373
Principal Investigator
Foday Darboe
420 NW 11th Ave
Unit 1002
Portland, Oregon 97209
Cell (503) 728-8039

Co-Investigator
Ismael Muvingi
Nova Southeastern University
3301 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale
Florida 33314-7796
Tel (954) 262-3023

This is a research study. Please read and decide if you would like to participate. Feel free to ask
questions at any time.
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to understand the conflict surrounding presidential term limit
manipulation in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi began on April 25, 2015 when President Pierre
Nkurunziza declared that he would run for a third term, despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s
constitution. This triggered opposition parties and civil society groups to organize peaceful
protests to challenge his third term bid. Understanding this phenomenon is extremely important
because the recent hike of violence among Burundians has negatively affected the peace and
stability of Burundi.
Why are you asking me?
Because you are a Burundian who experienced the crisis at first hand. Because of this
your participation in this study is imperative to the researcher in understanding more about the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi. Your participation in this
survey is solely voluntarily and is really appreciated.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete demographic
questions and this should only take a minute or two to finish. The survey questionnaire will ask
you 15 questions. This section will comprise a more sensitive line of questioning about your
perception of President Nkurunziza third term bid. This section should take approximately 25
minutes.
Is there any audio or video recording?
No audio or video recording will take place
What are the dangers to me?
There are risks associated with this study such as physical and psychological harm.
Participants could face physical harm from government officials if their identities are made
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public. Moreover, participating in this study can also result in psychological discomfort or
distress. That is, collecting information about disturbing events may bring psychological issues to
the surface. If you are uncomfortable, you may skip answering a question or stop participation,
either temporarily or permanently. If you have any questions about this study, your research
rights, or have experience physical and psychological harm as a result of your participation in this
study, please contact Foday Darboe at (503) 728-8039 or email me at fd234@nova.edu You can
also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with questions as to your research rights.
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?
There are no direct benefits; your participation will help the researcher gain additional
understanding of the conflict, the result of the study will help advise project proposal and policy
design as well as serve as guiding material for future research and interventions by development
agencies interested in peace-building within the region.
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
You will not be compensated for taking part in this study, nor will it cost you anything
for taking part in the study.
Participant Rights
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw
from this study at any time or decline to participate. During the interview, you may avoid any
questions that you do not wish to answer. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected
about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and will not be part of the study.
How will you keep my information private?
All the information gathered in this study is strictly confidential except disclosure is
required by law. Nonetheless, the Internal Review Board (IRB) or my co-Investigator may review
research records if deemed necessary. Any information obtained during this research will be
confidential; the real names of participants will not be used. All electronic correspondence,
consent forms, survey results and data analysis will be password-protected, and all printed
material will be locked. All data files will be destroyed 36 months from the conclusion of the
study. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time or decline to participate. If you
choose to withdraw, any information collected about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of
the study and will not be part of the study.
Voluntary Consent by Participant:
I have carefully read this consent form by my own admission without being forced or
coerced and duly accept my participation in this survey. I understand all of the questions and
voluntarily consent to take part in the survey. If I have any additional questions, I will contact the
principal investigator Foday Darboe.
Clicking on the “I agree button” below, I am agreeing to participate in this study:
I Agree

Exit
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Appendix C: Interview Questions
Introduction and demographic information
How old are you?
What is your sex?
What is your ethnicity?
What is your level of education?
What is your occupation?
Interview Questions
1. Tell me about your experiences with the conflict surrounding presidential term
limit manipulation?
2. How have President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations affected you?
3. Why do you think President Pierre Nkurunziza extended his term in office?
4. Did President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term aspirations contribute to violence? If
yes, how so?
5. What does presidential term limits means to you?
6. What do you perceive as some of the consequences of term limit manipulation?
7. How should Burundians deal with President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term in
office?
8. Could you reflect on the devastating cost to Burundi caused by President Pierre
Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term in office?
9. How has your family been affected by the crisis?
Is there anything else you would like to offer that I did not ask?
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Appendix D: Interview Participation Consent Letter

Interview Participation Consent Letter for the Research Study entitled:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA: A MIXEDMETHOD CASE STUDY OF CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI
Funding Source: None
IRB protocol #: 2017-373
Principal Investigator
Foday Darboe
420 NW 11th Ave
Unit 1002
Portland, Oregon 97209
Cell (503) 728-8039

Co-Investigator
Ismael Muvingi
Nova Southeastern University
3301 College Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale
Florida 33314-7796
Tel (954) 262-3023

This is a research study. Please read and decide if you would like to participate. Feel free to ask
questions at any time.
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to understand the conflict surrounding presidential term limit
manipulation in Burundi. The crisis in Burundi began on April 25, 2015 when President Pierre
Nkurunziza declared he would run for a third term, despite a two-term limitation in Burundi’s
constitution. This triggered opposition parties and civil society groups to organize peaceful
protests to challenge his third term bid. Understanding this phenomenon is extremely important
because the recent hike of violence among Burundians has negatively affected the peace and
stability of Burundi.
Why are you asking me?
Because you are a Burundian who experienced the crisis at first hand. Because of this
your participation in this study is imperative to the researcher in understanding more about the
conflict surrounding presidential term limit manipulation in Burundi. Your participation in this
survey is solely voluntarily and is really appreciated.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
If you agree to participate, Foday Darboe will interview you for no longer than 90
minutes. You will be presented with the interview guide ahead of time (see attached interview
guide for complete list of questions). The interview covers 10 questions about your perception of
President Nkurunziza third term bid. Your participation will last for the amount of the time the
interview takes.
Is there any audio or video recording?
The full interview will be recorded on a digital voice recorder.
What are the dangers to me?
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There are risks associated with this study such as physical and psychological harm.
Participants could face physical harm from government officials if their identities are made
public. Moreover, participating in this study can also result in psychological discomfort or
distress. That is, collecting information about disturbing events may bring psychological issues to
the surface. If you are uncomfortable, you may skip answering a question or stop participation,
either temporarily or permanently. If you have any questions about this study, your research
rights, or have experience physical and psychological harm as a result of your participation in this
study, please contact Foday Darboe at (503) 728-8039 or email me at fd234@nova.edu You can
also contact the IRB office with questions as to your research rights at (954) 262-5369/Toll Free:
866-499-0790 or email IRB@nsu.nova.edu
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?
There are no direct benefits; your participation will help the researcher gain additional
understanding of the conflict, the result of the study will help advise project proposal and policy
design as well as serve as guiding material for future research and interventions by development
agencies interested in peace-building within the region.
Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
You will not be compensated for taking part in this study, nor will it cost you anything
for taking part in the study.
Participant Rights
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw
from this study at any time or decline to participate. During the interview, you may avoid any
questions that you do not wish to answer. If you choose to withdraw, any information collected
about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of the study and will not be part of the study.
How will you keep my information private?
All the information gathered in this study is strictly confidential except disclosure is
required by law. Nonetheless, the Internal Review Board (IRB) or my co-Investigator may review
research records if deemed necessary. Any information obtained during this research will be
confidential; the real names of participants will not be used. All electronic correspondence,
consent forms, survey results and data analysis will be password-protected, and all printed
material will be locked. All data files will be destroyed 36 months from the conclusion of the
study. You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time or decline to participate. If you
choose to withdraw, any information collected about you will be destroyed at the conclusion of
the study and will not be part of the study.
Participants Signature
Your signature below indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that
the study has been explained to you, that you have been given time to read this document, and
that your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.
Participant’s Name (Printed)……………………………………………………………
(Participant’s Signature)………………………………….. (Date)……………………..
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Appendix E: Interview Participation Consent Letter

MEMORANDUM
To:
From
Date:

Foday Darboe
Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D.,
Center Representative, Institutional Review Board
June 7, 2017

Re:

IRB #: 2017-373; Title, “

A critical analysis of presidential term limits in Africa: A mixed-method case study of
causes of political violence in Burundi”
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level. Based on the
information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB review under
45 CFR 46.101(b) (Exempt Category 2). You may proceed with your study as described to the
IRB. As principal investigator, you must adhere to the following requirements:
1) CONSENT: If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be obtained in such a
manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and the process affords subjects the
opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed answers from those directly involved in the
research, and have sufficient time to consider their participation after they have been
provided this information. The subjects must be given a copy of the signed consent
document, and a copy must be placed in a secure file separate from de-identified participant
information. Record of informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from
the conclusion of the study.
2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The principal investigator is
required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Pei-Fen Li, Ph.D., respectively)
of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop as a result of this study.
Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, injury, depression as a result of
participation in the study, life-threatening situation, death, or loss of
confidentiality/anonymity of subject. Approval may be withdrawn if the problem is serious.
3) AMENDMENTS: Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of subjects,
consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to implementation.
Please be advised that changes in a study may require further review depending on the nature
of the change. Please contact me with any questions regarding amendments or changes to
your study.
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human subjects
prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46) revised June 18,
1991.
Cc:

Ismael Muvingi, Ph.D.
Pei-Fen Li, Ph. D.

